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1 Introduction to the Research 
Russian politics is not an easy subject of research. Double bottoms, shady arrangements, and 
informal schemes are everywhere. Written rules and declarations arguably hold less 
importance than deals we can only guess at. Speculations abound. Conspiracy theories are 
popular, but so are conspiracies.  
The phenomenon I will address under the term of selective law enforcement is part of this 
picture. When a legal issue of political importance is decided upon in court, few take the legal 
reasoning at face value and many leap to alternative explanations. If criminal procedures are 
initiated against a critical journalist, many will expect that he has stepped on the toes of 
somebody powerful within the administration. 
In 2011, I was picked up at my hotel by two straight-faced men in leather jackets. Some long 
hours later, my visa to Russia was cancelled, and I had to leave the country within three days. 
According to officials of the Federal Migration Service (FMS), I had infringed upon the visa-
regime.1 It seemed my internship at a Russian university did not allow me to do research 
independent of my local supervisor’s explicit and documented recommendation.2  
The myths and realities of ulterior motives and hidden politics reproduce themselves. It may 
be only a matter of time before a field observer is caught within the low-trust spiral of official 
explanations.Being in the middle of fieldwork on selective law enforcement in Russia, it was 
only too tempting to interpret the situation in terms of my research. Why was I really asked to 
leave the country? Would migration officials really pick me up at my hotel for suspected 
violations of a law widely known to go unenforced? Why did they ask to have a look around 
in my hotel room before they took me out? How come they knew of my meeting with the 
                                                 
1 Federal’naya Migratsionnaya Sluzhba. I use the transliteration system of the academic journal Europe Asia 
Studies (Taylor & Francis) which is an adaptation of the BGN/PCGN system. Full transcription chart may be 
found at Taylor and Francis’ web pages: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/authors/CEAS-table.pdf, [accessed 
31.07.2013]. I make exceptions for well-known persons (Alexei Navalny, not Aleksei Naval’nyi) and places 
(Nizhniy Novgorod, not Nizhnyi Novgorod) where other transcriptions are clearly more popular. In addition, I 
make exceptions for interviewees to whom I refer whose works have been published under names with Latin 
letters. (Alexander Verkhovsky, not Aleksandr Verkhovskii). 
2 I have not checked the validity of this claim. 
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regional Communist Party leaders the day before? Why did they inquire about my interest in 
the upcoming Duma elections? “You cannot just walk into our country with a sound recorder 
and pose difficult questions without us noticing,” one of the officials told me self-confidently. 
At the same time, he insisted that the only formal problem was the visa. 
This is the environment in which many of the interviewees of this study live. In their meetings 
with state officials, the air can be thick with suggestions. As critics of the establishment, they 
are investigated, raided, interrogated, faced with accusations and charges, and occasionally 
sentenced to serve time in prison. The circumstances smell strongly of political conflict. The 
timing, the targets, and the media debates surrounding the cases all suggest political 
motivations. In unrecorded conversations, state officials may even play with open cards more 
or less. Yet, as one of my interviewees said with a smirk: “They don’t sign anything” (Anon. 
journalist 2010). 
Ulterior motives behind legal acts are difficult to prove, particularly in a law enforcement 
system with a low degree of transparency. The political elements rarely leave prints on the 
official paperwork. The unwritten rules remain unwritten and are rarely articulated. The 
informal background is never quite clear but found in suggestions and signals. The 
interpretation of the conflict is based on common understanding but also on the mutual 
distrust between the actors. When the informal rules of the game are indeed uttered, they can 
only be articulated in the form of subjective interpretation.  
If we are to understand how Russian politics work, the double bottoms cannot simply be 
ignored. The intricate informal schemes behind the scenes complicate our inquiries, limit the 
certainty of our knowledge, and impede our ability to foresee the future. Our knowledge of 
selective law enforcement is correspondingly fuzzy, based on qualified guesswork, 
circumstantial evidence, analysis of incentives, and conversations with those with personal 
knowledge of the informal games. 
The interviewees of this study tell us about how they are subjected to selective harassment by 
state agencies: sometimes a raid, sometimes a formal warning, and sometimes criminal 
proceedings. All the various legal acts, they claim, are just another means of putting pressure 
on them, keeping them preoccupied or scaring them away from oppositional activities. Behind 
the scenes, they identify powerful individuals who are pulling strings, making telephone calls, 
and issuing verbal commands and informal directives.  
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Outside observers from states where legal institutions are in general trusted by their 
population may at times be caught off guard by selective law enforcement. The politically 
correct answer is refreshingly undecided. We may be tempted to ask: Is it better with selective 
law enforcement than no law enforcement at all? 
After the unfortunate meeting with the FMS, I dropped by my office in St. Petersburg to 
collect my belongings for the trip back to Norway. I had a brief conversation with two 
Norwegian colleagues, both with extensive knowledge of Russia and studying for Ph.D. 
degrees in Law. Their immediate reactions are telling. The first one asked me in disbelief why 
I had been so stupid as to go on a research trip without the correct visa. If I did not follow the 
regulations, it was only fair that I should face the consequences. The second student replied 
that he had never cared much himself for his travel documents in Russia; it is common 
knowledge that nobody cares and that violations are everywhere. There had to be something 
about my interviews, he contended. 
A similar ambiguity of arguments also surrounded the first of the two trials against ex-
oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a standard point of reference for anyone interested in 
selective law enforcement in Russia. The argument has been voiced repeatedly that “every 
successful businessman” who made his fortune in the 1990s violated the legal framework in 
some way or another. Strikingly, however, discussants would not always agree whether or not 
this worked in favor of Khodorkovsky. On the one hand, it seemed unreasonable that a few 
should be punished for crimes committed by thousands. Also, if the motivation was indeed to 
block Khodorkovsky’s political ambitions (as many claimed), things were not looking better. 
On the other hand, if every successful businessman violated law, and Khodorkovsky indeed 
was a successful businessman, would that not also imply the guilt of Khodorkovsky? Should 
not an example be made? Should he walk away just because others do? 3 
The official ruling of the European Courts of Human Rights on the case reflects the 
ambiguity, stating that the charges against Khodorkovsky caused “reasonable suspicion” but 
                                                 
3 The media discourse on the Khodorkovsky trials (a.k.a. the Yukos-trials) has later turned towards stressing 
procedural violations and the presumed innocence of Khodorkovsky, rather than simply his political selection. 
This trend became particularly visible after he was sentenced a second time in 2010. The above simplified 
argument based on my personal impressions from the debates in Norway at the time does not really concern 
whether Khodorkovsky was guilty as charged, but whether he was guilty of some white collar crime or another.  
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no “uncontestable proof” of political motivations. Furthermore, the court states that 
“Khodorkovksy’s political opponents or business competitors might have benefited from his 
detention”, but that this “should not have been an obstacle for the authorities to prosecute him 
if there were serious charges against him” (Guardian 2011).  
Alleged selective law enforcement provides us rich opportunities to talk past each other. A 
clear conceptualization is a first step in making sure we agree on what we are talking about 
when discussing selective law enforcement. The question of legal guilt and the issue of 
selective enforcement are separate issues and should thus be discussed separately. A claim 
that somebody has fallen victim to selective law enforcement implies neither that he or she is 
guilty of legal violations nor the opposite. In other words, if political and legally irrelevant 
criteria de facto caused the enforcement of law, no amount of legal guilt may hinder the fact 
that the case was being selectively imposed. Likewise, no extralegal motivations for law 
enforcement will change the facts regarding a possible legal violation. 
In examining the practice of selective law enforcement, Russian politics provide a rich source 
of information. While similar practices take place in many if not most countries (Levitsky and 
Way 2010), they are possibly most strongly associated with the post-Soviet world and with 
Russia in particular. That law in Russia is routinely used as an instrument for ulterior 
purposes has turned into conventional wisdom. Leonard and Popescu (2007, 3) write that 
“Russia’s selective application of the law affects businesses who worry about respect of 
contracts, diplomats who fear breaches of international treaties, human rights activists 
concerned about authoritarianism, and defense establishments who want to avoid military 
tensions.” The legal procedures against the so-called oligarchs in the first years of Putin’s 
presidency (particularly Vladimir Gusinsky, Boris Berezovsky, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky) 
increased the negative international attention to politicized justice and connected the practice 
to Russia. In particular, the asset-stripping of the oil company Yukos and imprisonment of 
Khodorkovsky attracted much attention for a decade. Even today, the cases against the 
oligarchs remain important symbols of Putin’s early years as president and the recentral-
ization of power he headed in the first decade of the century.  
In Putin’s third term of presidency (from 2012), selective law enforcement in Russia is still a 
hot topic internationally. The proceedings against three members of the punk group Pussy 
Riot in 2012 caused international outrage, not least after two of the group members 
(Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Maria Alyokhina) were sentenced to prison. At the time of 
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writing the prominent opposition leader and anti-corruption blogger Alexander Navalny risk 
several years in prison. As a consequence of the sustained attention to alleged legal abuse and 
politicized justice in Russia, laypeople nod in recognition when I tell them the topic of this 
research project – even though many have never heard of the term “selective law 
enforcement” as such. A typical response would be “Oh, in Russia! I am sure you have heaps 
of material to work with then!” 
1.1.1 Why Research Selective Law Enforcement? 
Researching the workings of selective law enforcement in Russian politics is important for 
three reasons at least. First, selective law enforcement is important in itself. Informal politics 
is vital to the governance of Russia, and selective law enforcement is an important aspect of 
today’s repression. Within Russia, the selective application of law for extralegal purposes is 
taken for granted. The cynical instrumentalization of law is a part of the common 
understanding of how things work. It is one of Russia’s open secrets; everybody knows about 
this deviance from the official rules, yet only an exclusive minority is aware of the details 
(Ledeneva 2011b). How the practice has received so little focused attention in academic 
discourse amounts to a small mystery.  
Secondly, selective law enforcement highlights a more fundamental issue of Russian politics 
today – namely how the formal and informal elements of politics interact. These interactions 
have been addressed in many terms – as hybridity, duality, contradictions or tensions –
between the democratic form and authoritarian content, between statism and informal 
networks, between the rule by law and the rule of men. In few practices are these tensions 
more starkly evident than in selective law enforcement 
On a third level, some of the findings and concepts may also be useful in the study of other 
authoritarian regimes marked by many of the same tensions as Russia. As Y.L. Morse (2012, 
189), contended the study of today’s authoritarian regimes needs research “with the explicit 
goal of midrange theory building and concept formation.” Research indicates that the 
authoritarian drift of political regimes reduces research on them in general, and field work in 
particular (Goode 2010). The need to approach the dynamics of these regimes by means of 
qualitative inquiry only grows. I hope this study will make a modest contribution to answering 
this challenge. 
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1.2 The Research Question – Some Introductory Remarks 
Selective law enforcement takes place in countless variations. It can be used to block 
unwanted actions, such as hindering the opposition in registering parties, or hindering 
independent candidates in registering for elections. Alternatively, selective law enforcement 
may take the form of aggressive legalistic attacks, be it selective investigations, administrative 
sanctions, or criminal proceedings. The legal pretext for the acts may be well-founded, 
poorly-founded or more or less unfounded, and the consequences for the victims may vary 
from long prison sentences to the minor irritations brought about by repeated state inspections 
or additional red tape. Correspondingly, selective law enforcement may scare journalists away 
from investigative journalism for good or it may have a softer impact – slowly draining their 
energy, motivation, and available resources. Whatever motivations may be behind the various 
legal acts are complex and diverse. In short, selective law enforcement is inherently chaotic, 
varied, and based on improvisation. No two cases of legal abuse are completely alike. 
True as that may be, I will argue that selective law enforcement exists as a tangible object of 
research, that it takes on specific and observable patterns, and that it fits certain definitions 
that make the concept meaningful. There is a need for an academic concept that provides us 
with a language to discuss selective law enforcement in explicit terms, to uncover how it 
works and ultimately how it may be countered. If its impact is different in every case, there 
are reasons to believe that selective law enforcement in sum contributes to keeping the 
Russian population politically inactive by reinforcing the common conception that activity 
will only bring about troubles. 
This study of selective law enforcement is exploratory. Instead of squeezing additional drops 
of knowledge out of already well-established fields, I try to open a new one. Clearing the 
ground for research to come, I attempt to close in on what selective law enforcement in Russia 
is all about. How can we conceptualize its hybrid existence on the margins of both formal and 
informal politics? How exactly is law enforcement selective? In what arenas does it take 
place? Who does it favor, and who is it directed against? How does it impact Russian politics? 
Can it tell us something about the governance of Russia in general? To approach the long list 
of yet unanswered questions, I ask: 
How does selective law enforcement work in contemporary Russian politics? 
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A broad approach, notwithstanding, I tend to this question with a range of assumptions and 
qualifiers. First of all, selective law enforcement is investigated as a mechanism of repression 
aimed at enforcing informal rules of political conduct through selective legal acts. The study 
investigates this phenomenon primarily as perceived by a number of prosecuted critics in 
Russia. The interviewees’ interpretations of both specific events and the practice in general 
are digested through a theoretically-informed view and synthesized in a comprehensive 
concept that explains how the practice functions in the contemporary Russian context. 
Because motivations and intentions are crucial to what selective law enforcement is, the study 
of it also concerns the question of why. This dissertation grapples with both the purposes of 
selective law enforcement for individual actors, the structural incentives that make this 
strategy seemingly popular in Russia and its ultimate impact in terms of institutionalized 
repression and the reproduction of the authoritarian system. 
The wording of the research question is in need of some further clarifications. 
Firstly, as hinted at by the term selective, the research is concerned with (perceptions of) 
volatile action. In other words, I rule out unconscious bias in the prosecutors’ minds, a topic 
better discussed within social psychology or behavioral science.4 
Secondly, I apply the term law enforcement in the broadest sense, in relation to both criminal 
and administrative proceedings, including all investigative actions that are seen by targets as 
selectively imposed and de facto punitive, such as selective inspections and raids. The 
research concerns any legal acts that (are perceived to) have been initiated informally for 
purposes of political repression. I apply the term broader legal system to encompass all the 
official entities involved in the process. 
Thirdly, while the term selective law enforcement often is used in cases of manipulation for 
economic gain, I am only interested in the enforcement mechanism’s political potential: that 
is, selective law enforcement employed for purposes of enforcing informal rules of political 
                                                 
4 As we know predominantly from U.S. research on social psychology, prosecutors and not least jurors tend to 
routinely discriminate on a range of extra-legal criteria such as race (e.g. Lynch and Haney 2011), social status 
(e.g. Phillips 2009), defendant’s attractiveness (e.g. Stewart 1980; Gunnell and Ceci 2010), or behavior the court 
room (e.g. Antonio 2006). 
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conduct. That being said, it is sometimes hard to draw a line between politics and big business 
in Russia, especially when we talk of fights over political office. 
1.2.1 Other Uses of the Term “Selective Law Enforcement” 
Readers should be aware that some scholars use the term “selective law enforcement” with 
the meaning of policing or prosecution strategies under strained resources (e.g. Kleinig 1998). 
Within such a conception, selective law enforcement may for instance include giving priority 
to the more serious violations (within a legal category) before the less serious ones. A related 
form of selective law non-enforcement is known to take place where the small fish in a 
criminal network may be released on the premise that they become police informants.  
In these accounts, selectivity is a neutral term and does not itself indicate abuse. In a positive 
sense, overly harsh laws may even be compensated for through selective law enforcement: 
“Though theoretically such laws are a trap for the innocent, it is only the real villains who are 
pursued in practice” (Fuller 1958/1977, 78).5 With regard to non-enforcement, it is pertinent 
to note that the police are not only responsible for enforcing law but also for maintaining 
order. These two tasks do not always call for the same actions. For instance, an informal 
warning may on some occasions serve the purpose of law better than the prescribed legal 
procedures. These strategies of policing and prosecution are not selective law enforcement as 
examined in this study, though the background mechanics are not entirely different. 
1.3 Existing Approaches and Academic Context 
Selective law enforcement is a well-known phenomenon. It is commented upon in human 
rights discourse, mass media, and academic research with roughly the same meaning. 
Commentators implicitly condemn the practice on the grounds that the legal reasoning in 
these cases differs sharply from what they see as the real motive for prosecution. The moral 
indignation may presumably stem from a feeling of being lied to, from the illegitimacy of 
what is seen as the real goals, or from a combination of these two aspects. 
Professional researchers on Russian state and society seem to agree that informal or quasi-
formal arrangements are important aspects of Russian politics. Studies of repression and 
                                                 
5 Lon L. Fuller asserted this claim polemically and hardly supported this point of view himself. 
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coercive capabilities confirm that such arrangements are also important for suppressing 
dissenting voices (e.g. Robertson 2011; Taylor 2011; Horvath 2013). In this context, a number 
of works also mention selective law enforcement explicitly (e.g. Gel'man 2004; Karklins 
2005; Barnes 2006; Leonard and Popescu 2007; Azarova 2008; Burger and Holland 2008; 
Meyer 2008; Robertson 2011; Popova 2012). In addition to area-specific approaches, 
comparativists seem to share a similar understanding of selective law enforcement, most 
explicitly Levitsky and Way (2010). A step to the side of political repression, there is also a 
literature on selective instrumentalization of legal tools in the post-Communist Russian 
economy (e.g. Grzymala-Busse 2004; Volkov 2004; Ledeneva 2006b; Yakovlev and 
Zhuravskaya 2009; Firestone 2010). 
Despite a certain degree of acknowledgement, however, selective law enforcement has mostly 
figured in the background of analysis. In this neglected position, the phenomenon is not 
articulated in any uniform way, though the terms “selective enforcement” and “selective law 
enforcement” are both commonly used. The illegitimacy of the practice is often suggested 
implicitly, but the foundation for this condemnation is seldom clarified. The few studies that 
do address selective law enforcement in Russia at some length tend to take recourse to 
circumstantial evidence and journalistic (often English-language) sources. Maybe most 
important for our purposes, these studies lack theoretical ambitions (e.g. Burger and Holland 
2008) for the most part. For this reason, the moderate attention fails to accumulate any 
significant knowledge as to how selective law enforcement works. 
On the one hand, it is hard to see how the underlying ideas in the mentioned literature differ 
from the concept of selective law enforcement that I suggest in this study. On the other hand, 
the existing literature rarely fleshes out the concept to such a degree that conclusions 
regarding its meaning can be firmly established. By using specific idioms in specific contexts, 
commentators obviously intend to bring about certain associations. Yet, readers are often left 
to their own interpretations and have to make inferences from the idioms’ semantics and the 
referential environment. In short, the authors make little attempt to fix the fluid associations 
into a harder scientific concept that can be used in systematic research. As it seems, most 
authors have been content with using the “elephant definition” when discussing selective law 
enforcement: something which is hard to describe, but becomes instantly recognizable when 
spotted. However, as some credit Bertrand Russell for saying: “Everything is vague to a 
degree you do not realize till you have tried to make it precise.” 
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1.3.1 Selective Prosecution in the U.S. Tradition 
Selective law enforcement should be differentiated from the U.S. legal concept of selective 
prosecution, on which there is a considerable literature. While the origin and legal focus of 
selective prosecution are very different from selective law enforcement as employed to 
describe a phenomenon in Russian politics, the two terms share some important 
characteristics that will be discussed below. 
Selective prosecution is, in the U.S. legal context, defined by three traits, namely “arbitrary 
classification,” “disproportionate impact,” and “discriminatory purpose” (Gershman 2008, 
25). Its legal history began in 1886, when the Supreme Court of the U.S. ruled that 
“discriminatory enforcement of the law can violate the Equal Protection Clause” (Kvurt 2007, 
142, fn. 74). In 1962 it was established that conscious selectivity in enforcement is not in 
itself a violation as long as the selection is not based upon “an unjustifiable standard such as 
race, religion, or other arbitrary classifications” (Gershman 2008, 25). Unless legally relevant, 
political views also qualifies as an “unjustifiable standard,” and some studies on selective 
prosecution deal with political profiling specifically (e.g. Lawson-Remer 2009). Secondly, to 
qualify as selective prosecution, the law in question must not in general be enforced against 
“other persons who are similarly situated or equally culpable” (Gershman 2008, 25). There 
must, in other words, be a double standard of enforcement involved. Finally, the selection 
must be “consciously and deliberately made.” Not least for this reason, selective prosecution 
is usually hard to prove in a court of law. 
Robert H. Jackson’s6 (1940, 19) warning about the potential abuse of prosecutorial discretion 
in the United States is strikingly relevant for selective law enforcement in today’s Russia: 
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can choose his 
defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he will pick 
people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prose-
cuted ... It is here that law enforcement becomes personal, and the real crime 
becomes that of being unpopular with the predominant or governing group, being 
attached to the wrong political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the 
way of the prosecutor himself. 
                                                 
6 Jackson was Attorney General of the United States (1940-1941) and later Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court (1941-1954).  He is also well known for his role as Chief Prosecutor at the Nurnberg Trials following the 
Second World War.  
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Inspired by Jackson (“the most able lawyer and writer ever to have served on the Supreme 
Court”), Bennett L. Gershman (2008, 2) has written extensively on prosecutorial misconduct 
over the last decades. In 2008 he directed sharp criticism against the George W. Bush 
administration (2000-2008). Not only does Gershman criticize the extra-constitutional 
treatment of supposed suspects in the war against terror, but he also observes a trend of 
selective prosecution against “prominent, strategically placed, or outspoken Democrats.” The 
quantitative studies of Donald Shields (2010) found this apparent bias under the Bush regime 
to be significant and systematic, though the quantitative analysis could certainly not tell much 
about any conscious motivations in this regard. The parallel to legal abuse in Russia will 
become clear in the course of this dissertation. 
The Russian constitution guarantees equality before the law (article 19), but Russian law has 
no legal concepts to deal specifically with political prosecution. One researcher who has 
attempted to directly apply the legal concept of selective prosecution to Russian realities is 
Yelina Kvurt (2007). Kvurt uses the first case against Mikhail Khodorkovsky in particular as 
a point of departure to discuss the possibility of introducing a similar legal concept to Russia. 
She concludes that there are no formal barriers to hinder the introduction of such a legal 
concept and also that Khodorkovsky would possibly have been “saved” if Russia indeed had 
one.7 There are however serious problems with Kvurt’s article.8 With regard to the approach 
itself, one may question whether her analysis based on a form of “hypothetical adjudication” 
(if Khodorkovsky had been an American citizen, then…) is meaningful, not least granted the 
                                                 
7 According to Kvurt (2007), Russians that claim to have been selected tend to contest the substantive claims or 
legal procedure instead of referring to their Constitutional Rights. Appeals to Constitutional Rights and claims 
of political persecution are in actual adjudication most often ignored.  This point is also observed by Peter H. 
Solomon Jr. (2008b, 227). 
8 Kvurt’s (2007) sources on Russian events are few and seem somewhat arbitrary. The only cases mentioned are 
the famous cases against Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky, and Berezovsky, and Kvurt is obviously unaware of how 
common claims to selectivity are in Russia. Furthermore, she mixes the question of selectivity in enforcement 
with the presumed innocence of Khodorkovsky (2007, 149) and arguably also the issue of repression of political 
dissent with a poor protection of property rights (2007, 167). Kvurt concludes that Russia should adopt a 
“totality of the circumstances standard” in reviewing cases of possible selective prosecution (ibid). For reasons of 
formalistic traditions and a massive problem with informal influence upon politicized cases, however, such an 
approach is hardly plausible. Finally, seemingly based on the prosecution of the three oligarchs mentioned, Kvurt 
(2007, 133) leaps to the conclusion that “almost all those targeted by Putin’s regime have been Jewish.” In 
addition to being plainly wrong, this also obfuscates selective law enforcement’s role in political repression. 
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huge differences between both the legal systems and the societies they are supposed to 
regulate. Also, a hypothetical adjudication would in most cases be practically impossible, 
considering the lack of firm information available to the “hypothetical judges.” Kvurt’s 
analysis of the possibilities of introducing the concept of selective prosecution to Russian law 
also becomes rather irrelevant when not taking into account the lack of incentives for Russian 
authorities to remove one of their own favorite tools of repression. 
A significant weakness of any legal approach to selective law enforcement is arguably its self-
imposed disciplinarian boundaries. My own study of selective law enforcement is concerned 
with its social and political significance – a significance that greatly exceeds its legal 
relevance. If we take the strict demand of the U.S. legal concept as a point of departure, only a 
small proportion of cases could presumably be legally proved in court. As a part of the social 
reality of Russians, however, the question is much more important than these few cases would 
indicate. In addition, a legal approach to selective law enforcement may presumably fail to 
see how the practice by definition is native to the twilight zone between legal and illegal 
practices. Selective law enforcement indeed illustrates some of the problems with making law 
the ultimate concept of what is right or important. Being aware of how ambiguities created by 
the legal system may be exploited provides a first step to understanding what selective law 
enforcement is and thus also why it is.  
That being said, the U.S. legal concept is relevant to the conceptualization of selective law 
enforcement in Russia. Notably, Gershman’s three defining traits of selective prosecution bear 
resemblance to my own conceptual components of selective law enforcement. Like selective 
law enforcement, selective prosecution concerns the instrumental aspect of the abuse, namely 
the conscious selection (“discriminatory purpose”). Selective prosecution also heeds the 
relative aspect of selective legal abuse – it is defined in part by the corresponding non-
enforcement of legally similar cases (“disproportionate impact”). Finally, selective 
prosecution and selective law enforcement both imply that the selection is made on a legally 
irrelevant basis (“arbitrary classification”). With regard to the research of Gershman (2008, 
18) and Shield (2010, 36), the focus on indirect outcomes (prosecution for “shame and blame” 
purposes) instead of legal sanctions also bears an interesting similarity to my own research. 
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The nature of this “indirect punishment,” however, seems to be qualitatively different in the 
U.S. and Russia.9 
Gershman’s research is part of a rich tradition of studies critical of doctrinal understandings of 
law and legality, not least in the United States, where the movement of Legal Realism already 
set a radical agenda in the 1930s (introduction in Schauer 2011).10 Relevant background 
literature with regard to this critical tradition includes works related to the school of Critical 
Legal Studies (CLS) (review in Ward 2004) as well as less dramatic socio-legal approaches 
(see Macaulay et al. 2007). Few if any have emphasized so strongly the irrelevance of legal 
texts and the importance of external criteria in law enforcement as did writers like Jerome 
Frank and Karl Llewellyn, important figures within the movement of Legal Realism.  
Most critical approaches to law and legality mentioned above fixate on the problems of 
legality in democracies in order to criticize orthodox concepts of legality as such. By 
investigating the strongest link of democratic legality, they question its supposed insulation 
from moral and political discourse. Indeed, the generality of their critical claims is arguably 
why the approaches are considered radical in the first place.  
My interest is on the side of this tradition. First, I am interested in selective law enforcement 
in its relation to informal governance and modern authoritarianism. As noted by Moustafa and 
Ginsburg (2008a), the mainstream assumption in the study of authoritarian regimes is not that 
the legal system is independent of politics. On the contrary, many (wrongfully) assume that 
courts under authoritarian regimes in every way are fully subordinate to the political regime in 
power. Second, I do not seek to deconstruct legality as such but to explore notions of its abuse 
in a few select cases. Indeed, because selective law enforcement is in part defined relatively to 
non-enforcement, we need to examine what separates the two. 
                                                 
9 In short, the obvious selectivity in enforcement combined with the Russians’ nihilism reduces any function of 
“shame and blame.” Russians rather complain about how much time and resources they spend on dealing with all 
the formalities associated with legal charges. In addition, society may shun the prosecuted individual or 
organization, not because of their supposed legal violations but because the prosecution signals that they are in a 
problematic relationship with the authorities. See section 8.1.3 for a discussion. 
10 The legal realists were not “realists” in the typical sense of the word, but a group of radical critics that tried to 
challenge the doctrines of classical legal thought. The “realism” in legal realism may connect to the movement’s 
strong emphasis on empirical studies to (in)validate the presumptions of how legal systems work.  
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Crucial aspects of selective law enforcement as a social and political phenomenon will not 
necessarily be revealed through legal analysis. Yet, I will also argue that we need to take law 
into greater consideration than a fixation on power and repression alone. In this regard, my 
research is integrationist, at times drawing on literature and perspectives from the study of law 
in my analysis.  
1.3.2 Darden’s Blackmail State 
A perspective on selective law enforcement that varies greatly from the legal approach is 
found in a study by Keith Darden (2001) and related works by the same (Darden 2008) and 
the Ukrainian researcher Mykola Riabchuk (2004; 2009a; 2009b). Together these works make 
for a rare example of theorizing legal abuse in its post-Soviet political setting. 
Darden’s analysis is based on very specific material: the so-called Melnychenko-tapes –
recordings taken in secret from the office of former President in Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma 
(1994-2005).11 The tapes reveal how president Kuchma actively exploited the pervasive 
corruption in the country to keep his administration loyal. Instead of cracking down on 
corrupt deals, Kuchma’s administration stored compromising material and used the threat of 
selective enforcement to blackmail subordinates into obedience. Actual prosecution, notes 
Darden (2008, 47), “appears to have been rare and selective – limited to cases of disobedience 
or political disloyalty.” While similar phenomena exist in many places, Darden (2001, 70) 
contends that post-Soviet states are different because of the “extent to which blackmail and 
the collection of kompromat is widespread, systematic, and conducted by the state itself.”12 
What I perhaps find most striking with the examples Darden draws upon, however, is how 
straightforward, personal, and explicit Kuchma was at times in his blackmailing. For my 
                                                 
11 The recordings were taped and smuggled out of the country by a bodyguard-turned-dissident after whom the 
tapes are named. 
12 Kompromat can at the same can time designate both compromising material and the informal practice of 
using it in various schemes. After this material has been collected, it can be “stored, traded, or used strategically” 
(Ledeneva 2006b, 58). Kompromat is usually personalized, destroying or weakening the target it is directed 
against. As the threat of punishment tends to suffice, kompromat is most often stored and used for blackmailing. 
While Darden (2001) uses the term with legal connotations, the term usually refers to non-compliance with 
social norms. These norms may or may not be reflected in legal rules, but the compromising material is often too 
speculative and unsubstantiated to be suited for court. Thus the main threat posed by kompromat is usually social 
ostracism. See esp. Chapter 3 in Ledeneva 2006b. 
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purposes, the material most importantly constitutes a rare piece of hard evidence that selective 
law enforcement is not just an academic construct or a speculative narrative used by critics.  
While the similarities are evident, the differences between Darden’s study and my own 
concept of selective law enforcement in Russia are considerable. Where Darden focuses 
primarily on non-enforcement as seen from above, I focus on actual enforcement seen from 
below. Second, Darden focuses on building cohesion within the state administration, while I 
focus on coercion against outsiders. Darden (2001, 68) concludes that the “blackmail state” is 
founded on “the troika of corruption, surveillance, and blackmail.” My study, however, 
indicates that a regime of surveillance is not necessary for such a mechanism to work. Rather, 
I show how unclear or overly burdensome laws in themselves provide a catch all mechanism 
in which everyone is in danger of prosecution. Also, my study suggests that Kuchma’s 
explicit blackmailing may not be representative of today’s Russia. While political blackmail 
does take place under Putinism, the threat of selective law enforcement is just as importantly 
communicated by political signals lubricated by a general expectation of politicized law 
enforcement among the potential targets. 
1.3.3 Ledeneva – Informal Practices and Sistema 
The works of Alena Ledeneva deserve a separate review due to their topic, impact, and 
special cross-disciplinary approach. With her area-oriented approaches and insider 
perspectives, Ledeneva is widely recognized as the foremost academic expert on informal 
practices in Russia. By an approach that may be called socio-ethnographical, she uses Russian 
colloquial terms as a point of departure for interpreting and elaborating on her own interview 
material from repeated field trips. The focus, especially in her early works (1998; 2001; 
2006b), is oriented towards the informal economy as a product of the players’ strategies to 
cope with the incoherent rules of the game. From this position, Ledeneva rarely touches upon 
the issue of political repression. 
Ledeneva shows little interest in selective law enforcement as an independent phenomenon. 
She (2006a, 47-48) mentions the term briefly as one way of using adminsitrative resources 
(see section 3.3.1), but only through an example. In a later survey she (2011c) suggests that 
selective law enforcement takes place when the “opening and closing of cases” – or 
alternatively “court decisions” – are “influenced by the status of the opponent.” 
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Unfortunately, this tentative definition leaves us little the wiser.13 Neither the degree nor the 
form of influence is addressed, and the concious selection is not made explicit except in the 
term itself. Also, we do not get to know what may hide behind the vague phrase “status of the 
opponent.”  
Although she does not deal extensively with selective law enforcement as a separate practice, 
Ledeneva remains highly relevant to our understanding of these issues. In her account, the 
instrumentalization and selective use of formal rules are important for most or all of the 
practices she investigates (see esp. 2006b). For Ledeneva, the informal practices are largely a 
coping strategy for players to bridge the contradictory demands of formal rules and informal 
norms. She would possibly contend that selective law enforcement is an element of most or all 
of these practices, and I would not deny her that point.  
A reader of Ledeneva should be aware that her conceptualization of “unwritten rules” differs 
from my own “informal rules.” For her, unwritten rules are not rules in a conventional sense, 
but rather another word for “informal practices” – a “know-how needed to ‘navigate’ between 
formal and informal sets of constraints” (2011b, 722).14 In this she differs from my more 
conventional notion of informal rules as analogous to formal rules with corresponding 
attributes of being enforceable, promulgated, and (not) complied with in a similar sense as 
formal rules. While Ledeneva operates with a down-up perspective in all her research, I 
approach the informal rules as enforced top-down by an authoritarian regime. 
Ledeneva agrees with Darden that informal practices exist everywhere, but that they are 
especially prominent in the post-Soviet world. She does not address extended surveillance as 
a factor (as does Darden), but links the prevalence of informal practices in Russia to two 
fundamental “sets of factors”: legacies of informal norms and practices, on the one hand, and 
a consistently weak legal framework on the other (2006b, 22-27). My own findings largely 
                                                 
13 Ledeneva does not attempt to provide a firm definition, but rather sketches out the rough meaning of the term 
for use in a survey. 
14 Ledeneva’s use of the term informal or unwritten rules may be confusing. While she uses the term actively in 
2001 (Unwritten Rules. How Russia Really Works), she reconsiders its applicability in 2006 (14-22) and explicitly 
abandons it as a “trap conceptually and a dead end empirically.” Instead, she skillfully develops a concept of 
informal practices. Later, however, Ledeneva (e.g 2011b) again turns to an idea of unwritten rules in the same 
“navigational” sense as she termed informal practices in 2006.  
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support this interpretation, and I also adopt parts of Ledeneva’s (2006b, 12-13) conceptual-
ization of how weak legal rules are related to informal practices.  
Though informal practices are a coping strategy when formal solutions fail, the incoherent 
rules of the game also create possibilities for short-term exploitation. Ledeneva (2011b, 722) 
notes how skilled and powerful actors may play upon the “enabling aspects” of both formal 
and informal constraints. On a few occasions, she (e.g. 2006b, 193) touches upon their 
repressive potential, for instance when she notes that the “informal practices also serve the 
needs of the political regime by undermining the principles of free and fair elections, 
independent media, and the rule of law.” 
Since Ledeneva did the fieldwork to her 2006 book, the consolidation of power under Putin 
has increased the repressive potential of the practice. The consolidation of power under 
Putin’s two first terms as president involved a centralization of influence over legal actors 
(Petrov 2011), and the control over the enabling aspects of incoherent rules was consolidated 
accordingly. In a system in which “inequality before the law is taken for granted” (Ledeneva 
2013, 31), the power networks that influence legal implementation now have much room for 
maneuvering. I agree with Ledeneva’s (2013, 15) point that Russia in all its vastness and 
complexities cannot be “managed” to more than a limited degree, especially not by its current 
quasi-modern form of organization. Yet, that fact does not exclude the reality that the 
informal rules and political agendas are being gradually stabilized and internalized by relevant 
actors. Putin’s sistema – the sum of formal and informal rules and practices – has gradually 
“matured.” Whereas it was earlier marked by manual control, it is now more of “an 
anonymous and seemingly automatic regime” (Ledeneva 2013, 31). The political guidelines 
for selective law enforcement have gradually become more internalized by regime insiders, 
law enforcement officials, and other social actors in Russia, something well documented in 
Ledeneva’s later works (e.g. 2011a, 2013). 
1.3.4 Levitsky and Way – The Interactionist Approach 
Finally, there also exists an approach to selective law enforcement focused on hybridity and 
repression. In a mixed methods comparative political science project concerned with 
identifying and delimitating “competitive authoritarian regimes,” Steven Levitsky and Lucan 
Way (2010, 26-28) describe selective law enforcement with regard to its coercive and hybrid 
(in terms of formal/informal) qualities: 
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Competitive authoritarian governments also employ informal mechanisms of repres-
sion. For example, many of them use “legal” repression, or the discretionary use of 
legal instruments – such as tax authorities and libel laws – to target opposition and 
the media. Although such repression is formal in the sense that it entails the (often 
technically correct) application of the law, it is an informal institution in that 
enforcement is widely known to be selective. 
Few readers of Levitsky and Way will linger for long on these sentences. Yet, this short 
account seems to constitute perhaps the most condensed and explicit academic conceptual-
ization of selective law enforcement as an independent phenomenon in authoritarian context 
to date.15 Levitsky and Way point to several essential characteristics of the phenomenon 
missed out by the approaches reviewed above. 
First, Levitsky and Way approach selective law enforcement as a form of institutionalized 
repression and link it to regime politics. This approach is similar to the one I advance and 
contrasts for instance with works by Alena Ledeneva (esp. 1998; 2001; 2006b) which focus 
less on repression and more on social relations, reciprocity, and the “economy of favors.”  
Levitsky and Way also open the door to discussions of selective law enforcement in relation 
to regime hybridity in general. The two comparativists are concerned with how the 
international environment after the Cold War created incentives to maintain formal 
democracy and employ “hidden” forms of repression: “The coexistence of meaningful 
democratic institutions and authoritarian incumbents creates distinctive opportunities and 
constraints for actors, which – in important areas of political life – generate distinct patterns 
of political behaviour” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 27). Undeniably, selective law enforcement 
is a part of this pattern.  
Levitsky and Way link the practice of selective law enforcement directly to incentives created 
by the international situation. Selective law enforcement, they claim, “can be presented to the 
world as enforcement of the rule of law rather than repression.”16 While nobody can deny that 
authoritarian leaders present the repression in any way they want, it is worth noting that 
neither Western nor Russian actors seem to believe in such representations (see e.g. Levada 
2010; 2012). While the importance to the international environment for Russia to end up with 
                                                 
15 Excluding my own pilot project (Bækken 2009). 
16 At different levels of explicitness, this is a common claim, see for example, Furman (2007) or Riabchuk 
(2009b). For a more comprehensive analysis of “façade” elements in Russian politics, see Wilson (2005). 
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formally democratic institutions after the Cold War hardly can be exaggerated, my research 
finds that its impact upon selective law enforcement is more complex and indirect than 
Levitsky and Way suggest. 
Levitsky and Way show some willingness to approach the peculiar hybrid characteristics of 
the phenomenon – holding it to be formal and informal in different “senses.” Their concept 
also hints at a two-phase structure in which the initial selection is informal, while the resulting 
legal procedures may still be correct from a formal point of view. Considering Levitsky’s 
interests in institutional interactions, however, it is somewhat surprising that this issue is 
largely left untouched beyond this point. Instead of confronting the interesting implications 
for Helmke and Levitsky’s (2004) model of institutional interaction, they do not discuss the 
hybridity of the phenomenon any further. Instead, they dump it in a large conceptual sack 
together with all sorts of extralegal practices used by authoritarian incumbents. 
My own approach to selective law enforcement is in some respects close to the one suggested 
by Levitsky and Way, though at a very different level of detail. In contrast to them, I actively 
challenge the reduction of selective law enforcement to a façade. I also take the hybrid 
characteristics of selective law enforcement into more consistent consideration and grapple 
with the conceptual problems this hybridity stirs up. My most important novelty in this regard 
is possibly the integration with a rule enforcement perspective that not least brings deterrence 
theory into the discussion. 
1.3.5  Hybridity and Interactions in Authoritarian Politics 
While the practice of selective law enforcement has received limited theoretical attention, the 
hybridity and tensions of modern authoritarianism that it reflects have been discussed at 
length. A significant literature discusses modern authoritarianism in terms of interactions of 
opposites – be it between the formal and the informal, democracy and authoritarianism, state 
and regime, clientelism and statism, patrimonial or rational-legal legitimacy or between the 
rule of law and the rule of men. These debates are directly relevant to my discussion of 
selective law enforcement. Conversely, selective law enforcement is directly relevant to these 
debates. 
Many of the works are comparative macro-scale analyses of interactions on regime level, 
looking at interactions of formal and informal elements as a key element of contemporary 
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authoritarian politics. An emphasis on political hybridity in contemporary authoritarian 
regimes has been especially common in the classification of regime types, not least as 
reflected in the discussion of various “democracies with adjectives” (Collier and Levitsky 
1997), “grey-zone” (Carothers 2002) or “hybrid” regimes (e.g. Diamond 2002) and also in 
studies of informal networks within the state structures (Wedel 2005, Kononenko and Moshes 
2011) or neopatrimonial forms of governance (see below). Since the end of the optimistic 
focus on democratization of the post-Soviet area in the 1990s (Carothers 2002),17 many 
writers on Russia and other contemporary authoritarian regimes have turned to “authoritar-
ianism with adjectives” (such as "electoral authoritarianism" in Schedler 2006, and 
"competitive authoritarianism" in Levitsky and Way 2002), extending the tradition of Juan J. 
Linz (see Linz 2000). In addition, works focused on contemporary Russia deal extensively 
with how informal elements of governance relate to the formal rules and institutions (e.g. 
Sakwa 2008; 2011, Kononenko and Moshes 2011; Mendras 2012; Robinson 2012). 
Neopatrimonialism 
As it seems, contemporary authoritarian rule has spurred researchers to seek new terms to 
help them extend or renew the discussions on authoritarianism by trying to account for the 
blurring between the state and its rulers and between the private and public sphere. 
Neopatrimonialism, a neo-Weberian term often associated with Guenther Roth (1968), 
became part of the solution. The rhetorical emphasis under Putin on the “strong state” and a 
“strong leader” may have contributed to an increasing popularity in also applying the term to 
                                                 
17 The so-called transition-debates provided a short, but hefty interim in the studies of Communist and post-
Communist countries (though the debates also concerned other areas). When the Cold War world order 
collapsed, policy-makers were eager to fill the vacuum left not least by Soviet power. Following seminal works by 
among others, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986) and Samuel Huntington (1991), 
academics, too, became part of these efforts to make the “democratization” of new and old states as smooth as 
possible. In retrospect, the political efforts were characterized by Levitsky and Way (2010, 19) as superficial, 
selective, and inconsistent. After Thomas Carothers (2002) declared a death sentence on the “transition 
paradigm,” the academic relevance of the concept has diminished. That said, it is still not uncommon to measure 
authoritarian regimes in terms of what they are not and keep democracy as an implicit or explicit yardstick for 
their performance, which in a way reproduces one of the fallacies of transitology. However, an increasing number 
of scholars underscore the need to look beyond normative categories to see how these regimes  “really work,” a 
phrase which has become a new mantra in the research on authoritarianism (e.g. Ledeneva 2001; 2006; 
Moustafa and Ginsburg 2008; Kononenko and Moshes 2008; Magloni 2008; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009).  
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Russian realities (Whitmore 2010; Hanson 2011; review in Robinson 2012). There seems to 
be a general consensus that neopatrimonialism as a concept attempts to deal with political 
systems that mix a rational-legal bureaucratization with some elements of informal 
(traditional, personal) rule. The consensus, however, ends there (reviews in Erdmann and 
Engel 2007; Pitcher et al. 2009; Guliyev 2011). In particular, it is unclear how the term relates 
to Weber’s original concept of herrschaft.  
An interesting contribution to the debate on neopatrimonialism as a concept is Farid Guliyev’s 
2011 article in Democratization. Guliyev finds it valuable to contrast a Weberian dimension 
of governance, what he calls state authority structure, with the Dahlian dimension of access 
to power – what we often discuss in the dichotomous terms of democracy and autocracy. 
While selective law enforcement to some degree relates to the access to power, it is primarily 
concerned with the exercise of power. In other words, it concerns the Weberian dimension of 
governance more than the Dahlian. In Guliyev’s typology, Russia’s form of structure would 
arguably qualify as “institutional patronage” with an “institutional ruler” and a “neo-
patrimonial administration.” 
Guliyev’s exploration of political hybridity with regard to its state authority structure provides 
an interesting supplement to the common regime type typologies with strong focus on the 
Dahlian dimension of access to power. For purposes of understanding Putinism, however, his 
approach remains insufficiently sensitive to the selectivity and exceptionalism in Putinism – 
the state bureaucracy is in a sense switched to “paternal mode” only on political demand. It is 
the control over this switch that provides for a deterrence-based reinforcement of the informal 
rules of political conduct that we can see in today’s Russia. Furthermore, while some reviews 
(Erdmann and Engel 2007; Robinson 2012) claim that neopatrimonialism takes the form of 
conflictive modes of organization, they do not account in full for the apparent element of 
mockery in the formal institutional setup. In Russia and elsewhere, the difference between the 
formal setup and its actual practices is known to be vast.  
Façade Politics 
Other scholars do take the mock elements of these institutions seriously. In fact, some have 
gone as far as suggesting that formal institutions, not least in post-Soviet Ukraine and Russia, 
were mere fakes to please or fool observers  
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Already in the 1990s, Ken Jowitt (1996) pointed to the emerging mimic democracies in the 
former Soviet Union. Some years later, several others followed the same conceptual path (e.g. 
Wilson 2001; 2005; Furman 2007; Meyer 2008; Riabchuk 2009a). In Dmitri Furman’s (2007) 
terms, Russia became a “counterfeit” or “imitation democracy,” and its constitution a “fig-
leaf.” Mykola Riabchuk (2009a) called the system a Potemkin democracy – referring to the 
fake villages that according to popular myth were constructed at the request of the legendary 
Russian statesman Grigorii Potemkin to impress Empress Catherine the Great. Andrew 
Wilson (2005) has called democracy in Russia “fake,” often instrumentalized for private gain. 
Rather dramatically, he suggests that a major part of post-Soviet politics is put on stage by a 
professional class of “political technologists,” experts in “faking democracy.” In Wilson’s 
(2005, 47) words: “Politics is ‘virtual’ or ‘theatrical’ in the sense that so many aspects of 
public performance are purely epiphenomenal or instrumental, existing only for effect or to 
disguise the real substance of ‘inner politics.’” 
Many of these interpretations suggest that that there is a strong element of deception in 
Russian politics. Furman (2007, 14) is less compromising than most: “Were it not for the self-
deceit on the part of society and the deception practiced by those in power,” he states, “such 
systems could provide no justification for their own existence.” Scholars often link these 
elements of deception in Russian politics to the international context and in particular to the 
post-Cold War environment (Meyer 2008; Riabchuk 2009a). Through a formalistic and 
superficial approach to democratization, “the international environment created incentives for 
incumbents to employ informal mechanisms of coercion and control while maintaining the 
formal architecture of democracy” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 27). 
The practice of selective law enforcement found in Russia may be seen to fit well within such 
an understanding of Russian conduct: If you look closer, it shows all the nastiness of a cynical 
power struggle, but on the outside it is glossed with legal coating to dazzle observers. 
Selective law enforcement must in this line of thought be understood primarily as a legal 
façade, more so than a particularity democratic one. Internationally, the “rule of law” is a 
slogan in the same league as “democracy,” “good governance,” and “free election.” It has 
been an important part of the Zeitgeist of the post-Cold War international environment, and a 
key phrase for opening diplomatic doors. The argument would imply that the rationale of 
using quasi-legal form of repression instead of others would be its “legal veneer,” as Levitsky 
and Way (2010, 28) call it. 
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However conceptually intriguing the façade interpretation of Russian politics and selective 
law enforcement may be, my research strongly indicates that quasi-legality in Russia has not 
been primarily about deceptions. Instead of sticking to a mode of explanation that only takes 
half the story into account, we should develop more sophisticated analyses. 
Legality and Authoritarianism 
In addition to the various approaches to political hybridity, one should mention some 
interesting studies of law and courts in authoritarian regimes (a collection is published in 
Moustafa and Ginsburg 2008b). These studies provide a welcome correction to the 
simplification that legal autonomy is possible only in democracies. In principle, legal 
institutions in any regime type may be empowered to extract the benefits of their autonomy, 
such as increased foreign investments and better control with corrupt state agents. In the 
words of Moustafa and Ginsburg (2008a, 8), limited legal autonomy makes sense “in an 
astonishing array of circumstances.” At the same time, the authoritarian regimes in various 
ways attempt to minimize the loss of political control this may imply (Moustafa and Ginsburg 
2008a).  
I attempt to link this legal dualism with the political dualism (or hybridity) noted above. In 
doing this, I relate to Fraenkel’s (1941) theory of the Dual State and to adaptations of this 
model made by Robert Sharlet (1977), Kathryn Hendley (e.g. 2007) and Richard Sakwa 
(2011).  
Institutional Interactions 
The hybridity and interactions between informal and formal elements are also found on the 
theoretical level of institutional interactions. Many authors writing on these issues are largely 
concerned with typologies (e.g. Pejovich 1999; Grzymala-Busse 2004; Helmke and Levitsky 
2004; Lauth 2004b; Stefes 2006). The hybridity of selective law enforcement, however, poses 
a problem to the existing typologies of institutional interaction and also to the mainstream 
conceptualization of formal and informal institutions as being separate. In short, these 
conceptualizations seem unable to incorporate a notion of enforcing informal rules by means 
of formal enforcement procedures. 
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Kerstin Zimmer (2008) observed some of the same problems in her studies of Ukraine. After 
criticizing normative concepts and existing typologies, she concludes that the boundaries 
between formal and informal rules in Ukraine were “blurred.” This is reminiscent of Thomas 
Carothers’ (2002) aforementioned “grey zone” between democracy and autocracy. The 
critique of existing dichotomies and typologies is meaningful and important. Yet, to identify a 
“blur” does not provide us with any useful basis for building academic concepts to be used in 
systematic inquiry. To conceptualize a complex phenomenon as essentially “foggy” would 
make it impossible to break it down into its conceptual components. By the same token, it 
would be meaningful and true to say that the Russian press is “partially free.” An 
interactionist approach, however, would try to examine how it is free and how it is not free 
and look at how these two elements interrelate. Instead of jettisoning the dichotomy of formal 
and informal, I use it explicitly to highlight and disentangle the apparent dissonance it creates 
in analyses of Russia.  
In sum, the broad category of interactionist literature has had an important impact on the 
present work. An area expert’s first commandment, however, is to be sensitive to area-
specific peculiarities. The interview material is therefore interpreted with reference to area-
specific literature on legal and political culture as well. This literature provides a 
counterweight to the integrationist approaches and anchors them to local realities. In this 
regard, I relate most closely to works by Hendley (2007; 2009; 2010; 2012c), Ledeneva 
(2006b; 2013) and Marina Kurkchiyan (2003; 2005; 2011).  
1.4 Structure 
I present my research in nine chapters and a conclusion. This first chapter introduces the 
readers to the study and the most directly relevant literature. The second chapter discusses the 
methods and premises of the study. Here, I present my qualitative and interview-based 
research project and my ambitions to build an academic concept of selective law enforcement. 
I present the case-selection process and discuss the status of the interview data. Not least I 
consider how and to what degree obviously subjective and one-sided perceptions of a 
phenomenon may lay the basis for sound research. I address the process of theorizing upon 
these data, relating them to a specific idea of an academic concept and to a methodology of 
concept development. 
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In the third chapter, I deal with some central aspects of the country of inquiry. In this part I 
briefly present some key elements of Russian legal culture and their impact on governance 
and repression in Putinist russia.  In the final part of this chapter, I also present some Russian 
colloquial terms to illustrate the relations between power and legality in the country. While 
this chapter may not contain many novel perspectives for experts on Russian society, the 
extraordinary role of law in Russia is a crucial backdrop to selective law enforcement. At the 
end of the day, it will be hard to fully understand quasi-legal practices in Russia without this 
backdrop in mind. 
The fourth chapter is at the heart of the analysis and presents what I call the analytical level of 
my concept of selective law enforcement. In this chapter, I come up with a suggestion 
regarding how selective law enforcement can be understood as a hybrid mechanism of rule 
enforcement. This perspective has a relatively bad fit with some of the more common 
understandings of separated formal and informal institutions, but I will argue that it has much 
to be said for itself. Indeed, the resistance of selective law enforcement to be grasped within 
common dichotomies should be paid extra attention because it may very well be an important 
part of why the practice has become a popular means of repression in the first place. 
Chapters 5-8 present evidence for the claims I make in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 introduces the 
three examined legal issue areas to present cases of alleged selective law enforcement with 
particular stress on how the legal rules have been utilized. Chapter 6 continues this discussion 
by synthesizing the findings to explore what exactly the role of law is in selective law 
enforcement, and what characterizes the laws most frequently used in the mechanism. 
Chapter 7 has a stronger focus on the stories of the interviewees. In this chapter, I present 
their perceptions of the quasi-legal schemes they see themselves as subjected to. The chapter 
explores the non-official circumstances of selective law enforcement by lending an ear to 
players who have found themselves in the middle of them. 
Chapter 8 ends this part of the dissertation by dealing with the impact and consequences of 
selective law enforcement. The first part of the chapter deals directly with the statements of 
the interviewees on how the selective use of law impacts their work and their environment. 
Towards the end of the chapter, I again move up on the ladder of abstraction to explore how 
selective law enforcement become institutionalized and serve to reinforce the current regime. 
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Chapter 9, and the last of the ordinary chapters, adds another level of analysis to the research. 
In this chapter, I attempt to integrate my findings about selective law enforcement with a 
perspective on Russian politics in general. As a point of departure for this analysis I use the 
model of the Dual State, originally formulated by Fraenkel (1941) but more recently 
associated with Hendley (e.g. 2007) and Sakwa (2011). Extending on their work, I propose an 
instrumental model to how contradictive formal and informal rules may serve to a political 
regime’s benefit. I also suggest that selective law enforcement in Russia has become a way to 
organize political and legal exceptionalism in a state of institutional tension. 
Towards the end of the dissertation, I conclude my research and restate some of my more 
fundamental findings about what selective law enforcement is and how it works in Russia.  
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2 Researching Selective Law Enforcement – 
On Methodology 
2.1 Data and Case Selection 
The principal source of data for my study of selective law enforcement is qualitative 
interviews with actors in the field. While patterns of politicized enforcement can be 
uncovered by quantitative means, as Donald Shields (2010) in the U.S. did for instance, such 
research tells us little about the processes leading up to these patterns. In my research on 
selective law enforcement, I have chosen to focus primarily on the subjective experiences of 
individuals who perceive themselves to have been subjected to such practice. 
The collected interview material includes roughly 50 interviews, about 40 of which are 
explicitly referred to in the presented research. During the course of two years (2010-2011), I 
conducted interviews in the cities of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, Samara, 
Kazan, Ufa, Kaliningrad, Vladimir, and Perm, all of which are capitals of one of Russia’s 
regions.18 I also visited Tuimazy and Sterlitamak in Bashkortostan and Khimki in the Moscow 
region (Moskovskaya oblast). In addition, I conducted several interviews in Moscow, relating 
to conflicts elsewhere, most importantly Novorossiysk in Krasnodar krai. Most interviews 
were conducted in Russian, the rest in English. A list of the interviewees that I specifically 
refer to in the text is provided in the appendix. 
After my field trips to Russia, colleagues have asked me about how I made the interviewees 
open up and tell their stories on such sensitive and possibly dangerous topics. When I first 
managed to get in contact, however, getting the interviewees to talk was never a problem. On 
the contrary, they were eager to present their point of view. Although a number of them had 
faced rather serious threats and even been hospitalized after violent attacks, few interviewees 
wanted to be completely anonymized. A few more asked for names and particular statements 
not to be publicized. Due to the character of the issues and the possible risk involved for the 
interviewees, the material should nevertheless almost in its entirety be considered sensitive. 
Some interviewees have also been rendered anonymous at the author’s discretion. 
                                                 
18 No interviews from Kaliningrad are explicitly referred to in the dissertation. The Kaliningrad interviewees 
concerned electoral manipulation, a topic sufficiently covered by references to Perm and Vladimir. 
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Readers should note that I have not checked upon the facticity of any of the accusations the 
interviewees made against third-party actors. Furthermore, these third-party actors have not 
been given any chance to reply to the accusations. This is of course unfortunate. Confronting 
these actors with the statements in question, however, would possibly involve a risk to my 
own research project and, more important, a security hazard for my interviewees. In order not 
to discredit the third-party actors unnecessarily, I have removed all names of individuals 
accused of immoral or illegal actions from the dissertation. I did, however, not take further 
steps in order to make it impossible to identify who they are. Firstly, the individuals are office 
holders and public persons accustomed to public criticism. Secondly, removing clues about 
their locality and official roles would negatively impact on the quality of my presentation. In 
the final product, then, the identity of some accused third-party individuals may be traceable. 
2.1.1 The Period of Inquiry, 2007-2011 
Following the so-called color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, a period of 
intensified crackdown took place against non-systemic opposition in Russia, particularly in 
the years 2005-2007. The focus was directed not least against civil society actors who 
cooperated with partners abroad, especially on topics such as democratization or human 
rights. Simultaneously, the protest movement associated with the umbrella coalition and later 
political party “The other Russia” (Drugaya Rossiya) was suppressed through various means. 
According to Robert Horvath’s in-depth analysis of this wave of crackdown (2013, 6), the 
“ideological, repressive, and mobilizational” campaign in Russia at the time was a direct 
response to the tangible, albeit possibly exaggerated, domestic threat of another color 
revolution. 
Some years later, observers reported that the election protests in late 2011 spurred another 
Kremlin offensive against critics and activists. A number of protesters faced trials in St. 
Petersburg (“the case of the twelve”), and the well-known corruption hunter and opposition 
leader Aleksei Navalny was charged with embezzlement on evidence that Navalny himself 
rejects as fabricated (Navalny.ru). In Putin’s third term as president (from 2012), a number of 
new legal initiatives, including bans on “homosexual propaganda”19 and the branding of 
                                                 
19 Ryazan oblast introduced a law against “homosexual propaganda” already in 2006, but regional bans became 
more frequent in the spring and summer of 2012. The Federal Law 135-FZ “O vnesenii izmenenii v stat'yu 5 
Federal'nogo zakona 'o zashchite detei ot informatsii, prichinyayushchei vred ikh zdorov'yu i razvitiyu' i otdel'nye 
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NGOs funded from the West as “foreign agents” (inostrannye agenty).20 have put renewed 
focus on the deterioration of civil and human rights in Russia. The period of increased 
political tension also saw a significant increase in the use of anti-extremist legislation against 
non-violent activists (Kravchenko 2013). In some accounts, then, the election protests spurred 
a new wave of repression in Russia. 
My research is focused on the interim between 2007 and 2011, roughly corresponding to 
Dmitry Medvedev’s term as president but excluding the major protests in late 2011. This 
period should have been a rather quiet period for Russian liberal critics, or so it might have 
looked from the outside. After Medvedev was elected Russia’s new President in March 2008, 
many domestic and international observers nurtured some hopes that he could lead Russian 
politics in a more liberal direction. Some of Medvedev’s first acts were welcomed by a 
number of human rights organizations. Certain bureaucratic requirements from the previous 
years were relaxed and among the Western-oriented NGO staff I talked with in 2008 the 
atmosphere was one of cautious optimism, though some of them also reported on increased 
activity by the Federal Security Service (FSB) against these NGOs (see Bækken 2009). 
While the world was fixating on the war with Georgia in August 2008, the Russian regime 
was consolidating domestically after the Putin-Medvedev succession had been secured. New 
amendments and additions to the federal law on extremist activities gave authoritarian leaders 
in the regions a new tool to fight old adversaries. A new anti-extremist unit was also 
established within the Ministry of Interior by presidential decree in 2008. By some it was 
interpreted as a new political police, though this interpretation would be simplistic at best. At 
the same time, the election monitoring group GOLOS reported throughout the period on 
consistent manipulation of elections. The election laws were steadily tightened and new 
restrictions on registration were adopted.  
The period of inquiry naturally adds its particular flavor to the research. The research for 
instance suggests that the quasi-legal attacks in this period were not part of any large-scale 
federal initiatives, but rather reflected independent regional initiatives to hit back at their 
                                                                                                                                                        
zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii v tselyakh zashchity detei ot informatsii, propagandiruyushchei otritsanie 
traditsionnykh semeinykh tsennostei" was passed in on this issue was passed in June 2013. 
20 Federal Law 121-FZ of 20 June 2012 "O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel'nye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
v chasti regulirovaniya deyatel'nosti nekommercheskikh organizatsii, vypolnyayushchikh funktsii inostannogo agenta". 
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critics in a period when the conflict between the federal authorities and the opposition 
movement played out in relative calm. While the political landscape in Russia is quickly 
changing, however, many of the underlying mechanisms are presumably of more permanent 
character. 
2.1.2 The Case Selection Process 
My choice to explore selective law enforcement particularly in Russia is a direct consequence 
of my educational background within area studies, in which I have been trained in the 
language, history, culture, and contemporary development of this country. Inherent in the very 
idea of meaningful area studies is the assumption that case and context is of great importance. 
Only through an extensive knowledge of the interviewees’ referential environment may an 
interviewer fully recognize what is actually communicated. As will be clear, I will draw upon 
different aspects of Russia’s culture and society in order to understand the complexities of the 
practice. I hope that my concept of selective law enforcement will be to some degree 
transferable to other cases in other countries, but any truth claims in that direction would be 
premature. 
Besides a few borderline concepts and approaches noted in the introduction, I am not aware of 
any well-developed scholarly concept of selective law enforcement. My own MA thesis 
“Selective Law Enforcement against Russian NGOs: Pursuing Informal Interests through 
Formal Means,” which was later published as a report for the Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs, NUPI (Bækken 2009), provides a possible exception. The findings of 
this pilot in many ways provide the point of departure for this more comprehensive inquiry 
and analysis. Most importantly, the pilot provided me with a “skeleton” (Morse 2004) or a 
“skeletal framework” – “characteristics identified from previous inquiry that provide an 
internal structure” (Morse et al. 2002, 1) and a starting point for my research. 
With my loose concept from the pilot project in mind, I started to collect reports of relevant 
legal cases in a temporary database. My sources included reports, newspaper articles, and 
press releases. One set of reports that proved particularly useful in this initial search was the 
annual U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports on Russia (2007-2012), especially on 
the crackdown on the liberal opposition and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While 
lacking in detail, these reports provide a decent collection of cases that are well-known 
regionally but never received much international attention. Human rights organizations such 
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as the Helsinki Committee, the Human Right Watch, Human Rights First, and Amnesty 
International also do useful reporting on related issues. The reports do not, however, operate 
with a classification along the line of my concept. Allegations of political motivations, for 
instance, are sporadically addressed in many individual reports, but not systematically dealt 
with by any of the above-mentioned organizations. Typically, the issues of political 
selectivity, grave procedural violations, and presumed innocence are not kept clearly separate. 
In the process of identifying about one hundred and fifty cases falling within my initial loose 
definition and taking place within the relevant timeframe, it became clear that some areas of 
legal issues were mentioned more often than others. For purposes of sound concept 
development (see below) and for attaining knowledge about the formal issues of the conflicts, 
I selected some of these legal issue areas for further studies, namely anti-extremism, election 
registration procedures, and intellectual property rights. These legal issue areas are all 
characterized by frequent allegations of politicized enforcement. Also, I (correctly as it turned 
out) expected the three fields to show a considerable variation of data within my conceptual 
delimitations. As such, they seemed ideal for purposes of theoretical replication –
strengthening the durability of the initial theory while at the same time developing it with 
regard to variance (Yin 2009). While the research focused on these three issue areas, I also 
sporadically digressed into other fields to test ideas and look for new ones. 
To narrow the scope of inquiry further, I started to read more specific reports, legal 
documents, and analyses. I also made use of local expertise in order to identify more cases 
and get more information on already identified ones. For the study of controversial anti-
extremism in Russia, the Moscow-based research center SOVA provides a solid point of 
departure, with its frequently-issued reports and sound analysis. In addition to its material on 
“real” extremism, SOVA also provides monthly newsletters and annual reports in both 
English and Russian on what they call wrongful anti-extremism (nepravomernyi 
antièkstremizm) by the Russian state.21 
                                                 
21 Note that the SOVA reports including those under the names of the accredited authors (Verkhovsky; 
Kozhevnikova; Rozalskaya; Kravchenko; Yudina; Aplerovich) are not page-referenced. The same is true for 
several other sources in Russian that would otherwise be expected to be page-referenced, e.g. the Ombudsman 
for Human Rights in Russia’s reports. 
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“Wrongful anti-extremism” is by itself an interesting term for my purposes, at least in theory. 
SOVA understands “wrongful anti-extremism” as “actions by the state and public groups, 
imposed within the framework for combating aggressive nationalism or other forms of 
unacceptable radicalism, but actually directed (napravlennye) mostly at wrongful restriction 
of civil liberties.”22 SOVA’s definition may suggest an active and willful act of selection in 
order to undermine constitutional freedoms, which would set selective law enforcement apart 
from unconscious or personally motivated bias in the legal system. The definition is also 
explicit about the suppressing role of selective law enforcement, linking it to the suppression 
of civil liberties. That said, SOVA does not adhere to a strict interpretation of their own 
definition when picking cases for discussion.23 
On election registration procedures, the election monitoring organization GOLOS is the most 
important source for both the identification and analysis of cases. In the period, GOLOS 
covered most regional elections in Russia in special reports that contain listings of 
controversial registration cases and brief analysis of the controversies. The GOLOS website 
(http://www.golos.org/ ) provided material ranging from short commentaries to analysis, and 
the organization housed several prominent experts on Russian election law. Furthermore, the 
GOLOS network had representatives in many Russian cities, making the organization a useful 
contact point for inquiry into electoral issues.  
In connection with the State Duma elections 2011, GOLOS was involved in serious 
controversies and subjected to massive criticism in the state-controlled media. Based on my 
own experience with the organization and my reading of their published material, however, I 
have no reason to question their professionalism. In the summer 2013, GOLOS was liquidated 
after repeatedly being targeted by highly dubious quasi-legal attacks. At the time of writing, 
the future of the organization is uncertain and the web-page [accessed 18.07.2013] only 
contains a short explanation of the situation  
                                                 
22 Definition at Http://www.sova-center.ru/misuse [accessed 27.08.2013]  
23 SOVA in practice reports on many different cases of anti-extremism that their analytics for varying reasons 
find unfair, uncalled for, ineffective, or unnecessarily harsh. The cases examined are not exclusively those actively 
“directed” (napravlennye) to curb civil liberties, but also cases initiated for purposes of building statistics, cases in 
which the procedural errors are grave, and some cases in which SOVA simply finds the legal interpretation to be 
dubious. 
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There has to my knowledge been no organized reporting on the misuse of intellectual property 
rights in Russia. Yet, as a consequence of the controversial enforcement I write about below 
(section 5.3), human rights lawyers and clients joined forces and built up a network involving 
Human Rights Watch and the Kazan-based human rights organization AGORA. The latter 
defended several of the targets and has also provided me with some information on the topic 
In the final stage of case selection, when the interviewees were approached in person, 
practical considerations also played a role, not least due to Russia’s vast geography. I did not 
make any field trips to either Asian Russia or to the North Caucasus, where practical barriers 
to research are greater. To reduce the number of field trips, I made most of my trips to regions 
where I could identify several relevant cases. That said, I examined only a few select cases in 
any given region. On two occasions, my research was hindered by bureaucratic barriers with 
possible political undertones. My research in Vladimir was interrupted in the fashion 
mentioned in the introduction. In late 2012, the Russian consulate in Oslo denied me a 
research visa for a field trip to Yaroslavl, with no reasons given. The Russian embassy has not 
followed up on my request to clarify the situation, and I have not been to Russia since. 
2.1.3 Who Are the Interviewees? 
The caseload I use for my study is dominated by cases well-known in the regional opposition 
networks, though unknown to most foreigners without special interest in politicized 
(in)justice. Many of them have been discussed in local and regional press, not least on the 
Internet. The interviewees can roughly be divided into a group of self-defined targets on the 
one hand and experts on the other. The group of experts consists of political scientists, 
lawyers, and others who work professionally on civil rights issues in Russia, in addition to 
experts on the legal issue areas and their politicization. Readers should be aware that a 
number of experts may possibly and probably be biased. It should be mentioned that some 
who have experienced selective law enforcement engage in extensive information retrieval to 
accumulate knowledge on the topic. Also, experts speaking frankly on these issues tend to be 
subjected to similar practices themselves. For these two reasons, the two groups of self-
defined targets of the practice and experts on the topic overlap to some degree. In addition, 
one should be aware of the fact that political scientists in Russia may also be involved in 
election campaigns as consultants or may also have party affiliations of their own. 
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I conducted interviews with representatives of targeted organizations and with individuals 
who had been prosecuted in person. Among the interviewees are also “representatives” for 
two men who served prison sentences at the time of inquiry. As one interviewee correctly 
pointed out, it would be wrong to see all the people I interviewed as univocally in opposition 
to Putin’s regime. As she insisted, it is part of the mission of civil society watchdogs, 
regardless of their political orientation, to keep a critical attitude towards the ones in power 
(Denisova 17.12.2010). That being said, it would be fair to expect a political orientation 
among these people against the current regime, not least considering this regime’s largely 
anti-liberal political development. At the time of my interviews in 2010 and 2011, the 
moderate optimism that followed the election of Dmitry Medvedev had already long faded. 
A subgroup of the liberal regime critics can be classified as human rights defenders, among 
whom some are professional lawyers. Also other Russian NGO representatives, who worked 
on topics ranging from environmental protection to election monitoring, were interviewed. 
Yet other interviewees were independent activists. Several journalists and editors were 
interviewed, representing newspapers known for their critical attitude towards the 
government. On the issue of selective election registration denials, the group of self-perceived 
targets for the most part consisted of politicians active in the political opposition on the 
regional or local level. On this topic, I also interviewed what may be called a regime insider – 
a member of the United Russia party and a permanent member of the Central Election 
Committee (CEC) in one of Russia’s regions. 
2.2 A Study of Perceptions 
While my research relates critically to the interview material, it remains completely dependent 
upon data from one side of a socio-political conflict.24 In a way, the conflict is also a 
conceptual struggle and a fight between narratives – the putative antagonists in selective law 
enforcement would certainly not accept the other part’s framing of the issues. To lend an ear 
to predominantly one side in a conflict is not a problem in itself, but the ambitions of the 
researcher should surely be adjusted accordingly – perceptions of other people’s political 
motivations (or rather statements regarding perceptions) should not be confused with the 
                                                 
24 For a discussion on the challenges in doing research on contemporary Russia and authoritarian regimes in 
general, see J. Paul Goode (2010). 
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political motivations themselves. In qualitative interview research, all an observer can do is to 
interpret the already interpreted reality (Giddens 1976). The study is first and foremost an 
account of how critics and self-perceived targets of selective law enforcement experience this 
practice. 
Perceptions of social phenomena are important. First, human beliefs about the world 
constitute an important part of our social and psychological reality and are worthy of attention 
in their own right. Secondly, our beliefs bear direct impact upon the “real” world of politics 
and society. After W.I. Thomas and Dorothy Swaine Thomas formulated this key insight in 
1928, it struck Robert K. Merton as so powerful that he called it “probably the single most 
consequential sentence ever put in print by an American sociologist” and coined it the 
Thomas Theorem.25 
The impact of beliefs upon the tangible world is particularly evident when considering 
selective law enforcement as a mechanism to enforce informal rules. A central argument of 
my thesis is built upon the theory of deterrence, which is “first and foremost a perceptual 
theory. Whether a punishment threat deters depends not on the certainty, celerity, or severity 
of punishment in any objective sense but on the potential offender’s perception” (Gibbs 2007, 
371). As the argument goes, if you don’t know why you have been punished, you cannot be 
expected to change your behavior accordingly. In short, it is up to the punished to interpret 
which rule is actually enforced and whether it is a formal or an informal one. In addition, if 
targets of prosecution experience that they are being punished, the rule enforcement 
mechanism will function regardless of whether this punishment is officially recognized as 
such or not. In short, the “perceptive” aspects of selective law enforcement are arguably as 
important for the outcome of the practice as are the “substantive” aspects.  
Giving self-perceived targets of selective law enforcement a chance to speak of such 
enforcement is therefore more than a second best option. These targets possess information 
about their cases that we cannot expect regime insiders or law enforcement officials to have. 
While insiders have a powerful hand in manipulating outcomes, it remains up to the 
prosecuted and observers to interpret these outcomes politically. The targets also have the best 
                                                 
25 For an introduction to the curious history of the origin and naming of the Thomas Theorem, see Merton 
(1995). 
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overview regarding indirect consequences, such as effects of shaming, scaring away 
employees and partners, and so on. Finally, in order to understand how the informal rules are 
transmitted to society, we should ask those who are receiving the message where they got the 
idea from (see Gibbs 2007, 371). 
Like so much other interview (and other) research, my project is subjected to one major 
limitation: we can never be sure about the truthfulness of statements. Indeed, skewed 
narratives are natural and to be expected. In this particular study, one bias struck me as 
consistent enough to be mentioned separately at this point. The collected stories were often 
marked by what is probably an exaggerated passivity of the interviewees once the legal case 
has been initiated. More often than not, the interviewees were very capable people: skilled 
lawyers, active journalists, or experienced politicians. Even though they face even more 
powerful adversaries when clashing with the ruling elite and the state coercive apparatus, one 
should also expect the targets of selective law enforcement to engage actively in mobilizing 
support for their cases and in informal bargaining with their antagonists. The Russian legal 
and political culture has a strong personal aspect, and it would be naïve to expect that the 
targets of selective law enforcement would not also partake in informal bargaining. Some 
interviewees also make suggestions in this direction, but I did not follow up to explore these 
issues in detail. In addition, in my work, the interviewees predominantly play passive roles. It 
should be understood that this way of (re)presentation is the outcome of methodological 
choices and the theoretical focus of my research. It is not an exclusive claim to truth. 
2.3 Developing Qualitatively Derived Concepts 
Legal abuse is highly particularistic, based on improvisation and evolving over time. As is the 
case with all informal practices, the actors master their environment by what Pierre Bourdieu 
(quoted in Ledeneva 2006b, 15) calls sense practique, a “feel for the game” – a mastery 
“which works outside conscious control and discourse.” This is true not only for the 
authorities who are using and developing quasi-legal schemes, but also for the entire field of 
informal politics. This feel for the game can never be perfectly translated into academic 
analysis, and unwritten rules will not be the same once they are written down. This research 
nonetheless seeks to provide a concept that can give external actors some insight into this 
intricate reality by providing generic descriptions of the phenomenon as it unfolds in Russia 
(see Morse et al. 1996).  
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Approaching a largely unexplored phenomenon by stuffing the little we know into more or 
less arbitrary mainframes will provide us with little understanding of what we are dealing 
with. On the assumption that explicit and clear concepts are needed both in order to structure 
academic discourse and to achieve better understanding of a phenomenon, I seek to develop a 
novel concept of selective law enforcement. I largely share the idea of Janice M. Morse and 
her colleagues (Morse and Mitcham 2002; Morse et al. 1996; 2002) of what an academic 
concept is and how it may be evaluated. As Morse states, “Concepts play an integral role in 
research. They have been described as the ‘building blocks’ of theory, they are the substance 
of which constructs are composed, they may be linked together to form the framework of the 
body of the theory, and they are the link between abstraction and data” (Morse et al. 1996, 
386). The development of academic concepts is part of the process of developing theory. The 
concept “provides not a causal/analytical setting but, rather, an interpretable approach to 
social reality” (Jabareen 2009). None-the-less, the development of qualitatively derived 
concepts and the careful building of theory are founded upon the same basic principles and 
share much of the same methodology.  
As noted by John Gerring (1999), an academic concept may fulfill different roles. The various 
purposes to some degree influence how the concept should be constructed and thus also the 
criteria of what should be regarded as a worthwhile concept. The quality of a concept would 
in this way ultimately be determined by how well it stands in comparison with other concepts 
that “might be employed in that particular empirical and theoretical context” (Gerring 1999, 
393). 
 “Concept formation lies at the heart of all social science endeavor,” (Gerring 1999, 359), yet 
there is to date no well-developed concept of selective law enforcement. My attempt to 
develop a concept is therefore modest and extremely ambitious at the same time. I first and 
foremost attempt to answer what selective law enforcement is. On one level, the concept lays 
the foundation for synthesis; recognition of patterns, comparison or recognition of variation, 
and recognition of new instances in other contexts (Morse 2004, 1391). At the next level of 
theory development, my research also explores certain theoretical implications of the concept 
and develops insights of a more general character. When we are developing academic 
concepts, contextualization is not a barrier to (limited) generalization, but rather a 
prerequisite: “A concept is technically a label, but that label represents or signifies something, 
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so we must always be able to define it and give examples to illustrate its meaning in a 
particular context” (Morse 2004, 1390).  
2.3.1 Building upon An Immature Concept 
In the introduction I argued that while the term of selective law enforcement may be relatively 
well-established and used in several societal discourses, its actual meaning has so far been 
largely undecided. Put differently, the concept’s “distinguishing characteristics” are “still not 
fully articulated” (Morse et al. 1996, 388). Selective law enforcement is therefore what Janice 
M. Morse and her colleagues call an “immature concept” – its definition, conceptual borders, 
preconditions, and outcomes are by no means set in stone (ibid).  
If we seek to develop concepts or more wide-reaching theory grounded in empirical 
observations, an immature concept provides a very useful point of departure. A loose initial 
theory is beneficial because it pays heed to context and qualitative data. By using loose and 
flexible concepts in the initial phase of an inquiry, the researcher is arguably able to “suck up” 
more and better empirical data in the early stages of research. As Herbert Blumer contended, 
the qualitative researcher wants a “sensitizing concept” – a concept that “gives the user a 
general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances” (quoted in 
Hammersley 1989, 140). When a concept is underdeveloped academically, a good way to 
start developing it is to inquire into its meaning in the field (Morse and Mitcham 2002). 
A precise concept is then not a prerequisite for qualitative research but a desired outcome of it 
(Hammersley 1989, 153). Based on my empirical material, I seek to articulate and expand on 
the practice of selective law enforcement so as to reap the above-mentioned benefits of a clear 
concept. I thus contend that the “concept must be mature before it can be operationalized and 
definable in measurable units” (Morse et al. 1996, 387). As advocates of the influential 
methodological package of Grounded Theory (e.g. Glaser and Strauss 1967, Strauss and 
Corbin 1994) have stressed, the job of developing theory should be done in small steps. If we 
rush the process of formalizing a theory on insufficient empirical grounds, we risk 
overlooking important aspects of what we are studying. A mature concept cannot be achieved 
in one day, but through “processes of saturation, replication and verification” (Morse and 
Mitcham 2002, 30). In terms of Grounded Theory, sound theory development must involve 
several case studies and move back and forth between the empirical world and the emerging 
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theory in a gradual process of theory formalization. The same holds true for the development 
of complex concepts like that of selective law enforcement. 
Empirical Instances, Generalization, Transferability 
In my opinion, critics of the Russian regime present their stories in very similar terms when 
criticizing the practices I call selective law enforcement. Not only are the stories similar with 
regard to their focus on repression and harassment, but also in stressing the political 
motivations, legal instrumentalism, and powerful manipulators related to the political regime. 
They also speak of the purpose of the legal acts in ways that reflect an implicit, albeit possibly 
not conscious, concept of rule enforcement. Yet, for all the similarities, the critics do not 
utilize any particular explicit concept to encompass all these traits and their interrelations. My 
interviewees will likely and hopefully accept and agree with much of my interpretation, but I 
can certainly not make any claims that my perspectives simply “emerge” from the data (cf 
Glaser in Raduescu 2011, 4).  
The concept of selective law enforcement is therefore my own elaboration upon the 
interviewees’ experiences – a tool I use for synthesizing their stories and promoting theory 
development. Following Janice C. Morse and Peggy Anna Field, I contend that worthwhile 
concepts may be “indicated in data rather than concrete entities directly described by 
participants” (quoted in Bowen 2006, 13). While knowledge of native concepts and points of 
reference is important in order to understand a practice, this does not imply that the best way 
to develop an academic concept is simply to adopt the native perspectives.  
While a qualitative study cannot tell us much about how common a practice is, it can tell us 
much about how formal and informal institutions work in a few select cases, and chances are 
good that the investigated cases are not unique. As David L. Morgan (2008, 72) puts it: “I do 
not believe it is possible for research results to be either so unique that they have no 
implications whatsoever for other actors in other settings or so generalized that they apply in 
every possible historical and cultural setting.” All case studies produce both context-specific 
and more general insights. This is why I hope that the core content of the concept can be 
transferable to other cases (Morgan 2008). It is exactly this transferability of case studies that 
make them excellent material for theory building (Yin 2009). 
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Focusing on one particular context when building a concept, therefore, does not mean that 
theorization and aggregation beyond the case are not meaningful. On the contrary, the 
development of more generic insights is an explicit purpose of my research. If we define a 
concept as “a complex mental representation of empirical experience” (Morse et al. 1996, 
385), the purpose of academic concept development would be to coordinate the different 
mental representations over time in order to achieve a greater degree of intersubjectivity. 
What I seek is a concept that “enables the communication of ... complex behaviours to others, 
enables their measurement and eventually their manipulation and application” (ibid). 
My findings make selective law enforcement a far more developed and explicit concept than 
what it has been earlier. For all my findings, sub-concepts, and labels, however, I will not 
claim that selective law enforcement at the outcome of my research is yet a “mature” concept. 
For a higher degree of maturity to be achieved, more focused attention is needed. In this 
regard, my efforts are but a first step. 
The Analytical and Operational Levels 
A good concept is marked by its endo-consistency – meaning that the conceptual components 
“are distinct, heterogeneous and, yet, not separable” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 19). The 
components also interact in specific ways that lie at the core of the practice. In other words, 
the endo-consistency makes the concept more than the sum of its components.  
To unravel its complexity, I operate with a differentiation between the concept’s basic, 
analytical, and operational levels (see Goertz 2006). The the relationship between the levels 
are non-causal: “they are not causes but constitute what the phenomenon is”(Goertz 2006, 
15). Selective law enforcement, according to my definition, presupposes (or is constituted by) 
the components of selectivity, law enforcement, and a link between them. This basic claim 
makes for the analytical level in the chart (figure 1). Selectivity (in law enforcement) in turn 
presupposes the more basic building blocks such as selectors and criteria for selection, and 
law enforcement presupposes laws, legal actors, and legal acts. The idea of a link between 
the selection and the law enforcement would rationally presuppose some reason for such a 
belief, a topic which is also a category open for examination. Once the basic outline of the 
map was laid out in this fashion, however, the development of the concept has been derived 
from empirical observations. In principle, all the levels of the concept are open for empirical 
input. 
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The conceptual levels are intimately connected. This fact is especially evident in the case of 
the analytical and operational levels that should be researched more or less simultaneously, 
using insights from one level to develop further insights on the other. To be more specific, it 
is only through the identification of the interactions on the analytical level that we may point 
out the components on the operative level. At the same time, it is only through a closer 
examination of the components that we are able to expand our knowledge of the core 
functions of the practice, identify variance, and expand the complexity of analysis. Without an 
examination of the conceptual components, qualitative inquiry will be limited to analyzing 
relatively superficial notions on the analytical level instead of constructing theory upon the 
building blocks underneath them. In other words, it is observations on the operational level 
that move the concept from the world of speculation into systematic research on an 
empirically observable phenomenon. Variation within the conceptual components on the 
operational level is also a primary source for identifying subtypes within the conceptual 
borders. 
Selective law enforcement both highlights and reflects central political tendencies in both 
Russia and other political systems that combine authoritarian rule with formal rule of law and 
democratic elections. Thus I also discuss the phenomenon of selective law enforcement on a 
contextual level, looking at its function within the Russian political system. This analysis 
utilizes some core insights from the other conceptual levels in order to criticize and expand on 
existing literature on Russian politics and authoritarian regime design.  
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3 Legality and Power in Russia 
3.1 Instrumentalism, Power and Legality in Russian Legal 
Culture 
In order to comprehend and evaluate the impact of the political and legal context upon the 
research, readers should be aware of certain features in the Russian political and cultural 
landscape that may promote and shape selective law enforcement. It is my ambition in this 
chapter to provide the reader with some means to independently consider the area-specific 
context in which the interviewees’ statements have been formulated. As will be hinted at in 
this brief analysis of the cultural predispositions, today’s popularity of selective law 
enforcement in Russia is not a product of chance. In many ways, it is the result of a specific 
historical trajectory and path dependencies that produced a system with an exceptionally low 
respect for legal institutions.  
Shaped by centuries of authoritarian rule, law in Russia is associated with the prerogatives of 
the powerful, typically political authorities. The elites are well known to wield the law for 
particularistic purposes. Even today, Marina Kurkchiyan (2011, 9) claims, “there is no sign of 
either a popular demand that law must be just or a universal expectation that lawyers must be 
seen to be ethical and fair.” In part, society fails to call its ruling elite to account because 
malpractice is so common. In a legal culture marked by pervasive rule violation and mutual 
distrust, who is to throw the first stone?  
Kurkchiyan (2011, 4) identifies three “component tiles in the mosaic of Russian legal 
culture.” They are: 
 (a) an extreme formalism in the perception of what law is; (b) the reduction of law’s 
social value to that of a mere instrumental role; and (c) a conflict between the 
formal and informal rules of Russian social institutions that continually undermines 
institutional performance (ibid). 
Although the exact impact of this tradition is hard to measure, the cultural aspects of the legal 
sphere provide some explanation for several aspects of selective law enforcement today.  
According to one definition, an instrumental use of law is present when the law is 
“consciously viewed by people and groups as a tool or means with which to achieve ends” 
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(Tamanaha 2006, 6, emphasis in original). In the Russian tradition, the law was not imbued 
with value in itself but seen as an instrument of governance (Solomon 2008b). Because law 
has been seen as an instrument of political engineering, the notion that it should stand above 
the hierarchy of men (or classes) has been alien. With an instrumental concept of law as a 
fundament, a rule of law is therefore hard to imagine; a tractor cannot steer the farmer.  
It was not until Perestroika in the late 1980s that a concept similar to “rule of law” (pravovoe 
gosudarstvo) gained attention in the Soviet Union (Hendley 2010). As late as 2009, Kathryn 
Hendley (259-260) argued that assessing Russia in terms of rule of law is still “like trying to 
fit a square peg into a round hole.” According to Kurkchiyan, the impact of a rule of law 
conception largely remains to be seen. She (2011, 12) finds that law still plays a “merely 
instrumental role” in Russia. Though others find reasons for cautious optimism regarding the 
governing role of law in Russia (e.g. Smith 2010), Kurkchiyan (2011, 12) asserts that “its 
value as a principle upon which to organize society is not increasing.” 
The instrumentality in Russian legal tradition goes hand in hand with a strong formalism. 
Legal formalism finds its rationale in the empowerment of rules to limit discretion, a rationale 
which in Russia may be traced back to a tsarist legal doctrine with little room for independent 
judicial power. Tsarina Catherine the Great, for instance, feared that any interpretation or 
judgment beyond a mere “identification of facts and appliance of law to these facts” would 
develop into de facto legislative power that could undermine autocratic rule (Wortman 1976). 
The Tsarina’s nakaz of 1767, an instruction to the country’s Legislative Commission, 
indicated a strong belief in legal formalism: “Where the laws are precise and clear, the office 
of a judge consists only in ascertaining the Fact” (article 178). The nakaz even specified how 
the consideration of “the spirit of the law” should be avoided at all costs: “Nothing is as 
dangerous as this general Axiom” (article 153) (quoted in Wortman 1976, 11).  
The formalism advocated by Catherine the Great presupposed rules that are as clear and 
directly applicable as possible. The complexity of social life, however, is not always easily 
regulated by clear-cut rules. Indeed, rules will by definition leave doubtful cases (Schauer 
1991, esp. 218-219). To make matters worse, today’s Russia does not fit the Tsarina’s ideal. 
Like other modern legal systems, Russia’s legal order is founded on a set of more general 
principles. In addition, directly applicable laws are frequently criticized for containing vague 
or unspecified legal terms. As indicated by this study, Russian formalism seems particularly 
unable to deal adequately with laws that are notoriously unclear to begin with. 
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Within the Russian formalistic paradigm, the exercise of discretion in legal decision-making 
is still frowned upon as a stepbrother of corruption (Henderson 2011; Hendley 2011). Russian 
judges have to deal with the ambiguities outside the legal sphere exactly because there is no 
space for officially exercising discretion within the legal institutions. In this highly non-
transparent setting, the formalist system is vulnerable to extra-legal penetration. The high 
level of corruption in the legal system fuels the fear of discretion in court rulings, which again 
forces discretionary justice into less controllable forms. In Hendley’s (2011, 17) account, the 
result is a vicious circle “motivated by the false assumption that the written law can account 
for every possible circumstance.” For these reasons, there is, from a critical point of view, no 
contradiction between an extra-ordinarily formalistic approach to law and a predominance of 
informal solutions. On the contrary, an overly formalistic state seems to encourage informal 
solutions because it is not itself flexible enough to tackle the complexities of everyday life 
(see also Ledeneva 2006b). 
My research confirms a willingness to apply a highly formalistic conception of law in 
individual cases. For the legal actors it may arguably be easier to instrumentalize the rules 
within a paradigm of legal formalism because this paradigm stresses broader legal principles 
and the originally intended purpose of law to a lesser degree. Any public “propaganda or 
dissemination” of swastikas, for instance, is a legal offense in Russia. This restriction was 
utilized in one illustrative case in which an activist was arrested for handing out crossed-out 
swastikas in protests against a nationalist march (Verkhovsky 2012). While a formalistic 
approach to the law would (possibly) show the officials to be right, the priority would make 
little sense from a substantial perspective. 
Skepticism against discretion also arguably gives more priority to local rules – rules with the 
narrowest range of applicability (Schauer 1991). Formalism may thus strengthen a system’s 
tendency to enforce various sub-laws and regulations, rather than vaguer legal principles 
higher up in the legal hierarchy (see Henderson 2012). This tendency may in extreme cases 
threaten to turn the hierarchy of laws upside down, with the consequence that infringements 
against specified standards may trump constitutional rights. Election registration procedures 
provide an example of how this preference for local rules may be instrumentalized for 
political purposes. In several cases, candidates have been denied registration due to purely 
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technical, completely minor, and substantively irrelevant mistakes (see section 5.1). Again, 
any “spirit” or “purpose” of the law is neglected.26  
The traits identified by Kurkchiyan provide the backbone for what is commonly referred to as 
“legal nihilism” in Russia, a well-known phenomenon in both Tsarist and Soviet Russia (see 
e.g. Tumanov 1989). According to Hendley (2012c, 150), legal nihilism in Russia “reflects a 
more particularistic view of law, under which citizens obey laws that strike them as fair 
and/or convenient” and otherwise ignore them. One may, however, claim that this form of 
obedience would indicate that the citizen is not influenced by law at all (Schauer 1991, 113). 
From my perspective, Hendley’s characterization of legal nihilism misses an important point. 
While simple non-compliance is certainly a consequence of the same disregard for the law, 
legal nihilism also takes the form of quasi-obeying cynicism marked by the willingness to 
instrumentalize, manipulate, and circumvent the law with full disregard for any notion of the 
spirit or purpose of law (see e.g. Firestone 2010).  
In this conception, the legal nihilist is not immune to incentives provided by the legal 
institutions. However, the legal nihilist does nothing to support the law in cases in which the 
incentives are not immediately present. It is at least my understanding that while pervasive 
non-compliance constitutes a major problem, legal nihilism in Russia also concerns a cynical 
and unrestrained instrumentalism. In its ultimate consequence, the combination of 
instrumentalism and particularism may create a situation in which “the law does not apply; it 
is applied.”27  
This legal nihilism is also reflected in a persistently low trust in legal institutions. The 
“Russian Public Opinion”, an English language annual published by the Levada Center 
confirms the semi-permanent feature of low trust in legal institutions stable throughout the 
whole of Putin’s presidency. With regard to polls directly relevant to selective law 
enforcement, only 8% believe that Russian authorities do not use law enforcement agencies 
against political opponents, while 40% believe it is a “quite common” or “common” practice 
(Levada 2012, 142), and 64% of the respondents believe that it is most likely or completely 
certain that courts are used “for political purposes in order to get rid of political rivals or 
                                                 
26 For reasons I will discuss elsewhere (esp. section 4.3), any such “purposes” would anyway be very hard to 
pinpoint. 
27 Derived from the Russian phrase “zakon ne deistvyet, a primenyaetsa”, see also Paneyakh (2002). 
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persecute the dissidents” (Levada 2012, 167).28 The low trust in legal institutions is constantly 
reproduced by continued manipulation and circumvention of law on many levels and on many 
arenas.29  
3.2 Quasi-Legality, Repression and Putinism 
Today’s Russia is formally a democratic and “law-based state” (pravovoe gosudarstvo), as 
codified in the first paragraph of the Russian Constitution.30 There is, however, a general 
consensus among academics that Russia can no longer (if ever) be considered among the 
democracies of the world. In some accounts, Russia falls short even of qualifying as a 
“competitive authoritarian” (Levitsky and Way 2010) or “partly free” regime (Puddington 
2012). Not least during Putin’s second term as president (2004-2008), the political leadership 
consolidated its grip on power in part by hunting down opposition and bolstering its own 
repressive capabilities (Taylor 2011, Horvath 2013).  
Yet the picture is not all that bleak. While the closeness in both time and space has made 
observers eager to compare Putinism with Soviet rule, the parallel is not entirely fair. On a 
day-to-day basis, the Russian state and legal system function rather well, if admittedly far 
                                                 
28 With regard to the specific cases of probable selective law enforcement mentioned in the Levada reports, the 
majority of the Russian population has little knowledge or interest in the cases. At the same time, the low trust 
in the neutrality of state institutions is evident. In one poll, only 10% of the respondents believed that the 2010 
sentences against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were decided “in accordance with the evidence,” whereas almost 
three times as many believed it was due to an “order from the government.” Another 10% believed that both of 
these factors were important for the verdict, while the rest of the respondents were undecided or did not follow 
the trial (Levada 2012, 172). Among those who had heard of the case against Alexei Navalny by April 1010, 
20% found the case to be caused by his possible criminal activities and 54% found his actions to “expose 
corruption among government officials and large corporations” to be the main foundation. The rest (26%) were 
undecided, a proportion of whom presumably found both reasons equally relevant (Levada 2012, 166). 
29 Yet, a survey by Hendley (2012) calls for a moderate optimism. It indicates that negative attitudes to law in 
Russia today are strongly correlated to formative experiences in the 1990s and possibly on the retreat.  
30 The exact meaning of pravovoe gosudarstvo is admittedly a complicated issue. Mainstream Russian 
constitutional legal theory connects the term to a substantial and “thick” interpretation in line with the 
constitutional context in which it is used. Importantly, however, the phrase pravovoe gosudarstvo is often 
interpreted not as a description of what Russia is and is bound to adhere to, but rather as a normative declaration 
for what it should aspire to become (Skrylnikov 2009). 
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from perfectly. As in most modern authoritarian states, there are elements of “softness” to 
Russian politics. These soft elements also shape how dissent is suppressed. Russia exhibits a 
rich variety of low intensity coercion – indirect ways to keep potential threats under control 
that also limit the need for high intensity coercion (Levitsky and Way 2010, 58). That said, 
old-fashioned blunt violence is not alien to Russian authoritarian rule today. Just as important, 
a political prisoner would hardly agree that a selectively imposed imprisonment is particularly 
“soft” after all. More common than taking political prisoners, however, is making 
oppositional activities unattractive and inconvenient by a less intensive but consistent 
harassment by legal, quasi-legal, and illegal means (see section 7.5.3 and 8.1) 
Whether we interpret it as the outcome of sophisticated authoritarian design or of genuine 
limitations upon the rulers’ capacity to employ coercive capabilities, Putin’s administration 
has increasingly employed a broader and more sophisticated mixture of means to control 
popular opinion. The efforts include various strategies of propaganda and mobilization, such 
as the arrangement of large pro-Putin demonstrations, the support of formally independent 
organizations, and the co-optation of popular nationalists (Horvath 2013; Robertson 2011). 
Various techniques to control the opposition and contain criticism should also be seen as part 
of this strategy. To Graeme B. Robertson (2011, 199), the creativity and experimentation in 
containing opposition have put Putin’s Russia “at the cutting edge of contemporary 
authoritarian regime design and have made it a model for other authoritarians.” 
In line with such arguments, several researchers have noted how the political elite in Russia 
seemingly prefer fluid rules of the game (Riabchuk 2004; Wilson 2005; Mendras 2012). 
When the principle of power tends to trump the principle of equality before the law, powerful 
groups and individuals have beyond a doubt many incentives to preserve the status quo. The 
ruling elite in Russia have a more or less free hand to enjoy its political influence over the 
economy, something which provides extraordinary opportunities for amassment of wealth. 
Selective law enforcement also makes it easier for them to curb critics and limit the 
development of a strong opposition.  
While the ineffectiveness of the law makes the ruling elite less vulnerable to legal constraints, 
a system of governance built on legal nihilism does not come without costs. First, legal 
nihilism severely impairs the government’s ability to rule Russia by legal means. And while 
informal solutions may be effective for coping with problems in the short term, they also 
undermine the efficiency of governance. Surely, it is not by chance that all modern societies 
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have established formal institutions and law as means of control, regardless of their political 
orientation.31 For Russia’s announced plans to modernize the economy, reliance upon 
informal solutions is highly detrimental (Ledeneva 2013).  
It is also extremely difficult for the rulers to opt out of this system of legal nihilism (Ledeneva 
2013). The country is highly resistant to legal reform because, as Ledeneva (2011a, 40) notes, 
“changes in the formal rules are simply interpreted as yet another constraint to be dealt with 
informally.” Not only will the bureaucracy be hesitant to implement rules that threaten their 
own position in a corrupt economy, but also other legal subjects may, partly as a matter of 
habit, develop new schemes and techniques to counter legal initiatives that challenge their 
way of social navigation.  
The best or only way to fight corruption effectively may paradoxically be by informal means. 
Legal initiatives to root out corruption may not only be ignored and left unenforced but also 
even be used selectively for corrupt purposes. In this way, fighting corruption by increasing 
scopes of punishment becomes sort of like fighting a snowman with snowballs, every ball 
adding to the snowman’s body. 
Individuals on the inside of a regime based on selective law enforcement will not only face 
the problem of ineffective governance and lack of control beyond their personal sphere of 
influence. In addition, they are also subjected to a more direct threat. Selective law 
enforcement can be used not only against old enemies of the regime; it is also employed to 
deter opt-outs. Individuals that fall from grace in authoritarian systems tend to fall hard, and 
this tendency is not restricted to heads of state. Insiders may be above the law, but the tables 
may be turned against them at any moment. The ruling elites, then, also have the sword of 
Damocles hanging over their heads in the same way as the opposition. The only real 
difference in this regard is that, as long as they are on the inside of the regime, the insiders do 
comply with its informal rules and are more or less safe from crackdown for that reason. 
Ledeneva’s (2011a; 2013) interview research shows how these dynamics are actively played 
out in Russian politics. Individual actors must compromise themselves in order to get 
promotions within the regime. In this way, they are “hooked” (na kryuchke) and dependent on 
the continuing goodwill of their superiors. Darden’s (2001) above-mentioned work on 
                                                 
31  For a number of interesting examples, see the edited volume Moustafa and Ginsburg (2008). 
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Ukraine under Leonid Kuchma shows how information of legal violation was collected and 
stored to be used for blackmailing regime insiders as well. In today’s Russia, we repeatedly 
see how individuals fall out of the establishment only to become quickly trapped in the legal 
system in ways they had earlier been protected from. 
3.3 Native Approaches to Quasi-Legality 
As an important and persistent practice in Russia, the informal subversion of law for 
particularistic purposes is, unsurprisingly, reflected in the Russian language. This final section 
of the chapter will briefly review a number of the most relevant and frequently used colloquial 
terms and identify their relevance for our understanding of selective law enforcement. Most 
directly relevant for my study is the Russian terminology surrounding manipulative tactics. 
This review serves as an illustration of some of the points I make in the above parts of this 
chapter. Simultaneously, it also picks up on and concludes the review of existing approaches 
from the first chapter, adding relevant Russian terms to that discussion. Finally, it points 
forward to the presentation of my own concept of selective law enforcement. 
The term selective law enforcement may be directly translated into Russian as izbiratel noe 
pravoprimenenie or izbiratel’noe primenenie zakona. Also the more artificial selektivnoe 
pravoprimenenie is recognizable in Russian. At the very least, these terms are usually 
understood among my interviewees and their colleagues. Yet, the idioms are not native to the 
language in which Russians commonly frame their experiences with legal abuse. Reflecting 
the cultural tendencies discussed above, the most popular colloquial terms surrounding quasi-
legal practices do not stress the element of legality. Instead they focus on power and 
manipulative skills. 
3.3.1 Administrative Resources and Political Technologies 
Possibly the most commonly-used term that reflects the blur between public and private 
spheres in Russia is administrativnye resursy (administrative resources). It is also frequently 
adopted in Western discourse on post-Soviet countries.  
The use of the term varies considerably, but administrative resources are often understood 
broadly as the diverse means that office holders control and are willing to use in their own 
interests. They include “money, personnel, organizational know-how and communication 
Legal Action for Extra-Legal Purposes 
 
~ 51 ~ 
 
channels, the control of media and other facilities, as well as powerful networks” (Meyer 
2008, 98-99). Administrative resources can be used to describe the power of various 
individuals, informal networks, or formal organizations. In Ledeneva’s (2006, 221 fn. 39) 
conception, the term concerns an ability to “control areas beyond the administrative system, 
such as courts, media, electorate etc.” Most often it refers to the prerogatives enjoyed by vlast, 
an abstract Russian term that denotes both authority and the authorities, power and the 
powerful. In Russia today, vlast often points to the president, governors, and the state 
administration, and to United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya), the current party of power. It may 
also correspond to the powerful informal networks that surround and link to these institutions. 
Often, observers use the term administrative resources specifically about the means 
incumbents use in order to win elections. Some definitions are restricted to the electoral field 
exclusively (e.g. Mendras 2012, 171). On other occasions, definitions of administrative 
resources explicitly mention selective law enforcement as an example of their use (e.g. Meyer 
2008, 99; Ledeneva 2006b, 48-49).  
Western literature tends to associate administrative resources with illegal and immoral acts. 
Gerd Meyer (2008, 99) stresses how they are “often used illegally.” Ledeneva (2013, 72, my 
emphasis) finds the term “widely used to denote the abuse of administrative power.” Gordon 
M. Hahn (2004) suggests that administrative resources are illegal measures used to 
consolidate authoritarian power. According to Aleksei Levchenko’s (2009) review of the 
concept as used by Russian scholars, however, administrative resources are not illegitimate in 
themselves, but may take legal or illegal form. Any person of power will necessarily use the 
position to strengthen his or her electoral chances in one way or another, Levchenko (2009, 3) 
argues. Administrative resources “emanate from legitimate empowered individuals of 
authority, and are thus legitimate and as a rule ‘honest’ (chestnye).”  
Levchenko and a number of other Russian analysts (eg. Panfilova and Sherverdyaev 2005) 
therefore distinguish administrative resources from the abuse (zloupotreblenie) of such 
resources. Levchenko (2009, 4) even provides a separate definition of this abuse, though 
unfortunately an inadequate one. According to him, the abuse of administrative (electoral) 
resources is “the use of vested authority in legal or illegal (legal’no ili nelegal’no) ways that 
directly or indirectly obstruct political opponents and violate (narushayut) the voters’ rights.” 
The term “abuse” suggests that Levchenko takes the (lack of) moral qualities into account in 
his definition. He also evidently seeks a definition which is external to the legal-illegal 
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dichotomy. Yet he is not successful in finding any good alternatives and ends up linking it to 
the violation of electoral rights. Exactly how the violation of voters’ rights may be “legal or 
illegal” is unclear. At the end of the day, Levchenko’s definition leaves us unsure of whether 
the abuse of administrative resources is a legal or moral concern. 
Political technologies (politicheskie tekhnologii) is another Russian term with connotations 
similar to administrative resources. Indeed, political technology is in many ways the science 
(or art) of putting administrative resources into effective use.32 In the same way as 
administrative resources are often used to denote electoral resources, political technology is 
used in the narrower sense of electoral technology. The 1990s saw a great increase in the use 
of such technologies when free elections combined with huge stakes to be won in the 
privatization and with an untested legal framework full of loopholes. In the early 1990s, the 
skill and knowledge of how to manipulate elections and election laws turned into big 
business. The professional “political technologists” in Russia perform a number of tasks for 
their clients: “The manipulation of the media is central to their work, but by definition it 
extends beyond this – to the construction of parties, the destruction of others, the framing of 
campaign mechanics and the manipulation of results” (Wilson 2005, 49). Included in their 
work is also the exploitation of every possibility provided by the legal framework to win 
elections (see e.g. Poluektov 2002; Matveichev and Novikov 2003; Buzin 2006; 2007; Buzin 
and Lyubarev 2008). 
In the same way as administrative resources, “political technology” is, according to 
Levchenko (2009, 4), a neutral term – there are white, grey, or black technologies. Both 
political technologies and administrative resources exist in various forms and defy any clear-
cut separation along the legal-illegal dichotomy. Though the practices they denote are not 
plainly illegal, they have a strong stench of unrestrained cynicism that is difficult to justify 
within an ideological framework of rule of law.  
The above quotation on “legal or illegal ways that ... violate voter’s rights” may sound like 
nonsense. Yet, it illustrates the ambivalence of administrative resources and their relationship 
to commonly applied dichotomies; the example from Levchenko is also not unique. Various 
actors use the term across a wide range of cases, and it is interpreted differently and not 
                                                 
32 Note that Ledeneva (2006, 22, fn 39) contends that administrative resources are not to be understood as 
resources as such. Neither should they be understood as administrative, she adds (ibid). 
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always consistently with regard to legality and legitimacy. The ambivalence in Levchenko’s 
analysis reflects the term’s existence in the grey zone between, or outside, the dichotomies we 
usually employ. As a term, administrative resources highlights the blur of a neopatrimonial 
system in which the boundaries between the public and the private sphere are not clearly 
drawn. It originates in a political culture in which, contrary to the mainstream Western model, 
the state has never been assumed to be separate from the networks it consists of (Zimmer 
2008). With my concept of selective law enforcement, I hope to capture these ambiguities 
without sacrificing the use of terms of universal appliance. As noted in the introduction, the 
dichotomous terms of formal and informal provide me with a useful tool to unravel the 
confusion our use of such dichotomies often leads to. 
3.3.2 Telephone Justice and Basmannoe Pravosudie 
The terms administrative resources and political technology are useful to understand the 
instrumentalism of formal rules and the blur between their uses for public or private interests. 
Neither of them, however, pays any specific attention to the utilization of the punitive 
capabilities of formal rules to promote these interests.  
A popular Soviet-era term that directly concerns political interference in judicial matters is 
“telephone justice” (telefonnoe pravo), according to some coined by Arkadii Vaksberg in 
1986 (e.g. Popova 2012, 131). The term is relatively popular today in academic writing and 
has a central position in works of among others Hendley (2009) and Ledeneva (2008; 2011c). 
As is the case with the two other terms mentioned above, telephone law relates to the 
prerogatives of the powerful. It originated with the ability of the Communist Party elite to 
“pick up the telephone and call prosecutors and judges and tell them what outcome the Party 
expected in specific cases” (Karklins 2005, 13). As such, it not only encompasses selective 
law enforcement but also pressure to exert leniency or drop charges. 
Ledeneva (2011c) suggests that the “basic meaning” of telephone justice was originally “court 
decisions made on orders from above (sverkhu).” Her survey research, however, indicates that 
this meaning has now been significantly extended in everyday use in Russia (ibid).33 In a later 
work, Ledeneva (2013, 150) therefore defines telephone justice broadly as “a colloquial 
                                                 
33 Interestingly, 15% of the respondents equate telephone justice to “selective law enforcement” as defined by 
Ledeneva (see section 1.3.3 ). 
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phrase to denote inequality before the law, selectivity in law enforcement and the consequent 
gap between law and justice.” To the degree that my interviewees use the idiom, they seem to 
understand it more narrowly as the direct interference in legal processes by verbal commands. 
While Maria Popova (2012, 131) defines telephone justice as “a channel of politicians to 
communicate their preferences about the outcome of individual cases to the judges who hear 
them,” it is worth noting that this channel of influence is not exclusive to politicians as such. 
In my own study at least, the individuals who are mentioned as the most active “callers” are 
frequently leaders within the state bureaucracy. 
A terminological novelty that also deals specifically with politicized justice is basmannoe 
pravosudie, assumed to have been first introduced by radio host Aleksei Venediktov (2003). 
Basmannoe pravosudie has become a rather popular phrase in Russia and was officially 
commented upon by then President Dmitry Medvedev in 2009 (Vzglyad' 2009). Compared to 
telephone justice, it may carry stronger connotations of a centralized regime rather than 
independent individual manipulators. Basmannoe pravosudie arguably focuses less on the 
initiation of the case than does telephone justice and more on the legal process itself. 
Basmannoe pravosudie simultaneously refers to Basmanniy sud, the local Moscow court 
where the first procedures against Mikhail Khodorkovsky were held in 2003, and to the father 
and son Aleksei and Fyodor Basmanov, leaders of the oprichniki – the notorious secret police 
set up by Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century. The term’s resistance to translation and its 
esoteric references make it obviously ill-suited for comparative studies beyond Russia. 
3.3.3  Selective Law Enforcement between Politics and Legality 
The obvious strength of the native Russian terms lies in how they reflect the Russian attitudes 
towards law, power, and the relation between the two. Common to the reviewed terms is how 
they transcend the dichotomies of legal-illegal and public-private, reminding us that these 
dichotomies are not after all absolute. In Russia there is a “much less pronounced moral 
predominance of formality than in ‘western’ social conduct” (Böröcz 2000, 375; see also 
Zimmer 2008). Knowledge about the referential environment and cultural background of the 
observed phenomenon should be heeded in my discussion to make analysis better attuned to 
the interviewees’ own experiences. Taking the local concepts into account provides an 
important check point so as not to let artificial and rigid models from outside impede our 
understanding of a phenomenon examined in a cultural context. 
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That said, the examined terms are in themselves not a good foundation for academic concept 
development, especially not for a concept useful beyond the analysis of Russia. As Emile 
Durkheim (quoted in Gerring 1999, 362) pointed out:  
It is not our aim simply to discover a method for identifying with sufficient accuracy 
the facts to which the words of ordinary language refer and the ideas they convey. 
We need, rather, to formulate entirely new concepts, appropriate to the require-
ments of science and expressed in an appropriate terminology. 
In contrast to the Russian terms mentioned above, “selective law enforcement” is constructed 
especially for the purposes of academic development, research transparency, and cross-case 
transferability.  
My concept of selective law enforcement pays specific attention to law, which the above-
mentioned Russian concepts do not. My analysis does not take recourse to a legal approach to 
selective law enforcement, however, as this would miss out on its much broader political 
significance. Rather, the analysis is based on a middle position that allows for a more than 
skeptical attitude towards legal idealism while at the same time acknowledging both the 
normative and descriptive usefulness of separating formal and informal institutions. My 
approach fully incorporates the perspective of legal instrumentality, which is so crucial to 
quasi-legal repression in Russia. 
The focus on specifically legal tools allows us to ask several important questions: Why 
exactly is law such a popular tool of repression? In what ways is law related to power? What 
legal documents are utilized in the process? Which legal issue areas are most relevant? The 
notions of telephone justice and basmannoe pravosudie do not provide a path for exploring 
such questions. Instead, they simply assert that the law is subordinated to power and the 
powerful. A closer examination of what role law plays in selective law enforcement helps us 
understand how the practice functions, how it relates to legal affairs, and why Western 
observers are so upset about it.  
Selective law enforcement is also useful in the way it relates closely to other analytical 
perspectives on politics on different levels of aggregation. As argued in the introductory 
chapter, much of the recent literature on authoritarian and neopatrimonial rule concerns 
exactly the same tensions that characterize selective law enforcement. Selective law 
enforcement thus provides a subject of research in which these tensions may be explored in a 
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richness of detail. Not least, it shows how the ambiguity that results from quasi-formality and 
political dualism may be actively played upon by actors seeking legitimacy. 
Finally, compared to esoteric concepts that refer to history, folklore, and wordplay, selective 
law enforcement is semantically intuitive and does not presuppose area-specific knowledge. 
Hopefully, this makes the concept less susceptible to an unfruitful proliferation of ever new 
meanings. I also suggest how selective law enforcement as a concept may be disassembled 
and investigated in detail on an operative level, something which makes it easy to elaborate 
on, improve, or contest in area-specific or comparative studies. 
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4 The Mechanics of Selective Law 
Enforcement 
4.1 What is Selective Law Enforcement? 
Simply put, I suggest that selective law enforcement is selectivity, law enforcement, and a 
specific relation between the two. As mentioned in the introduction, “selectivity” and “law 
enforcement” are used with specific meanings. First, “law enforcement” must here be 
understood broadly, like de-facto punitive or restrictive legal acts .This is important, because 
according to a substantial understanding of law enforcement, selective law enforcement is not 
law enforcement at all (see below). “Selectivity,” on the other hand, is understood narrowly 
and only encompasses (the perception of) conscious selection based on goals of political 
suppression of dissent.  
The two linguistic components juxtapose, as suggested by Levitsky and Way (2010, 26-28), 
the informal (selectivity) and the formal (law enforcement). The conceptual integrity of the 
term “law enforcement” is thwarted by the qualifier because the informal basis of selection 
negates some essential quality that we normally associate with law enforcement. In my 
theoretical conception, selective law enforcement is not law enforcement at all. On the 
contrary, I will claim it is a mechanism to enforce informal rules that are politically or legally 
implausible to formalize. The notion of “law enforcement” in this term simply relates to the 
fact that the enforcement of informal rule is achieved by the use of state resources and with 
the pretext of reference to law and formal state institutions. 
Selective law enforcement is thus primarily the realization of a link between informal rules of 
political conduct and formalized law enforcement, pointing back to a formal rule set for 
“justification.” The two linguistic components of “selectivity” and “law enforcement” are 
separate and “phased” as a selection precedes law enforcement (although continued 
interference with the case may also take place). When selective law enforcement takes place, 
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informal criteria constitute the only or primary reason for a selection – and thus also the main 
reason for legal procedures to be initiated.34 
Individual actors make use of their influence over law enforcement for various reasons. 
Presumably, they are in the majority of cases not directly concerned with the interests of the 
political regime as such. Rather, they take care of their own problems and their own 
opponents and critics. They are not necessarily consciously motivated in each and every case 
by the long-term enforcement of informal rules but rather by a wish to clear up a specific 
situation there and then.  
In Russia, access to state power under Putin’s first two terms of presidency was concentrated 
among an increasingly uniform group of regime insiders. To a larger degree than before, the 
interests of regional leaders were realigned with the interests of the central regime in Moscow 
(Petrov 2011). When mayors, local party leaders, or governors arrange for selective law 
enforcement they may be primarily concerned with personal matters. Yet, they also tend to 
reinforce the authoritarian rules of political conduct that benefit the authoritarian regime at 
large. Not least because the access to extralegal influence over the broader legal system is 
concentrated among regime insiders, the informal criteria for law enforcement seem to take 
on patterns that benefit this regime. This study does not indicate that the practice is 
coordinated by a central authority in all cases. Rather, structural incentives replicate the 
                                                 
34 Whether the link is one of causality is a complicated question, also beyond the philosophical disagreements on 
the relationship between intention and cause. A perception of causality in a broad sense is evident in 
counterfactual statements among critics: Law enforcement would not have been initiated if an informal selection 
had not been made. At face value, this would indicate that an informal selection is a necessary condition for law 
enforcement, a claim that is clearly unreasonable except in a probabilistic sense. It would be fair to say that 
observers can never identify more than the primary antecedents of selective law enforcement, and even these they 
usually base on qualified guesswork rather than hard proof. Whether the informal selection may be seen as a 
sufficient condition for law enforcement is also unclear, but here also any use of causality must in any case be in 
its broadest sense. The targets’ perceptions suggest that the practice is often built directly upon incoherent legal 
rules – rules that are easily manipulated. As will be seen in the discussion below (chapter 6), the legal system may 
thus be seen as an important part of the practice, even in the extreme interpretation of it being purely contextual. 
In short, the pretext is important. Because the claim to causality is also conditioned upon other contextual factors 
and structural incentives that back up the practice, even a “probabilistic causality” must be in the sense of political 
motivations being part of the “conditions of existence which do not cause something to appear but which create 
the space for its existence and which interact with a multiplicity of other processes”  (Benton and Craib 2011, 
90) 
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pattern of selective law enforcement in different regional contexts. Surely, this fact does not 
rule out that more coordinated campaigns may also take place. 
Frequently, selective law enforcement seems to be a simple reflection of power relations. The 
core rule that underlies all cases of selective law enforcement is that threatening the interests 
of those in power (vlast) may ricochet on you, also in quasi-legal form. It is the 
institutionalization of selective law enforcement that justifies a concept that involves a notion 
of informal rules. By definition, a rule is a generalization valid for all cases that are 
encompassed by the rule’s formulation, while a command only concerns one specific case 
(Schauer 1991). For this reason, a command cannot shape incentives beyond a specific case in 
the same way as a rule does. While this is true, direct commands almost by necessity carry 
with them signals of a more general nature, which function as informal directions or rules to 
be applied in future situations.  
4.2 Selective Law Enforcement as a Mechanism Enforcing 
Informal Rules 
I propose that selective law enforcement works just like other rule enforcement mechanisms 
in many respects. The practice is directed towards punishing or restricting actual and potential 
violators of rules. In the context investigated here, the politically motivated prosecution may 
enforce general obedience and suppress dissenting views. It seeks to keep political 
adversaries, civil society watchdogs, and other critics silent. By selective, but systematic and 
more or less predictable distribution of punishment, the practice also provides incentives for 
the rest of society to stay away from oppositional activities. The key message delivered by 
consistent politicized enforcement is that being in conflict with political authorities is a risky 
affair. In short, selective law enforcement reinforces existing political power relations by 
keeping insiders on the inside and outsiders out. 
4.2.1 The Logics of Rule Enforcement 
In the context of selective law enforcement, there are basically two ways in which the directed 
appliance of violence may help to enforce rules. First, a punitive act may deter further non-
compliance with any given rule. According to the theory of deterrence, the punishment will 
“affect the calculus used by rational actors to assess their potential strategies and to select 
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their rational choice of action” (Knight 1992, 17). In short, the punishment reinforces the 
belief that non-compliance will result in unpleasant consequences, and it thus makes the 
subjects more likely to comply. The punishment also reinforces the perception of threat for 
others that are (made) aware of the punishment – when they realize that violations are 
punished they have an incentive not to violate the rules themselves (Golding 1975). The 
implications and consequence of this mechanism are discussed at some length below. 
Second, a rule may be enforced by impeding the subjects’ ability to violate it. Restricting 
entrance into a strictly forbidden area, for instance, is not just enforced by punishing 
trespassers, but also by setting up some sort of physical barriers. These preventive barriers 
help to keep persons outside, thus making sure the rule of denied access will not be violated. 
The physical restriction of imprisonment blocks the ability of a subject to commit a host of 
unwanted acts. When deterrence is dependent upon rational reasoning or psychological fear, 
acts of a preventative nature work in a more straightforward fashion and are directed against 
the “physical aspect” of rule violation. As is the case with punishment, the legal acts or 
sanctions may vary greatly in severity and be absolute or partial. Common to all forms of 
preventive acts is the ability to constrain potential non-compliers from committing unwanted 
acts, usually for a limited period of time (Friedman 1975, 67-75). 
Preventive acts do not have the same broad impact as deterrence does. At the same time, 
prevention is a less complex mechanism and is effective in its own way. First, in contrast with 
deterring punishment, someone whose non-compliance has been simply blocked need not 
understand the motivations behind law enforcement to be prevented from non-compliance. 
Second, while deterrence is dependent upon providing incentives, a method which is known 
to be a gamble, preventive acts do not face these limits. The differences between these two 
aspects of rule enforcement carry implications for how selective law enforcement may be 
imposed effectively. Deterring and preventing constitute different strategies with different 
outcomes and scopes. Deterrence has a broader impact and is therefore less demanding on 
resources in general. In selective law enforcement, preventive acts carry the greatest 
significance when efficiently imposed to block the actions of consistent violators, those who 
will not be deterred. Keeping someone preoccupied works as a soft or partial prevention, 
restraining the target’s ability to concentrate his efforts on unwanted acts. Needless to say, 
preventive acts function only when a rule is prohibitive and not where it constitutes an 
imposition to perform a specific action. In this they differ from deterrence, which in theory 
may impose incentives for any act. 
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In reality, many if not most legal sanctions have both punitive and restrictive elements. 
Imprisonment, for instance, impairs the prisoner’s ability to commit serious violations for that 
period of time. At the same time, it is traditionally also seen as a form of punishment (leaving 
out restoration/rehabilitation). The prospect of potential imprisonment is believed to shape the 
incentives of both former prisoners and the outside world. Similarly, a fine is both a 
punishment and a financial restriction, and an execution is certainly the ultimate preventive 
act against the person in question but also greatly deterring for others.  
We need to approach punishment broadly in order to understand the impact of selective law 
enforcement upon society. The deterring effect is not dependent upon whether or not the 
punishment is officially recognized as such. The same holds true for restrictions. Repeated 
and prolonged court cases, for instance, may be interpreted as both punitive and restrictive 
even when they are won. Formally neutral acts, like inspections or interrogations, may have 
similar consequences. The litmus test of punishment is whether or not non-compliers are put 
in a (subjectively) worse situation than those who comply (Macrory 2008, 37). 
Finally, to the degree that investigative acts are initiated selectively for the ulterior purpose of 
later punishment (or further restrictions), they may also be encompassed by the term selective 
law enforcement. An example may be searches allegedly for unlicensed software but in reality 
more for internal documents and correspondence that can be useful in future suppression of 
(legal) activities. 
4.2.2  Selective Law Enforcement’s Chain of Purpose 
Like all regulative rules, the informal rules that are enforced by selective law enforcement are 
composite. First, all regulative rules contain what Schauer (1991, 23) calls a factual predicate, 
a description of its scope.35 The factual predicate defines the conditions to be met for 
sanctions to be imposed (or rewards given). It may be translated into a “if p” where p is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for punishment or reward. Secondly, the rule contains a 
consequent, “then q,” specifying what will supposedly happen if p is fulfilled (Schauer 1991). 
                                                 
35 I refer frequently to Frederick Schauer in my conceptualization of rules. I do not intend to contribute to any 
legal philosophical debates in my adaptation of Schauer but find his (1991) thorough conceptualization of rules 
useful for my purposes. In particular, I lean on his clear-cut separation of predicates and consequents that is key 
to my concept and on his conceptualization of rules as separate from law. 
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In deterrence-based enforcement, the rule is enforced by realizing this link between p and q. 
In the case of preventive acts, the rule is enforced simply by making p difficult or impossible 
to realize. 
In this understanding, the prescriptive rule thus includes a threat or warning that something 
might happen if the rule is violated (I will not discuss rewards). While this threat need not be 
explicit, it needs to be recognized for the rule to qualify as regulative. When we identify a 
regulative rule, we intuitively also accept that it has a consequent. A restaurant sign saying 
“no dogs allowed” (example used in Schauer 1991) has no explicit consequent, yet it is 
understood that “if you bring a dog, it will not be allowed into the restaurant” or “if you bring 
a dog into the restaurant, you will be kicked out.” 
In the logic of deterrence, to impose punishment against non-compliers will sustain the rule’s 
integrity by it reinforcing the link between predicate and consequent. In other words, 
punishment is primarily a means to an end, although the enforced rule is usually itself also a 
means to achieve some form of goods. Importantly, the punished must understand the 
significance of the punishment if they are to take the rule into account. If those stopped from 
entering the restaurant do not understand that the denial or because of their dogs, they might 
come back another day accompanied by the same dogs and expect to get in with a more 
fashionable clothing. For this reason, all rules that have ambitions to regulate behavior beyond 
a single instance must be promulgated to have the desired deterring effect. In the above case, 
the sign “no dogs allowed” does the trick. 
In the case of selective law enforcement, however, the main goal is not to enforce law. Legal 
rules are used as an instrument against a predefined target, and the legal steps are initiated 
based on external and legally irrelevant criteria. The doorkeeper of a bar may for instance 
deny entry to a person that fails to produce a valid ID, while the decision is actually motivated 
by racist discrimination. At this bar, IDs are only checked on occasion.  
Selective law enforcement implies that the law enforcers in that instance do not act upon the 
legal rules that are instrumentalized. The doorkeeper is motivated by the informal rules as 
hinted at by the bar owners and influenced by its clientele; he or she uses the lack of ID as a 
pretext for racial profiling. At the same time, the pretext may fend off accusations of racism, 
which the bar owners’ fear may lead to all sorts of trouble. In such a case, the stated rule is 
purely pretextual; its enforcement takes no regard to the issue of ID. Had the person in 
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question actually produced a valid ID, the doorkeeper may have simply changed pretext and 
referred to the strict dress code. The motivations would remain the same and be unrelated to 
the pretextual rules. Whether or not the guest complied with the instrumentalized rule is 
theoretically speaking irrelevant to the claim that it has been selectively enforced. 
Political quasi-legal repression may take place according to a similar logic. After a series of 
peaceful but vocal street protests, a hypothetical mayor and an equally hypothetical political 
advisor find the prolonged protests to be detrimental to their position. They decide to contain 
the protests, but do not want to create a scandal. They know that an illegal crackdown with a 
strong hand may very well turn out to be counterproductive. For the same reason, the town 
council does not dare to deny the requests to arrange more rallies. The political advisor makes 
a phone call to the local chief of police, and during the ensuing days several lead activists are 
detained and charged with taking bribes, using illegal substances, or distributing unlicensed 
software.  
The initiators of the investigation hope and expect that several other activist leaders will fear 
such legal scrutiny and stay home on the next day of the protests, finding that the risk is not 
worth the trouble. In this case, the concern of the police was not to enforce law as such, but 
rather to dig up any possible violation on the part of some predefined targets. This case does 
not necessarily mean that the charges were entirely off the mark; the approach may have been 
partly designed on what the police already had collected about their targets. Next week the 
protestors lack several of their leaders, and the rank and file have been drastically reduced, 
paradoxically with good help from activist websites spreading the word about the selective 
crackdown. In a relatively silent fashion, and with no obvious legal violations, the mechanism 
of selective law enforcement has reinforced the authoritarian rules of conduct. 
Above, I held punishment to be a means to enforce a rule. By punishing criminals, for 
instance, the integrity of the criminal code is strengthened. In the case of selective law 
enforcement, this logic may at first seem to be turned upside down. In the above example, the 
legal rules become a means to the goal of punishing a predefined target and not the other way 
around. Selective law enforcement is what U.S. federal prosecutor Robert H. Jackson (1940, 
19) warned against when he stated that the most dangerous power of a prosecutor is the 
discretion to “pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be 
prosecuted.”  
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While it is true that a legal rule in selective law enforcement is a means to pursue punishment, 
this punishment again enforces another, informal, set of rules. It is this “secondary” 
enforcement that is the primary purpose of selective law enforcement. In selective law 
enforcement, legal rules are not in any way to be confused with the rules that are actually 
enforced. A chain of purpose can thus be identified: The legal rule is a means to punishment 
is a means to sustaining the integrity of informal rules. To understand selective law 
enforcement as rule enforcement, we should not be disturbed by the legal rules thrown at the 
scene to confuse us. By employing legal rules and enforcing them selectively, influential 
individuals can instrumentalize the state monopoly on legitimate violence to pursue the 
informal interests of themselves and their patrons. 
4.2.3  Legal Acts Are the Tip of the Iceberg 
Punishment may deter in two main ways. First it may deter the punished individual herself 
from further non-compliance, after the old principle “once bitten, twice shy.” It is, however, 
not the target alone who may be deterred by rule enforcement. We must also take into account 
the general deterrence – the so-called chilling effect. Not only may some of the detained 
activists in the above example fail to show up on the next rally for fear of further 
investigations or frame-ups. Other activists as well will consider the risk, as will in theory 
every potential non-complier that understands the political link. Every time a target is 
punished, an unknown number of bystanders are considering the experience, and adjusting 
their future behavior accordingly. 
From an outcome perspective of rule enforcement, then, the prosecution itself is just the tip of 
the iceberg. While we can observe selective law enforcement, or at least subjective 
representations of it, the subjects of general deterrence are out of our radar’s reach. We can 
never count the number of statements and opinions that are never expressed publicly due 
partly to the threat of selective law enforcement. Even the deterred individuals themselves are 
hardly able to recognize all the factors driving their decisions. The general danger associated 
with criticizing authorities leads journalists and others to self-censorship. I contend, however, 
that the term “self-censorship” only clouds the repressive origin of the practice. What is self-
censorship here but another word for successful enforcement of informal rules by means of 
deterrence? While it is well worth examining cases of individual prosecution, it should be 
underscored that most of the iceberg remains submerged and out of view. 
Legal Action for Extra-Legal Purposes 
 
~ 65 ~ 
 
4.2.4  Why Informal Rules Must Be Promulgated 
As already stressed, selective law enforcement is characterized by a link between the informal 
selection process and the formal legal procedures. Legal subjects may certainly misinterpret 
the political context, attributing a legal case with political meaning that the law enforcers 
never had in mind. Alternatively, prosecuted individuals may consciously lead others into 
believing in a political link that they have no belief in themselves. If a perception of a 
political link is established, the logic of informal rule enforcement will be partly valid even 
without the actual existence of ulterior motives on the officials’ part. As Austin T. Turk 
(1976, 287, emphasis in original) noted, “Law believed to be biased may be just as ineffective, 
or worse, as law that is biased.” 
According to Schauer (1991, 113), a subject of a rule can be said to follow the rule if and only 
if the rule constitutes a reason for action. If no consideration of rules is involved in the 
subject’s mind (the rule might for instance be unknown), the subject may of course happen to 
comply with it entirely by chance.36 The rule would, however, not constitute a reason for 
action; thus the law will not be followed. If somebody does not comprehend the reason a 
punishment takes place, no mental link is established between precedent and consequent in 
the minds of the would-be-deterred. In other words, no rule is enforced (except for restriction 
effects). For the relevant subjects to change behavior in the way law enforcers seek, the 
reason for prosecution must be known to them (for the sake of argument, I will not discuss the 
possible effects upon unconscious behavior). 
Because of this important subjective aspect of rule enforcement, initiators of selective law 
enforcement must promulgate what trait or action they consider unwanted. Not only do they 
need to deliver this message to the law enforcers to be sure they take the necessary actions, 
but they also need to transmit the political message to the punished and other relevant 
subjects. Importantly, it is the perceived reason for punishment that will determine what rule 
is essentially enforced, regardless of the intentions behind the prosecution. What is perceived 
                                                 
36 Schauer (1991, 113) stipulates that  “to be guided by a rule requires only that the agent take the existence of a 
rule as a not-necessarily-conclusive reason for action, but that to follow a rule requires both being guided by the 
rule and acting consistent with (complying with) its indications. Compliance with a rule is therefore different 
from following a rule precisely because of the way in which only the latter requires guidance by the rule. 
Conversely, non-compliance with a rule does not presuppose non-guidance, for non-compliance may be the 
conclusion of a reasoning process in which a guiding reason was outweighed by other guiding reasons.” 
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as a completely random display of force might certainly scare the targets but will hardly deter 
them from anything.37 Methodologically speaking, this is good news for a researcher. If 
insiders want to deter their critics, they necessarily need to leave some tracks that can be 
traced.  
Let us imagine another scenario of selective law enforcement to illustrate the point. The 
governor of the fictional region Primerskaya oblast is fed up with a journalist repeatedly 
looking into the regional leadership’s shady involvement with the construction business. The 
governor fears for his reputation, but even more so he38 fears that sustained pressure may 
result in prosecution and his own eventual downfall. As it happens, the accusations have more 
than a grain of truth to them, and even a governor is only above law up to a point. The 
governor decides that action must be taken, but subtly enough to not trigger scandal around 
the sensitive issues. The governor therefore arranges for the fire security agency to make a 
“routine” inspection at the newspaper’s premises. Knowing that the newspaper is located in 
an old building, he expects that no offices there will actually comply with the strict formal 
demands of fire security in Russia. The governor hopes that the agency can issue a fine to add 
pressure to the newspaper or better shut it down to buy himself time. More than anything, 
however, he wants to show that this line of investigation is unacceptable and needs to stop, 
and that he is willing to go to coercive measures to see it done. 
When the agency has fulfilled its part of the deal, the future behavior of the newspaper is 
entirely up to how its staff, editors, or owners perceive what has happened. If the newspaper’s 
staff does not understand the governor’s intentions or role in initiating the fire security 
inspection, there will be no incentives for it to change attitudes regarding the regional 
government. Instead the newspaper may consider the fire security issue, perhaps buying new 
extinguishers or installing fire doors. Ironically then, the formal rules are by mishap enforced 
instead of the informal. The governor’s scheme fails and the newspaper will pick up the same 
topic once reopened if not before. For the legal acts to deter future criticism of the regional 
government, therefore, the de facto reason for crackdown must be communicated. 
                                                 
37 This is why I favor speaking of selective rather than arbitrary law enforcement. “Arbitrary” is used in a 
contradictory fashion, in the meanings of both “selective” and  “random or unpredictable.” 
38 Governors in Russia are, with very few exceptions, male. The few exceptions include Valentina Matvienko in 
St. Petersburg (2003-2011) and Natalya Komarova in Khanty-Mansiisk autonomous okrug (from 2010) and 
Marina Kovtun in Murmansk oblast’ (from 2012). 
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To approach selective law enforcement as the enforcement of informal rules –partly by means 
of deterrence– has wide implications. Importantly, it provides theoretical backing to the claim 
that this quasi-legal practice is oriented towards demarcating the borders of what is politically 
permissible. The argument is built upon the assumption that consistent distribution of 
punishment can provide structural incentives for relevant actors to act upon. Crucially, actors 
cannot act upon incentives they do not know of. In this way, my concept of selective law 
enforcement provides theoretical backing to criticize theories suggesting that selective law 
enforcement is primarily intended to camouflage repression behind a legal façade (section 
1.3.5). 
4.3 Selective Law Enforcement in Terms of Institutional 
Interactions 
We have seen how selective law enforcement may be described in terms of how it connects 
informal rules with legally-imposed sanctions. As such, the practice is aimed at reinforcing 
the informal rules of political conduct by restraining or punishing those who challenge these 
rules. This next section will extend the discussion by incorporating some perspectives on 
institutional interactions, in particular on how selective law enforcement combines informal 
and formal elements.  
There is a considerable literature discussing the interpretation, conceptualization, and 
systematization of our knowledge about how formal and “other” institutions interact. The 
relations between formal political institutions and important informal institutions are crucial 
to politics in Russia – a country well-known for its formalist bureaucracy and strong state 
ideology, yet also for its informal networks, clientelism, and corruption 
There are challenges associated with the use of a formal-informal dichotomy. Some scholars 
even reject it in full. Yaroslav Startsev (2005), for instance, argues that the formal-informal 
distinction is inherently biased and claims that the dichotomy presupposes the predominance 
of the formal. To describe a world of grey-scales in terms of black and white arguably tends 
to lead us into residual categories with unclear meanings. Instead of explaining what a 
practice is, we may be tempted to call it quasi-formal or semi-legal for lack of better terms. 
For the sake of exploring a phenomenon with a distinct hybrid character such as selective law 
enforcement, however, I contend that dichotomies may still be useful. Properly used, quasi-
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formality may be more than a residual category. In positively defined terms, quasi-formality 
may underscore rather than obscure the essence of what selective law enforcement is and how 
it works. Yet, selective law enforcement is not easy to align with existent typologies of 
institutional interactions. In the following discussion, I will not conclude on any preferred 
typology but provide a criticism of existing typologies with the peculiar practice of selective 
law enforcement in mind. For purposes of concept development, I also utilize the debate on 
institutional interaction to shed further light on the hybrid character of selective law 
enforcement. 
4.3.1  Separate Institutional Chains And Their Interaction 
In a simplified model of rule enforcement, violations of legal rules lead to formal sanctions, 
and non-compliance with informal rules correspondingly leads to informal sanctions. Legal 
rules are enforced by agencies authorized by the government, while informal rules are 
enforced by society.  
This paradigm is arguably how we often think, and definitions that build on this 
understanding of separated institutional chains are many. Hans Joachim Lauth (2004a, 70) 
holds that while formal institutions “are guaranteed by state agencies and their violation is 
sanctioned by the state, most of the informal institutions are based solely on their existence 
and effectiveness.” Another scholar defines informal institutions as those that are “not 
sanctioned or codified via legal recognition, legal enforcement, or official access to 
power/policymaking” (Grzymala-Busse 2004, 5). The enforcement of informal rules, then, 
may be seen as enforced “by means of sanctions such as expulsion from the community, 
ostracism by friends and neighbors, or loss of reputation” (Pejovich 1999, 166). In the 
interpretation of Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky (2004, 727), informal rules are 
“shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of 
officially sanctioned channels.” In a slightly different formulation, “state agencies and courts 
are not (officially) involved in the process” of enforcing informal rules (Stefes 2006, 18). 
Along these lines of thought, we may envision a model of two parallel rule sets with 
corresponding sanctioning mechanisms (figure 2).  
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The conceptual separation of informal and formal institutions is nothing out of the ordinary. 
Moreover, informality must necessarily be opposed to formality to make sense at all. 
Selective law enforcement, however, challenges the model of separate formal and informal 
institutions because the concept also suggests that informal rules may be enforced by formal 
means. The conceptual integrity of a separation model can possibly be salvaged, for instance 
by seeing the initiation of selective law enforcement as an informal sanction. Yet, a 
characterization that circumvents the hybridity so essential to the practice is in my view not 
satisfactory. In the case of selective law enforcement, the informal rules are certainly not 
“enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” (above). Likewise, state agencies and 
courts are definitely “involved in the process” (above) even though the rules are informal. 
The tight relationship between informal rules and formal institutions is widely acknowledged. 
While many definitions see informal and formal institutions as separate, they are still seen as 
interacting. Lauth (2004a, 73) even identifies informal political institutions by “their reference 
to binding decisions, guaranteed by the legally-constituted exclusive authority of the state.” 
According to him, this reference is exactly what separates informal political institutions from 
other informal phenomena. Following Guillermo O’ Donnell’s (1996) lead in engaging the 
topic of informal institutions, a number of works present models of institutional interaction on 
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a similar platform. Within these works, the informal institution types are defined exactly by 
their relations to formal institutions in one way or another. 
Like O’Donnell, Lauth primarily focuses on Latin America in his research. According to his 
(2004b, 24) typology of institutional interactions, the relationship between informal and 
formal institutions can be divided into the following categories: complementary  – in which 
the institutions support each other; substitutive  – in which the informal institution does what 
the formal fails to do; and conflictive – “when the two systems of rules are incompatible.” 
Based on her studies of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, Anna Grzymala-Busse (2004, 7) asserts a 
very similar categorization, discussing the different types of institutional interaction in terms 
of “substitution, undermining, and reinforcement.” In a different article, however, Lauth adds 
a subcategory to his model of interaction that draws it closer to my area of interest. 
Conflictive institutions, he (2004a, 74) states, may either “displace each other” or the informal 
may penetrate the formal to the extent that the latter becomes “occupied” and its functionality 
subverted. Selective law enforcement is typically used exactly for undermining constitutional 
rights from within the legal system. 
Victor Nee (1998) provides another typology from the perspective of institutional economics. 
Nee identifies three distinct types of informal norms –congruent, decoupled, and 
oppositional– based on how they relate to formal institutions. Like Lauth or Grzymala-Busse, 
Nee stresses the division between institutions in conflict or harmony with each other. The 
reference to decoupled norms, however, is a reintroduction of an idea earlier discussed by 
John Meyer and Brian Rowan (1977). Meyer and Rowan (1977, 345) found that formal 
institutions lend legitimacy to an organization because they are considered “proper, adequate, 
rational, and necessary.” Yet, they also found that the activity of many organizations 
consistently deviated from the formal blueprint, to the degree that it seemed more or less 
independent. Formal rules are often created as vague or otherwise flexible, Meyer and Rowan 
contend, so as to provide legitimacy without restricting efficiency.  
In a declared attempt to set a “research agenda” on the issues of institutional interaction, 
Helmke and Levitsky (2004) extend Lauth’s and Grzymala-Busse’s typologies from the same 
year (table 1). Building on the same logic, they restructure the typology to encompass four 
types of informal institutions along two defining dimensions. The first dimension concerns the 
effectiveness of the formal institutions that the informal ones interact with. The second 
regards whether the outcomes of the informal institutions are seen as convergent or divergent 
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with the formal. Three of the table fields are filled with institutional types we are now familiar 
with: complementary, substitutive, and competing (conflictive). In addition, Helmke and 
Levitsky (2004, 729) include in their four-field matrix the notion of accommodating informal 
institutions. These institutions “create incentives to behave in ways that alter the substantive 
effects of formal rules, but without directly violating them; they contradict the spirit, but not 
the letter, of the formal rules” (ibid).  
 
 
 
Helmke and Levitsky’s discussion of “accommodating” institutions seems to build on the 
above-mentioned subtype that Lauth (2004a, 74) proposes and indicates that the authors do 
not neglect the widespread phenomenon of selective law enforcement. Yet, the matrix they 
present is by no means unproblematic from the perspective of selective law enforcement. 
Indeed, selective law enforcement highlights difficulties with regard to both the vertical and 
the horizontal axis of the model.  
The distinction that makes up the vertical axis in Helmke and Levitksy is also implicated in 
the other typologies discussed, all of which operate with an idea that institutions may be in 
harmony or in conflict. While there is a degree of intuitiveness about such a distinction, and 
something may certainly be said for it, it seems impossible to either foresee or measure any 
isolated outcomes of formal and informal institutions. In empirical studies, the impacts of 
theoretically separated formal and informal institutions seem impossible to disentangle. The 
problem of precisely identifying institutional causes for effects is obvious, but the trouble 
extends beyond this general problem.  
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The other key problem with the distinction stems from its institutional origins. As Douglass 
North (1990) observed, institutions are purposefully shaped within the existent opportunity 
structures; they are the creations of men and women operating in context. This fact means that 
legislators tailor new rules in accordance with existing institutions. New rules may be created 
for the purpose of fighting old habits (informal institutions) or for the purpose of 
complementing them. But the impact of the rules cannot be understood independently of each 
other. This situation makes any notion of “independent” institutional outcomes implausible. 
We may mend the problem of identifying causality by replacing “outcomes” in the above 
typology with a notion that includes intentions of agents, such as “intended outcomes” or 
“institutional purposes.” This conceptual adjustment will not, however, resolve the deeper 
issue of institutional interdependence and contextuality unless we choose to artificially isolate 
legal interpretation from its context. 
The problem of measuring outcomes and intention in empirical studies is probably most 
obvious in the study of heavily corrupted and authoritarian regimes. As Keith Darden’s 
(2001) study of Ukraine shows, anti-corruption laws were deliberately used for corrupt 
purposes, not only for individual benefit but also to keep the regime intact. Darden writes: 
“Where graft is essential to the functioning of the state hierarchy … it is useful to think of 
hierarchy-reinforcing graft” (Darden 2008, 41). Also basing herself on studies of Ukraine, 
Kerstin Zimmer (2008, 268) contends that laws “are often purposefully designed in such a 
way, that informal patron-client relationship must be used in order to act successfully.” This 
manipulation is not only a legacy of the past. While there are important elements of 
improvisation to the legal manipulation (Ledeneva 2006b), the structural incentives for 
manipulation may also be part of active institution building and authoritarian regime design 
(Gel’man 2004; Robertson 2011).  
In many ways, this thesis adds to the circumstantial evidence in this regard, though an actual 
intent will always be hard to prove. When the legislators belong to the same elite group as do 
the most powerful manipulators –and sometimes even are the same individuals– it would be 
counter-intuitive to find the intention behind laws to be in conflict with implementation 
practices. At the same time, it is no more intuitive to contend that the laws are in harmony 
with their abuse. In conclusion, the separation between convergent or divergent institutional 
outcomes or even intended outcomes may be suboptimal. 
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To make Helmke and Levitsky’s vertical axis work properly after this critique, we can address 
the “outcomes” of formal rules only in terms of their formal purpose. This formal purpose 
should not be addressed as the actual intentions of agents, but rather a theoretical construct to 
denote a rational-legal “promise” that a legal text supposedly gives its subjects. It is not 
impossible that Helmke and Levitsky had something like this in mind when they made 
practices that “contradict the spirit, but not the letter” of law an example of an accommodat-
ing informal institution (above). With my above discussion (section 3.1) on instrumentality in 
Russian legal culture in mind, however, the “spirit of the law” is not necessarily a fruitful 
point of departure for discussing selective law enforcement. To the degree legislators can 
imbue “spirit” in a law, we would reasonably expect some degree of consistency between the 
legislators’ motives and that spirit. Then again, we can only guess regarding their motives. If 
the motives of individuals are an epistemologically problematic subject of research, the 
motives behind group decisions are even worse. The only thing that remains certain is that 
these motives are diverse and complicated. As pointed out above, from the very creation of 
formal rules, the legislators take into account the existing world, including informal practices. 
The horizontal axis of Helmke and Levitsky’s model separates informal institutions, 
depending on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the interacting formal institution. Also 
along this axis we encounter challenges. As I will argue, selective law enforcement stands in a 
seemingly paradoxical relation to the formal legal system; it is at the same time dependent 
upon both the legal system’s effectiveness and its weakness. 
The informal criteria that are enforced by means of selective law enforcement are in direct 
conflict with the constitutional rights and thus the “formal purpose” of the legal system. To 
allow for such extralegal criteria to consistently influence law enforcement, the broader legal 
system must by definition be weak in the common conception of the word. Selective law 
enforcement also makes the legal system weaker by undermining it. First, selective law 
enforcement preys upon its financial resources. Second, pervasive abuse also weakens the 
popular belief in the legal system, an attitude which again hurts the ability of formal rules to 
be a regulative force in society.  
Lauth (2004a, 74) introduces the concept of parasitic institutions. According to him (ibid), 
parasitic informal institutions live at the expense of formal institutions either by “partially 
occupying or penetrating them.” Being a parasite, however, is an act of balancing. Parasitic 
institutions are dependent upon the formal institutions they undermine (Lauth 2004a, 74). 
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Selective law enforcement is dependent upon the continued existence of the legal system, its 
allocated resources, and its basis for legitimacy. As in biology, no parasite can survive 
without a host, though the host can easily survive without the parasite. The more the legal 
system is abused, the less legitimacy it retains for rational-legal regulation and the less 
legitimacy it can lend back to selective law enforcement. With regard to physical resources, 
selective law enforcement is entirely dependent upon the state coercive apparatus. Because 
the scheme would be nothing without the muscles of the state, the parasite attaches itself to 
the formal institutions and preys upon its monopoly of legitimate violence.39 The typology of 
Helmke and Levitksy does not account for such complex interactions.  
4.3.2  Breaking the Conceptual Chains 
We have seen how many definitions find common grounds in a model in which formal and 
informal institutional “chains” constituted by rules, enforcement channels, and sanctions are 
kept separated. We have also seen that an approach to selective law enforcement as the 
enforcement of informal rules by means of formally imposed punishment has certain 
advantages. Yet, this concept’s bad fit with a traditional model of separated institutions is 
obvious. It is pertinent to ask, then, whether it is possible to break these institutional chains in 
order to reorganize them in a way that adequately addresses our subject of interest. As I argue 
below, the hybridity of the practice and the neopatrimonial setting again complicate our task 
considerably. 
Stefan Voigt and Hella Engerer (2001) are among those who acknowledge the composite 
nature of institutions and the centrality of enforcement mechanisms to their functions. With 
background from law and economics, the two researchers define institutions as “commonly 
known rules to structure repetitive interaction situations plus an enforcement mechanism that 
ensures that non-compliance with the rule-component is sanctioned” (Voigt and Engerer 
2001, 132). In other words, they distinguish between two “components of institutions,” 
                                                 
39 Vadim Kononeko (2011, 5) uses an almost diametrically opposite biologism to describe the relationship 
“between informal groups and formal institutions,” calling it “a sort of symbiosis.” The relationship that 
Kononeko sketches in that very same paragraph, however, is arguably parasitic. The state is “chronically weak 
and subordinate to the networks, yet it is kept afloat as a sort of institutional carcass that the networks need.” 
Also Ledeneva (2013, 246) speaks of a “symbiotic relationship,” reflecting the fact that the state is too weak to 
exist without informal practices to mend it effects, yet she also contends that the informal governance of Russia 
is detrimental to the official policies in the long term.  
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namely rules and their enforcement (ibid). This is a useful point of departure for our purposes, 
as we have noted that it is exactly the rules and their means of enforcement that constitute the 
hybridity of selective law enforcement. A conceptual separation between the rule component 
and the enforcement component of an institution may therefore provide a more accurate 
model for our purposes than the above typologies. 
According to Voigt and Engerer (2001, 132), “one can distinguish between rules whose non-
compliance is sanctioned by representatives of the state and rules whose non-compliance is 
sanctioned by members of society.” This premise again forms the basis to separate “external 
institutions” enforced by the state and “internal institutions” enforced by society (ibid). Voigt 
and Engerer (2001, 133) also set up a typology of institution types based on categorizations 
along the lines of “kind of rule” and “kind of enforcement.”  
 
 
 
In this typology (table 2) Voigt and Engerer attach one specific type of rule to one specific 
type of enforcement. According to the resulting typology, the identification of one 
“institutional component” will therefore be sufficient to identify both the other component 
and the institution type. This bundling of the two institutional components “rule” and 
“enforcement” is unfortunate, as it largely ruins the point of addressing them separately in the 
first place. Moreover, their typology replicates the above identified problems of separated 
formal and informal institutions on a different level. The separation of “private rules” – 
enforced by “organized private enforcement” on the one hand – and “state law” – enforced by 
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“organized state enforcement” on the other – again provides a bad fit with selective law 
enforcement. We may possibly apply a distinction between just and corrupted legal acts to 
decide whether the rule enforced is a “private rule” or “state law” and whether the 
enforcement should be considered “external” or “internal.” Yet, we end up struggling with the 
same problems of discerning motivations and outcomes as identified above. 
The problem of Voigt and Enger’s typology originates in the authors’ assumption of a clear 
separation between state and society. For this reason, the authors are not able to remove the 
fog surrounding hybrid institutions in neopatrimonial systems. In the case of selective law 
enforcement, the law enforcers are not acting purely on the behalf of the state (external 
sanction), but neither are they completely privatized for corrupt interests (internal sanction). 
Rather, the law enforcers attempt to combine the two rule sets in order to reach their informal 
goal within the formal framework. The coexistence of the two rule sets reflects the blur 
between the public and private sphere in Russian politics. Both formal and informal rules have 
a role to play in the enforcement mechanism itself, something not accounted for in the models 
discussed. At the very least, formal rules provide the financial resources and the legitimacy of 
the formal order. It would be impossible to leave out this important fact in a concept of 
selective law enforcement. 
As we have observed above, the neopatrimonial character of today’s Russia makes the 
application of standard models of informal and formal institutional interactions problematic. 
Kerstin Zimmer (2008) asserts that the Western separation between the public and private is 
normatively derived and artificially imposed on post-Soviet countries. Zimmer rejects much 
of the existing literature as ideologically biased and based on the erroneous assumption that 
neopatrimonial states can be seen as separate from their rulers. She contends that “informal 
rules and practices neither operate alongside nor in conflict with formal rules, and that they 
also do not replace the formal rules” (Zimmer 2008, 267). Instead, Zimmer asserts there is a 
“blurring of formal and informal rules” (ibid, emphasis in original). 
Many of Zimmer’s comments are well justified. As noted, no rules develop in isolation from 
their environment. The interconnectedness of informal and formal rules is part of their 
functioning and their design. Notions of “pure” formality are meaningless at least with 
regards to intentions. We should also be aware of the trap of making formality a normative 
ideal in itself. As József Böröcz (2000, 352) puts it, a system of governance based on 
Legal Action for Extra-Legal Purposes 
 
~ 77 ~ 
 
formality alone would be “just about the purest and most absurd” form of dystopia 
conceivable.  
With regard to our concept of selective law enforcement, the blur between the formal and the 
informal rules is important to the functionality of the mechanism because the formal rules 
provide an instrument while informal rules provides the motivation for the enforcement. In 
selective law enforcement, we see that “if p, then q” but also that “if r, then q,” where p is the 
formal predicate, r is the informal, and q is the expected consequence that gives the rules their 
integrity. In this model, the blurring of informal and formal rules is shown by the two rule sets 
sharing the same consequents. Because of this over-determination of q it will, like noted 
above, ultimately be up to the prosecuted and observers to interpret the inspections with 
regard to p, with regard to r, or possibly with regard to both. While easy to keep separated on 
a theoretical level, an absolute distinction between formal and informal rules is sometimes 
harder to apply in actual cases. Questions regarding legality become fuzzy since the mixture 
of informal intentions and de jure legality is fundamentally non-transparent. By actively 
playing on the indeterminacy of these issues, selective law enforcement evades, complicates, 
and distorts attempts at objective identification. 
Because informal and formal rules have separate roles to play, however, their conceptual 
separation remains fruitful. As Guro Erdmann and Ulf Engel (2007, 105) note: “Under 
neopatrimonialism … formal structures and rules do exist, although in practice the separation 
of the private and the public sphere is not always observed.” Indeed, Zimmer utilizes both the 
formal-informal and the public-private dichotomies in her own analysis. Rather than rejecting 
the conceptual pair as such, Zimmer presumably seeks to show how the interpenetration of the 
two makes a sharp distinction problematic and the relationship between them complex. 
Certainly, a distinction between formal and “the other” has both a normative and a descriptive 
purpose. After all, there is a difference between formalized rules and informal rules of 
conduct, and in many cases the difference is intuitive and obvious. The constitution is a 
collection of formal rules, and the semi-institutionalized rates on kickbacks to state agencies 
are certainly informal. This description holds true even if laws are designed in a process 
shaped by complex motivations which may or may not involve positive expectations about 
their potential instrumentalization for extralegal purposes (see section 6.6). 
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4.4 Selective Law Enforcement as Instrumentalized 
Ambiguity 
Based on the above discussion, I arrive at an illustrative model of selective law enforcement 
in which informal rules challenge the prerogative of laws to define what is punished within 
the formal enforcement channels. Instead of two separate chains, selective law enforcement 
sees a blur between the formal or informal rules. The blur does not occur at the level of the 
rule as such (formal and informal rules are distinguishable). Instead, there is a blur of which 
rule set carries what influence upon the selection leading to legal processes. If we move up the 
chain from imposed sanctions to identify the reasons for the legal acts, we find that two 
different rule sets may possibly have influenced law enforcement.  
Law enforcement officials and political insiders actively make use of this non-transparency. 
On the one hand, the crackdown against regime critics signals that the country is still 
governed by authoritarian leaders who insist on extra-constitutional prerogatives. At the same 
time, the practice paradoxically suggests that the country is ruled at least by reference to law, 
a fact that the Russian leadership plays upon especially in international discourse.  
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A claim of selective law enforcement would necessarily stress the influence of informal rules, 
but initiators will be safeguarded by officially referring to the other, formal rule set. Figure 3 
illustrates how selective law enforcement is an instrumentalization of the ambiguity created  
exactly by the problems identified in the above discussion of institutional interactions. 
In terms of our rule approach, we see a formal rule “if p, then q,” but also an informal rule “if 
r, then q.” The two rules have the same consequent, making selective law enforcement non-
transparent and leaving the question of what actually caused the law enforcement to be a 
matter of opinion and controversy.  
Critics observe the outcome q and interpret it as an enforcement of an informal rule: “if r, 
then q.” In other words, they believe r is what determined the decision to initiate a case. The 
authorities have already hinted that this assumption is a reasonable one (because they 
promulgate this rule) but will publicly brush off the accusations at the same time. They will 
focus on the fact that there is a legal rule “if p, then q.” They may argue that q is therefore the 
consequence of p. By utilizing this discursive switch, the authorities may move the discussion 
from one about political selection “q, thus r” to one about “p or not p.” This latter discussion, 
however, will largely be futile because the existence of p is a strictly legal question which 
cannot be decided outside a court of law. In this way, a spokesperson may deflect criticism 
without resorting to direct lies. In a sense, the deflection is nothing but a well-known 
conversational trick – dodging an unpleasant question by answering a completely different 
one. The answer is absurd in the sense that it does not address the question. Yet, this 
incongruity does seemingly not make it any less popular. 
As my analysis shows, the two issues of political selection and actual legal violations should 
be kept separate. Thus, the reference to legal violations cannot justify a political selection. In 
the same way, claims to political selection cannot justify legal violations. 
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5 Three Issue Areas of Controversy 
In the previous chapter, I presented some of my main findings on what I call the analytical 
level of the concept. The next few chapters reduce the level of abstraction by presenting the 
examined legal issues more directly and move to the operational level of the concept. The 
focus on the interviewees’ perceptions of selective law enforcement will also come to the fore 
in the next chapters, not least in Chapters 7 and 8, which are in part dedicated to the 
interviewees’ subjective interpretations of informal games. 
Below I will initiate this discussion by presenting three legal issue areas with stress on the 
most contentious legal issues and cases of alleged abuse. I will pay special attention to how 
and why the laws seem unable to constrain the informal influences upon enforcement, 
something that will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
5.1 Selections before Elections: Double Standards in 
Implementing Registration Demands 
For a considerable part of the political opposition in Russia, elections are something to be 
watched from the sidelines. Prior to elections, the election committees and courts determine 
who may stand for elections and who may not. Most committee chairs and judges responsible 
for legal review would insist that they are simply applying the law. To many among the 
opposition, however, registration procedures are experienced as a legal minefield designed to 
eliminate unwanted candidates and monopolize the contest for political power. By direct and 
indirect influence over the broader legal system, the incumbents may be able to filter out the 
most politically dangerous candidates before Election Day. With one viable contester after the 
other removed from the race, the elections themselves may be far less competitive than was 
the preceding fight for registration. As a result, voters are also deprived of their favored 
candidates – resulting in a dramatic reduction in democratic output. The candidates who can 
somehow avoid these mines emerge at great advantage. 
Building primarily on material from local and regional elections in Perm and Vladimir in 
2011, this section will discuss the legal framework and enforcement practices related to the 
registration of candidates to stand for elections and the denials of such registration. In both 
Perm and Vladimir, the elections were dominated by serious controversies after several viable 
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opposition candidates were denied registration. After the controversial elections in Perm, even 
Evgenii Kolyushin, a prominent member of Russia’s Central Election Committee, said he was 
alarmed by “possible double standards” in the implementation of election registration 
procedures in the region (Polina 2011a). Remove “possible” from Kolyushin’s statement, and 
most interviewees in this study would probably agree with him. 
5.1.1 The Formal Framework 
The legal framework regulating Russian elections is a very heterogeneous affair. Not only 
does it differ throughout the Federation, but it is also constantly amended on both the federal 
and the regional level. Since the establishment of one dominant party, United Russia (Edinaya 
Rossiya), in the State Duma and in most regions since about 2003, the number of amendments 
has escalated (see Lyubarev 2011b). In Vladimir, the local Election Code was amended 20 
times in the course of one legislative period (Lyubarev 2011a, 416). In Perm krai, the most 
relevant regional laws were amended 16 times during 2010 and 2011 alone.40 Even the federal 
framework law (Federal Law No. 67-FZ of 12 June 2002) that is intended to provide the main 
guidelines for federal and regional elections was amended several times every year in a period 
when United Russia enjoyed an absolute majority in the State Duma (Lyubarev 2011a, 425). 
In general, frequent changes in themselves lead to uncertainty, as every election will have a 
different legal basis than the previous one. Moreover, many changes are adopted immediately 
prior to the elections, giving candidates scant time for preparation (Lyubarev 2011a). 
In accordance with the Putinist doctrine of a “unified legal space” (edinoe pravovoe 
prostranstvo), regional laws should not contradict the federal framework law. One may 
therefore reasonably expect that changes in federal law would trigger waves of regional 
amendments throughout the federation in order to adapt and bring one’s framework into 
accordance with federal requirements. That is, however, an insufficient explanation for 
regional amendments. According to Arkadii Lyubarev, the amendments are not intended to 
clarify the situation or bring the legislation up to date. On the contrary, the electoral 
legislation specialist notes, they bear witness to “the creative spirit of regional legislators” 
(Lyubarev 2011a, 425).  
                                                 
40 Perm Central Election Committee, see especially http://permkrai.izbirkom.ru/way/949273.html, [accessed 
23.05.2012]. 
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According to another study of regional election laws under Vladimir Putin’s second term 
(Buzin 2007), regional legislatures have tended to adopt the strictest standards allowed by the 
federal framework. Andrei Buzin’s (2007) study concluded that the amendments in sum made 
the legislation more vulnerable to extralegal pressure. The regional chapter of GOLOS 
(2011b) in Vladimir is of the opinion that the regional amendments to law in this region were 
detrimental to everyone but United Russia. Intentionally or not (see section 6.6), the legal 
minefield has not been cleared but intensified in the period examined. 
5.1.2 Perceptions of Selectivity 
In general, my interviewees were not happy with Russian election laws. It seems clear from 
their experiences, however, that Russian law should not be analyzed separately from its 
enforcement practice. The political scientist and campaign councilor Oleg Podvintsev in Perm 
summed up the situation in these terms:  
[The main problem] is the implementation, of course. But in reality, it is both this 
and that because the law provides the basis for such an implementation. That is, the 
law is in reality contradictory and contains too many restrictions. Therefore, every-
thing actually depends on the discretion of those implementing the rule. (Podvintsev 
13.11.2011) 
Against the opposition, the interviewees claim, election committees take great care to identify 
even the most marginal mistakes. A political advisor and social scientist I interviewed had 
recently had a chat with a colleague who had “worked against” one of the candidates: 
She told me openly that it had been hard to block [him]. They called on some special 
lawyer from Moscow and searched for every possibility, worked tightly with the 
election committee to dig up a sufficient basis to block him from the elections. And 
dig it up they did. (Anon. political advisor 2011) 
If the candidates are favored by the current authorities, however, even outright falsification of 
registration documentation could easily pass, according to the claims of some interviewees. 
As the above-mentioned advisor recalled, the election committee had brushed off his own 
request to engage graphologists to examine more closely the signatures of another candidate, 
“even though a blind man could see that these signatures were just fake.” (Anon. political 
advisor 2011)  
The political advisor (ibid) also summarized the situation in terms several other interviewees 
would probably agree with: 
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The thing is that the law [enforcement] is selective … The [election] committee gets 
an instruction:“We don’t need this guy, use whatever means it takes to get him 
removed” and everything is switched on. Or the committee on the contrary gets the 
instruction:“This is our guy so please don’t touch him.” … It is simply selectivity. 
The rigidity of the law will only be applied in some occasions when it is necessary to 
block the road. 
Notably, the complaints of denied candidates greatly resemble the opinions of Russian 
experts. This similarity holds true not only for interviewed local experts like Vyacheslav 
Beloborodov (13.11.2011) and Oleg Podvintsev (13.11.2011) in Perm or Lyudmila Eshanu 
(05.09.2011) in Vladimir, all of whom may possibly have stakes in the regional political 
games, but also for internationally known researchers like Lyubarev, Buzin, and Grigorii 
Golosov. Lyubarev (2007, 27) notes that the abuse of registration procedures often leads to “a 
selection of candidates and parties, not allowing those with good chances for victory to stand 
for elections.” He holds this problem to be a major drawback for political competition in 
Russia and even calls it the “main inadequacy of Russian elections” (ibid). Golosov (2011, 
627) notes how the deliberate disqualification of “viable challengers” from elections has 
become widespread throughout the country. The GOLOS reports confirm the tendency of an 
increasing politicization of administrative procedures prior to elections. Scholars from outside 
Russia often rely on the local expertise of GOLOS and researchers like Lyubarev to make 
similar conclusions (e.g. White 2011; Ross 2011). 
5.1.3 Common Controversies 
Even though the legal framework is heterogeneous, it is quite possible to identify some 
categories of common controversies related to registration denials and withdrawals in recent 
years. Most often, the denials find their formal basis in one or more of the following broad 
categories: (1) too large a percentage of the collected signatures are found invalid; (2) the 
candidates’ registration documents contain errors or contradictions; or (3) the candidate has 
violated certain Russian laws in the pre-election campaign.  
The requirement of signature collection may be the most controversial feature of Russian 
election law. Before each election, independent candidates (samodvizhentsy) or parties not 
currently represented in the State Duma must amass signatures to document their support 
among the electorate. The number of signatures to be collected depends on the size of the 
constituency, and it may thus range from a handful in a small electoral district to the two 
million signatures needed to register as an independent candidate for President of the Russian 
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Federation. If more than a certain percentage (also varying) of the signatures should be 
deemed invalid (nedeistvitelnye) or inauthentic (nedostovernye) by expert evaluation, election 
committees can refuse that candidate or party list the right to run in the elections.41  
Regardless of the indisputable importance of signatures in the registration of samodvizhentsy 
or smaller parties, federal legislation lacks specifications for how the signatures are to be 
verified. The procedures, then, are often subject to controversy. At the end of the day, the 
legal actors are left with wide discretion in deciding whether a candidate’s signatures should 
be considered valid or not (Buzin and Lyubarev 2008). 
An instance from Perm can illustrate the level of discretion and the fixation on detail that can 
accompany the verification of signatures. Among the signatures collected to document 
support among the electorate (for a sitting deputy), the experts found one signature which they 
insisted had been written with the letter “п” (p), not ”ы” (y) as in the person’s actual name, 
even though the signer publicly certified that it was indeed his signature (GOLOS 2011c, 
103). In Vladimir, the party list of Yabloko was first registered but later lost the registration in 
court due to blots or corrections in signatures. According to GOLOS (2011b), these were 
irrelevant in determining the signatures’ authenticity.  
More often, the committees focus on alleged inconsistencies in the personal data that are to 
accompany the signature (e.g. Buzin 2006, 2007, Buzin and Lyubarev 2008). In Perm, for 
instance, many signatures were found invalid because of incorrect home addresses. In 2005, 
the region of Perm oblast’ had merged with Komi-Permyak okrug into Perm krai, a new 
federal entity. “Perm oblast’” was thus no longer a correct address. On the other hand, most 
passports still stated Perm oblast’ as place of residence, producing a catch-22 situation: no 
variant would correspond with passports and with the official registers (GOLOS 2011c, 103). 
In several controversial cases, signers are alleged to have given incorrect addresses of 
residence; this is particularly common when the street names contain abbreviations or are 
known under two different names, something which is not unusual in Russia (Buzin 2006). 
Russian law stipulates that all signatures collected on incorrect forms are to be deemed 
invalid. In many cases in which the percentage of invalid signatures seems extraordinarily 
                                                 
41 Signatures are a common feature in Russian law, essential also to the registration of parties and the initiation 
of referendums. For the legal specifics for Perm krai and Vladimir oblast’, see and Perm Krai Law No. 766-PK  
and Vladimir Oblast’ Law No. 10-OZ. On invalid signatures, see Article 32 and 33, respectively. 
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high, the dispute is not actually about the individual signatures but about the sheets on which 
the signatures were collected. Alfred Khaibrakhmanov, for instance, had to cancel his plans 
for re-election as city deputy in Perm. He was denied registration on the grounds that the 
signature sheets for his candidacy had printed the text “year of birth (if 18—day and month of 
birth)” as header of the column where the signer should write down her age. In recent 
amendments to the regional law, the header had been specified to be “year of birth (if age of 
18 on the day of election—in addition day and month of birth).” For the lack of the extra 
seven words in the column header, all of the signatures were found invalid and 
Khaibrakhmanov was denied registration although nobody who had signed the list was below 
the age of 19 anyway. According to the Sverdlovsk District Court in Perm (2011), it would be 
unacceptable to show leniency in such a case. The court (ibid) held that it would be wrong to 
show flexibility in the enforcement of such a clearly-stated requirement, as this would 
“violate the principle of equality before the law of all the candidates, the principle of equal 
suffrage and [the right] for citizens to exercise their eligibility.” 
Signature collection is not the only headache for politicians seeking to get their candidacy 
registered. Alleged irregularities in the documents provided for the committees form another 
frequent basis for denials. Because all candidates must submit registration documents, 
candidates nominated by parties in parliament can also be rejected by this procedure. The 
exact demands to documentation are not specified by federal law, so once again much 
discretion remains with local actors. After 12 years as a city deputy in Perm, Galina Slautina 
(13.11.2011) explains, she was asked to provide the election committee with her marks from 
high school, a document she had not seen in 30 years. In many cases, the stated basis for 
denial concerns inadequate documentation or lack of correspondence between the information 
given and the documentation provided. In other cases, the documents are simply found 
invalid. In Perm, one candidate for the Communist Party (CPRF) was denied registration due 
to an allegedly invalid passport, but won back the registration in court (GOLOS 2011c, 106). 
The same thing happened to Sergei Godunin (interviewed 06.09.2011), a political veteran 
running for the party Just Russia (Spravedlivaya Rossiya) in Vladimir. These disparities are a 
very common basis for denials, according to Lyubarev. Typical foundations may be incidental 
remarks in the passport (by state officials) or failure to provide a copy of the empty pages 
(Lyubarev 02.06.2011). 
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The third commonly applied basis for refusing registration may perhaps seem more 
substantial. Registration can be withdrawn if the candidate has violated certain laws during 
the election campaign. Abuse of office, using money from other sources than the election 
fund, and violating intellectual property rights or conducting “extremist activities” during the 
election campaign are all valid reasons for denials. The disallowance of financing election 
campaigns from outside the election funds are reportedly routinely violated, but only cracked 
down upon on occasion. In selected cases, however, it may be interpreted in an incredibly 
strict and formalistic manner (Lyubarev 02.06.2011).  
Problems related to the two latter bodies of legislation will be discussed below. The denial of 
candidates or parties on grounds of extremist charges must however be considered a tiny issue 
compared to the problems above. Yaroslav Nemchaninov got some attention when he was 
accused of having incited hatred against a supposed “social group” – which consisted of 
“deputies of the State Duma, excluding the CPRF [Communist Party] faction”(GOLOS 
2011b, 10). In another case some years earlier, the registration of the People’s Party 
(Narodnaya Partiya) in Vladimir was cancelled after its campaign was seen to incite hatred 
against the police as a “social group” (Lyubarev 2007, 26). Denials based on copyright 
infringements seem to be more common. 
5.1.4 Registration in a Mine-Field 
The interviewed candidates from Perm and Vladimir are in unison in one respect: the law is 
way too demanding on technical details. It is indeed these details that are most frequently 
pointed to when candidates are blocked:  
It is very strict, very formalized … If you want to remove somebody, find a comma—
no problem. Some bagatelle, trifle or imprecision … Any tiny non-correspondence 
and it will mean removal from the elections. (Cherkasov 05.09.2011)  
The legislation is used in such a way that it is possible to find violations absolutely 
everywhere, but only on some occasions and only with some candidates will they 
[actually identify them]. (Podvintsev 13.11.2011) 
Only the most experienced politicians with a very professional lawyer would be able to 
conduct a perfect registration application with signatures, said Lyubarev (02.06.2011) in an 
interview. 
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In some respects the detailed demands of Russian election law are not so unique. After all, 
modern bureaucracies everywhere tend to create masses of rules and standards. Commonly, 
however, those who fail to meet administrative standards will simply face the irritation of 
additional paperwork. At times, a fine or an administrative fee may be imposed. In the cases 
reviewed here, by contrast, the principle of proportional punishment seems to have been 
completely neglected, as administrative infringements are deemed sufficiently grave as to 
deprive the candidates of their constitutional right to stand for elections. As Lyubarev 
(02.06.2011) pointed out, “all important laws concerning registration should have only this 
goal: to filter out unserious candidates, but let those pass who have or can get real support 
from the electorate.” Denying registration because of minor technicalities has little or no 
connection to this purpose. But then again, the interviewees do not see this as the real reason 
for the denials. 
This formalism is also evident in the fact that signatures are almost exclusively rejected for 
being invalid (nedeistvitelnyi) and very seldom for being inauthentic (nedostovernyi), that is, 
written by another person (Lyubarev 2007). When Mikhail Kasyanov failed to register as a 
candidate for the presidential elections in 2008, for instance, 80,147 of the signatures 
controlled were found invalid, but only 213 unauthentic (Buzin and Lyubarev 2008, 81). 
When Grigorii Yavlinskii was unable to register as presidential candidate four years later, 
25.66% of the signatures controlled were found invalid, but almost all of them because they 
had been delivered to the Central Election Committee (CEC) in the form of photocopies 
(Supreme Court decision 8.2.2012). In other words, the rejections were based not on claims of 
foul play, but of sloppy handiwork.  
This formalism creates great frustration among critics. As a Yabloko politician commented: 
Of course there might be mistakes but this is not a crime, not a falsification … Even 
if there is an error in the passport number, this does not mean that the person is 
non-existent. It just means that the passport data has been written incorrectly. 
(Vishnevskii 26.08.2011) 
Because of frequent denials for invalid or inauthentic signatures, citizens have repeatedly 
deposed or testified before committees and courts to confirm that their support and signatures 
are real. Often, however, such statements are not considered relevant by committees or courts 
which insist that expert evaluations are more important evidence (Eshanu 2011c).  
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Implemented in this way, the signature collection is, in practice, not so much to document 
public support as to document organizational capacity. According to a member of United 
Russia and a regional CEC, it is exactly this element that makes his party stand out in 
registration processes. United Russia’s low number of registration denials, he says, is due not 
least to their skilled and professional lawyers. From this perspective, he adds, “signatures are 
money” (Anon. United Russia member 2011). Quite a few, however, would find the 
crackdown on these alleged technical violations a strange priority in a country ridden with 
more grave election violations and even blunt falsifications (Myagkov et al. 2009). They 
make more sense, however, if interpreted as selective law enforcement. 
5.1.5 An Insider’s Perspective 
When I pressed a member of United Russia and a Central Election Committee (CEC) on the 
issue of selective registration denials, he made a discursive switch (section 4.4) and assured 
me that the committee he works for only had rejected those who were actually violating the 
law: 
Everywhere that we have had scandals, I have looked at the basis for denials. The 
law is applied in a clean way, legal and correct … The reasons [for denials] are 
mistakes done by the collectors and the candidates’ lawyers. (Anon. United Russia 
member 2011). 
Not only did the committee not deny any candidate without a legal basis, the CEC member 
explains: The committee was in fact so soft-hearted that its members on several occasions had 
given candidates and party lists particularly light treatment. Recently, he claims, candidates 
from the Communist Party were let through on the committee’s good will. Earlier the Union 
of Right Forces (Soyuz pravykh sil) had been allowed to run under the governor’s protection 
despite grave violations of the election law. “We have in [our region] no instances when the 
law has been applied unrightfully,” the CEC member concluded, “[but] I can find instances 
where the law has not been applied – when more [candidates] could have been refused” (ibid). 
Only a handful of candidates will be eligible in a single mandate district, and the local 
committee must vote over the registration of one and each of them. Selective non-
enforcement therefore becomes an active decision in the same way as selective enforcement. 
The registration process is binary in that it has only two possible outcomes. From this 
perspective, the above-mentioned CEC member is in practice reformulating the pig 
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Napoleon’s decree in George Orwell’s classic novel: All animals are equal (none are 
unequal), but some animals are more equal than others.  
The politician from United Russia stressed that party membership was not necessarily 
decisive for selective law (non-)enforcement: “We are not always independent from politics, 
but dependent on politics in ways not favorable to United Russia.” In fact, the only case of 
selective law enforcement (in his definition) he could think of was against a United Russia 
candidate. This case was also mentioned by Lyubarev as the only example he could think of 
when United Russia candidates had been deregistered. You also have cases in which the 
merits are almost identical but they only rejected the candidate not from United Russia, he 
adds (Lyubarev 02.06.2011).  
5.1.6 Selections before Elections 
While practices such as bribes or ballot stuffing on Election Day still take place in Russia and 
elsewhere, much electoral manipulation has become legal or quasi-legal (Gandhi and Lust-
Okar 2009) in modern states. Not only may changes in the electoral system have dramatic 
consequences for how the votes cast translate into delegate seats, but also the supply side of 
elections may be altered, with important impacts. In several African countries, for instance, 
incumbent legislatures have included nationality clauses in the election laws in attempts to 
block specific opposition candidates (Schedler 2002, 42). 
My findings sketch out the workings of a less direct way of manipulating which parties or 
candidates end up on the ballot. Unlike, for instance, the above-mentioned nationality clauses, 
the practice is not openly restrictive against any particular candidates. Instead, selective denial 
of a candidate or party registration in Russia is based on a technically demanding environment 
for all candidates, including regime insiders who stand for elections.42 The interviewed 
candidates complain first and foremost about double standards in the implementation of 
registration requirements, and they are united in their belief that that the motive for denials is 
overwhelmingly political. 
                                                 
42 The parties with representatives in the State Duma are, however, not required to collect signatures before 
elections in Russia. 
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While unable to verify these accusations about ulterior motives in individual cases, this 
analysis confirms that the Russian registration system is indeed prone to abuse. The 
combination of vague and frequently-changing laws, mixed with a lot of strict requirements, 
formalistic enforcement and harsh punishment, creates a legal environment in which no 
candidates can be entirely safe from denials without informal support from the power 
networks. Because the incumbent regime has both formal and informal influence over 
administrative and legal actors, it can rely on this formally apolitical administrative 
framework to work as a de facto political filter.43 Selection prior to elections in this way 
reduces the need to employ more direct and illegal means on election day in order to ensure 
victory at the polls. Indeed, at its full potential, it can make other means of manipulation more 
or less superfluous.  
In many districts, the ultimate consequence is that the people are deprived of their right to 
vote for their favored candidate. Especially in single-mandate districts, alternatives are often 
scarce. As indicated by both my own research (see section 7.1) and the extensive study by 
Maria Popova (2012) on electoral disputes, it is exactly when a candidate has real chances to 
win that they are most likely to fight for their registration in court. 
 
                                                 
43 The regime’s control over the committees is rather straightforward. The central election committee in Perm, 
for instance, had for the most part been set up by the governor and the incumbent legislature, with the leader 
nominated by the Federal CEC in Moscow. Also various less formal methods allow the incumbents and 
administration to fill the committees with loyal members (Buzin 2007; Popova, 2012). On the short biographies 
of the members presented on the Perm CEC webpage in 2011, four of the committee members were listed with 
explicit reference to the ruling party. There is general consensus among observers that non-partisan committee 
members are also dependent upon incumbents and regional administration, not least for structural reasons 
(Buzin 2007; Golosov 2011; White 2011). Even the CEC member interviewed (2011) admits that the 
committees’ set-up is “politics, purely politics.” While the Duma parties were represented with one candidate 
each, even a united opposition of three votes would hardly make a difference among the committees’ 14 
participants when it comes to a vote on registration. GOLOS in Vladimir (2011a) has complained that the 
TECs tend to be the products of CEC lobbyists representing the interests of the ruling party. Lyudmila Eshanu 
(2011a) also claims that rapid reshuffling of the territorial election committees (TECs) just before the elections 
has already become a “tradition” in Vladimir.  
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5.2 Extremism or Criticism: Controversies of Anti-
Extremist Legislation and Enforcement. 
Moving from electoral politics to the legal issue of anti-extremism makes for a radical change 
of political setting. While it is technically possible for candidates to be denied election 
registration based on alleged extremist activities, anti-extremism is a politicized legal field 
that first and foremost deals with extra-systemic oppositional elements.  
Confronted with considerable problems of anti-constitutional and violent groups of both 
nationalistic and extreme Islamist character, the Russian authorities have under the leadership 
of Putin and Medvedev channeled considerable amounts of money and prestige into fighting 
political and religious extremism. The measures against extremism, however, quickly 
assumed a character whereby freedom of speech was compromised. In several cases, law 
enforcers seemed to confuse the security of the state with the survival of the political regime. 
Taking advantage of the situation, some Russian state actors saw opportunities for ensuring 
their own welfare rather than that of the Russian state and society in the fight against 
extremism.  
According to SOVA, the trend of using anti-extremism for targeting political opposition and 
regime critics was evident earlier also, but grew considerably stronger from about 2005 
(Verkhovsky 2008b). It should be noted, however, that controversial prosecution of regime 
critics involves a fairly low number of cases compared, for instance, to the systematic 
persecution of religious minorities based on the same legal framework (Rozalskaya 2011, 
Kozhevnikova 2010).44 This fact of course does not make prosecution of politically critical 
actors any less real. In the period under scrutiny, controversial enforcement of anti-extremist 
legislation against critical voices was a persistent problem. 
5.2.1 The Legal Framework 
To some extent, the Russian authorities have been addressing the issue of violent nationalist 
groups in both word and deed. In 2002, a uniform legal framework was adopted to encourage 
prosecution. This new law “On Combating Extremist Activities” (Federal Law No. 114-FZ of 
                                                 
44 In recent years, the groups that have been hit most severely include various nonviolent Muslim religious 
organizations and not least Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
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25 July 2002) arguably did not change much, legally speaking (Levinson 2003). Politically, 
however, the law carried significance. As commented by Brian Gross (2003, 726), the 
“consolidation of scattered legal provisions” was needed to put focus on the issue and 
facilitate anti-extremist prosecution. 
While Gross (2003, 732) welcomed the initiative of creating a separate legal framework, he 
also feared that the law would be open to abuse, especially on the local level “where 
enforcement tends to be arbitrary and self-serving.” In his evaluation of the law, Gross (2003, 
759) specifically discussed the possibility of using the law as a tool for cracking down on 
political opponents. The main issue in this regard is the list that defines extremist activities. 
As he (2003, 723) characterized it, it could be considered “rather vague and unpredictable.”  
The law “On Combating Extremist Activities” underwent significant amendments in Putin’s 
second term of presidency. In 2006, a law (Federal Law No. 148-FZ of 27 July 2006) was 
adopted to further expand the definition of extremist activities. Realizing the poor quality of 
the changes, however, the Duma cancelled many of them the next year. The main legal keys 
to the Russian anti-extremist campaign in recent years are therefore to be found in later 
amendments in addition to the original text from 2002. Most important here are the major 
amendments of 2007, “On Introducing Amendments of Certain Legal Acts of the Russian 
Federation in Relation to the Fulfillment of State Control in the Field of Counteracting 
Extremism” (Federal Law No. 211-FZ of 24 July 2007). 
The 2007-amendments to the extremism law importantly established “extremist-oriented 
crimes” as “any crimes motivated by political, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious hatred or 
animosity, or by hatred or animosity towards any social group,” a formulation now included 
in several of the articles in the Criminal Code. While these amendments were subjected to 
heavy criticism by worried civil society actors, Verkhovsky (2008a) holds that many of the 
2007-amendments were for the better, at least from a technical point of view. Not only were 
many uncertainties from 2006 removed before they came into use, but the changes also 
attempted to address a need to deal with ideological and political motivation behind, for 
instance, neo-Nazi attacks on anti-fascists or ideologically motivated killings of gay men – 
actions that previously had fallen outside the concept of racial or religious hatred 
(Verkhovsky 2008a).  
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The legislation on extremism simultaneously deals with major crimes, minor administrative 
infringements, and offenses mentioned in neither the Criminal nor the Administrative Code. 
All these offenses are subsumed under a rather lengthy “definition,” or rather list, of extremist 
activities. While the law on extremist activities provides grounds for sanctions against 
organizations (including media outlets), individuals can only be legally sanctioned for 
violations of specific articles in the Criminal or Administrative Codes of the Russian 
Federation. The most relevant points in the Criminal Code are Article 280 (Public Appeals for 
the Performance of Extremist Activity); Article 282 (Incitement to Hatred or Emnity, as well 
as Abasement of Human Dignity); 282-1 (Organizing an Extremist Community); and Article 
282-2 (Participation an Extremist Community). In 2008, a special anti-extremist department 
was created under the Ministry of the Interior to intensify and coordinate the enforcement of 
extremist-related crimes. In 2011, a special commission was also set up for this purpose. 
The institution-building was also followed up by real anti-extremist efforts. In 2008, 
Verkhovsky (2008a) could conclude that “appropriate enforcement is increasingly common.” 
In the examined period, the developments have been complex and marked by contradictory 
tendencies (see e.g. Yudina and Alperovich 2011). In the years of 2007-2011, abuse continued 
to be a persistent problem, and in 2012 it increased significantly (Kravchenko 2013). While 
legislators have repeatedly changed the definition of extremist activity, the vagueness seems 
to have survived all the amendments.45 Not surprisingly, liberal critics have been equally 
persistent in criticizing this feature. One of the more controversial issues in politicized 
enforcement of the law became the term “social group,” which I will address in the following. 
5.2.2 Prosecution through Vagueness  
Russia’s anti-extremist legislation has repeatedly been criticized for the vagueness of its 
terms. The opaque character of the law has resulted in a large volume of cases hardly in line 
with any normal conception of the term “extremism.” Among them is a number of overtly 
political cases against critics of the government and law enforcement agencies. The idea that 
“extremism” is a highly flexible tool in the hands of (mostly regional) political authorities is 
                                                 
45In addition to their reports on enforcement, SOVA also provides sound analysis of the amendments in their 
legal, social, and political context. Further documents are available on SOVA’s web pages at http://www.sova-
center.ru. 
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firmly embedded among the interviewees. Many of them stress how the law can be stretched 
to encompass every political statement: 
Now I am sitting here with you, and they can issue a warning that we are extremists. 
That is, [the definition] is so broad, that anything can count as extremism ... Look, 
we have tested it ourselves, it is really like that – every action can according to this 
law count as extremism. (Karastelev 03.06.2011) 
If you here [in Russia] criticise the authorities today, you are an extremist. That is 
the approach. They try to present every publication critical to the authorities as 
extremist. (Vishnevskii 26.08.2011)  
Earlier when someone was not pleasing (ne ugoden), they [law enforcers] tossed 
some narcotics into his pocket. Now it is very easy simply to charge him with 
extremism … The law in its current form lets [the law enforcers] punish not only 
extremists but also those who are not pleasing the authorities (vlast’). (Anon. 
journalist 2010) 
The case against Vadim Karastelev and the Novorossiysk Human Rights Committee may 
serve to illustrate what controversial enforcement can follow from a vague definition of 
extremist activities. In this case, a special slogan used in one demonstration became central in 
the accusations of extremist activities. The banner said ”freedom is not granted, it is taken.”46 
According to the expertise report that the court used as foundation for their ruling, this text 
implied the following proposition: 
A human being has individual and unalienable natural rights – the freedom or right 
to think, express himself, live and so on. Thus one cannot wait for these rights to be 
given man from somebody “above”, but one need to take them with force, use them 
without preliminary permission. (Florin 2009)47 
Because the said slogan gives “priority to individual rights over the state,” the slogan was 
found to have an “extremist character.”48 The Russian ombudsman on human rights (2010) 
subjected the court decision to heavy criticism in his annual report: “If this slogan is extremist 
                                                 
46 ”Svobodu ne dayut, ee berut,” a reference to Maxim Gorky’s words “prava ne dayut, prava berut” from  the 
1901 drama Meshchane, sometimes translated The Philistines in English. 
47 The specialists in literature (literaturovedy) have clearly copied the entry in the “Encyclopedic Dictionary of 
Winged Words and Expressions” (Serov 2003) word for word.  
48 In the interpretation of court documents by Karastelev himself. See the forum entry under the pseudonym 
vprutin 01.07.2009: “fabrikatsiya ekstremizma novorossiiskim pravozashchitnikam” on 
http://komitet23.org/forum/index.php, [accessed 22.06.2011]. 
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… so is the Russian Constitution.” Furthermore, the Ombudsman (ibid) considered the expert 
conclusions to be “endlessly far from the truth.” 
In the caseload presented by SOVA (e.g. Verkhovsky 2008b, Verkhovsky and Kozhevnikova 
2009, Kozhevnikova 2010, Rozalskaya 2011, Verkhovksy 2012) and the US Department of 
State (2007-2012) reports, we see a significant number of overtly political interpretations of 
the term “any social group” (kakaya-libo sotsialnaya gruppa). The legal term is also found in 
Article 29 in the Russian Constitution, protecting minority rights, and the concept of political, 
ideological, or social hatred is included in several articles in the Criminal Code, including 
Article 63, which lists hate motive as an aggravating circumstance for any crime under 
Russian Law. However, it was not until 2007, when the concept of hate crime became 
“completely absorbed” (Verkhovsky 2008b, 10) by the anti-extremist legislation, that the term 
became a favourite tool for prosecuting regime critics. The notorious Article 282 (not to be 
confused with 282-1 or 282-2) of the Criminal Code has an especially prominent role in this 
process. 
Article 282 applies to:  
actions aimed at the incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as abasement of dignity 
of a person or a group of persons on the basis of sex, race, nationality, language, 
origin, attitude to religion, as well as affiliation to any social group, if these acts 
have been committed in public or with the use of mass media. 
It should be noted that Article 282 does not address “political” or “ideological” hatred 
directly. The term “social group” has, however, proven extraordinarily flexible when anyone 
has wanted to infuse it with a political meaning. 
The period from 2007 saw what could almost be called a creative urge to test what could be 
achieved by using this term. In 2009, for instance, one case was initiated based on charges of 
inciting hatred towards the social group of “owners of domestic motor transport” 
(Verkhovsky 2010). In 2010, Roman Zamuraev was accused of inciting hatred against another 
“social group” – people who had not joined the organization Armiya voli naroda (Army of the 
People’s Will) (Kozhevnikova 2010, my emphasis). In this interpretation, the “social group” 
included almost every human being on earth and turned the idea of protecting minorities on its 
head. 
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More important than such anecdotal evidence, however, is the persistent push of the 
Procuracy (or the Investigate Committee) and law enforcement to establish a political 
interpretation of the term “social group” to shield the political authorities and themselves from 
criticism. According to SOVA, the cases in which Article 282 was used to protect 
professional groups with close connections to the regime constituted a “vast majority” of the 
cases that invoked this term (Rozalskaya 2011). In contrast, only a few attempts have been 
made to apply the article to protect sexual minorities. These attempts have repeatedly failed 
on the grounds that sexual minorities were not found to constitute “social groups” 
(Verkhovsky 2010, Rozalskaya 2011). 
The broad and varying interpretations of article 282 are due at least partly to the fact that both 
the terms hatred and social group are poorly defined in Russian law. In addition, the 2007 
amendments to extremist legislation included a technically minor yet greatly consequential 
move to disconnect “incitement to hatred” from the idea of “violence or threat of violence.” 
As totally nonviolent actions could also be seen as “inciting hatred,” it then became hard to 
distinguish ordinary criticism from hate speech – legally speaking. According to Verkhovsky 
(12.11.2010), the only strictly legal interpretation possible is that virtually all political 
agitation is extremism, “because incitement to social discord is the general agenda of any 
political movement.” It seems that well-connected political forces have taken advantage of the 
blurred legal lines to push their own agenda, often by punishing critics of the regional 
government or law enforcement. 
In a plenary session resolution in 2011, the Supreme Court addressed the problem of political 
abuse. According to this resolution (2011, article 7):  
Criticism in mass media of state servants (professional politicians) or their actions 
and views should not in all circumstances in itself be counted as actions directed 
against the dignity of an individual or a group of people. In relation to these people, 
the limit of what is acceptable criticism should be broader than that concerning 
private persons. 
The resolution goes on to underscore the point that law enforcement should take into account 
the motive of the individuals who have been spreading the extremist material; in order to be 
convicted for violation of Article 282, it is not sufficient that a crime has been committed in 
hatred but that the action was intended to incite hatred. The Supreme Court also stresses that 
fact-based political and scientific discussions should not be considered a violation of Article 
282. 
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Promising as this may sound, however, a SOVA report from the same year observed that the 
“prosecutors and judges are so far simply ignoring [the 2011 resolution]” (Rozalskaya 2011). 
Also in 2012, several cases were initiated on grounds of inciting hatred against police as a 
social group (Kravchenko 2013). A case against the two activists Oleg Vorotnikov and 
Leonid Nikolaev (both members of the art group Voina) was closed in May 2012, when the 
investigation concluded that “there is no consensus whether the police comprise a particular 
social group.” In other words, the issue is still pending. 
5.2.3 Formalism and Counter-Intuitive ‘Anti-Extremism’: Prosecution 
through Strictness  
Some parts of the defining list of “extremist activities” are fairly clear and semantically 
consistent. Yet, these have been used in a controversial manner as well. Indeed, not only 
extremely flexible terms but also the very lack of flexibility seems to back up controversial 
rulings. According to SOVA reports, imitated anti-extremism based on formalistic 
interpretation and a wish to produce statistics is widespread. Hundreds, possibly thousands, of 
warnings have been issued to schools and libraries – for failures to block access to banned 
Internet sites49 and for distributing extremist literature,50 respectively (Kozhevnikova 2010, 
see also Rozalskaya 2011).  
The actions described in the articles on “demonstration or dissemination of Nazi symbols” 
(Art. 20.3) and “massive dissemination of extremist materials” (Art. 20.29) in the 
Administrative Code are also regarded as extremist activities. A common criticism raised 
against these formulations is that they pay no attention to the context in which Nazi symbols 
or extremist materials are used. For instance, practically all screenings of documentaries about 
                                                 
49 Schools are required to block all potential access to all extremist websites, regardless of whether they are 
actually visited using school computers. Schools often use state-provided filtering software that is not seen to 
adequately block access to these sites. 
50 Libraries are caught in a catch-22 in which they are prohibited from helping to distribute extremist literature, 
yet by the laws regulating libraries they are not allowed to remove them from their collections. After a 
cooperation project with the SOVA Centre amongst others, the Russian Library Association (RBA) provided its 
members with special instructions on how to best cope with the contradictions in organizing their activity. For 
details, see SOVA (2010) and the instructions themselves at Zaitsev (2010), also available at http://www.sova-
center.ru/racism-xenophobia/docs/2010/06/d19095/ [accessed 20.07.2013]. 
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Nazi Germany can by a strict interpretation be considered a public demonstration of Nazi 
symbols, regardless of how negative an attitude they display towards Nazism.  
The responsibility to ensure that the Russian media complies with law lies with the 
monitoring agency Roskomnadzor.51 If the agency identifies an indicator (priznak) of 
extremism in a publication or broadcast, the monitoring agency issues a formal warning to 
make the media outlet refrain from extremist activities in the future. SOVA lists a range of 
cases in which they find Roskomnadzor’s warnings to have been unfounded, although not 
necessarily selectively initiated on political grounds. According to SOVA, 15 out of 33 
warnings issued in 2009 were inappropriate or unfounded. In 2010, the figure was 10 out of 
28 (Verkhovsky and Kozhevnikova 2011). A formal warning about extremism is in itself 
inconsequential, but a repeated violation within a year provides grounds for liquidation 
proceedings in court. Thus, formal warnings act as a good way to produce statistics without 
creating scandals (in practice, the first formal warning is rarely followed by a second). At the 
same time, issuing warnings is often seen as a typical tool for exerting pressure. 
In 2009, Roskomnadzor issued a formal warning to the newspaper Novaya Gazeta’s federal 
edition for quoting and publishing material from the webpage of Russkii obraz, a group of 
ultra-nationalists. 52 According to a journalist in the newspaper’s federal edition, the article 
intended to show the readers the real character of this legal national group, and therefore 
included full quotes and photos in the article (Girin 01.06.2011). Roskomnadzor, however, 
found the newspaper article to “incite to social, racial, national and religious discord (rozni)” 
as well as “propagandizing and publicly demonstrating Nazi attributes or symbols.”53 As the 
press secretary said: 
You can call anyone an extremist. You can call a newspaper, yes Novaya Gazeta, 
[extremist] ... The news about our warning gave the fascists a good laugh. They 
laughed hard on the right-wing websites, these people that are always writing 
commentaries about how we are an anti-fascist newspaper. (Prusenkova 
22.06.2011) 
                                                 
51 Roskomadzor was up to 2008 part of Rossvyazokhrankulturu. 
52 Nikita Tikhonov, the editor of Russkii Obraz’ journal, was (with Evegenii Khasis) sentenced in 2011 for the 
2009 murder of human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov and Novaya Gazeta’s journalist Anastasia Baburova.  
53 Official warning from Roskomnadzor to Novaya Gazeta 31.03.2010, author’s archives. 
Legal Action for Extra-Legal Purposes 
 
~ 99 ~ 
 
Or as the newspaper’s journalist put it: “You cannot fight extremism by punishing those who 
are trying to fight extremism” (Girin 01.06.2011). 
The Supreme Court (2010, article 23) attempted to curb simplistic, formalistic, and counter-
intuitive enforcement of this type though a plenary resolution stressing that mass media 
quotes should not be taken out of context when considering their legality. In 2011, the director 
of Roskomnadzor, Sergey Sitnikov, expressed a need to eliminate “contradictions in 
legislation regarding the qualification of images of Nazi symbols,” a statement that at the time 
created some hopes for change (Verkhovksy 2012). 
5.2.4 Extremism or Criticism 
This analysis of anti-extremist legislation and its enforcement has pointed to several plausible 
answers as to why anti-extremism has become a rather popular tool of selective law 
enforcement in Russia. The material indicates that amendments to the legislation created legal 
uncertainties that were quickly exploited. Selective law enforcement seems to take place in 
two distinctly different ways, on different scales, and with similar outcomes. First, the 
application of anti-extremist legislation against critics of the political authorities in Russia 
indicates how the discretion provided by vague formulations can encourage politically skewed 
law enforcement. Second, we have once again seen how strict rules, if enforced relentlessly, 
may serve to support what would normally be considered against the spirit of the laws. In the 
legal issue area of anti-extremism, this sort of formalism does, however, seem to be a much 
less prominent problem for critics than the vague formulations. 
When a legal rule, like article 282 for instance, is overtly oriented towards delimiting civil 
freedoms, it is not self-evident whether or not its politically skewed use should count as 
selective law enforcement. In contrast with the notion that everyone may be framed guilty, 
many critics of anti-extremist law propose that the legal formulations are so broad that every 
form of criticism may be encompassed under the term. While the legal term “social hatred” is 
very unclear indeed, one cannot say that it is catch-all in the same sense as is a minefield of 
bureaucratic demands. For purposes of using selective law enforcement to curb political 
dissent, the two may seem similar. Yet, they are not identical. The difference not only 
concerns whether all are under the threat of legal sanctions, but also relates to the degree of 
agreement between formal and informal predicates (see section 4.2). This difference is purely 
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relational and cannot be understood through looking at the formal or informal components 
separately. 
When overtly political laws such as the ones on extremism are overextended, self-perceived 
targets and other critics of selective law enforcement roughly agree with the legal documents 
with regard to what action caused a reaction. This form of selective law enforcement may be 
relatively hard to separate conceptually from that of legal interpretation. Not only is the legal 
issue area highly politicized to begin with, but we may find it less easy to separate the distinct 
meaning of vague legal rules from informal rules that are also fluid by definition. The 
interviewees’ conceptualization of coupled law enforcement also reflects this. Typically, a 
critic may claim that anti-extremist law is used as an instrument to get critics of the regime 
rather than to fight real extremism. This assertion is in essence not only a claim of political 
selection, but also a statement that disputes the law enforcers’ interpretation of what can be 
considered extremism. The contention is thus also one over the meaning of poorly-defined 
terms. 
At the same time, this form of law enforcement may still fall under the definition of selective 
law enforcement; it is politically biased, and the enforcers’ purported “interpretation” of 
formal rules is allegedly guided by unofficial preferences and informal interests. We may also 
suspect that the targets are often predetermined with little care for what the law does or does 
not concern. While the interviewees may partly agree with the legal proceedings as to what 
act caused a legal reaction, they still insist that the motives were extralegal and not prescribed 
by law. 
5.3 Raids on Pretext of Copyrights Enforcement  
The third and final legal issue I will consider in this chapter is the legislation surrounding 
intellectual property rights and copyrights on computer software in particular .The practice of 
using, buying, and selling pirated software, movies, and music is known to be rampant in 
Russia. In the period of inquiry, piracy products were distributed openly on the Internet, by 
street vendors, and even in shops. As in most parts of the world, most citizens found no 
reason to actually worry that the violation of copyrights might suddenly result in legal 
sanctions.  
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While the task of policing may seem overwhelming, official Russia is not blind to the 
problem of copyright violation. It was under Putin’s second term that Russian authorities 
started to take the issue more seriously, partly due to considerable pressure from international 
actors. After a few years of increasing state attention, stakeholders’ reports (BSA 2004-2012) 
indicated impressive results, though certainly from a poor starting point. In the entire period 
investigated, the governmental enforcement of copyrights has gone up, and the relative 
amount of pirated software has gone down. In a 2010 press release, Georg Herrnleben, the 
regional54 leader of the international Business Software Alliance (BSA), praised the Russian 
government. Herrnleben evaluated Russia’s efforts as “highly effective,” not least considering 
the uneasy world economy (BSA 2010). Two years later, BSA (2012) still evaluated Russian 
efforts positively and accredited the success to both the legislation itself and its effective 
implementation. 
At the same time, there have also been accusations of selective law enforcement against 
critics of the government and candidates of the opposition.  
This is the legal environment surrounding the third examined legal issue area that will be 
discussed in this chapter. As will be evident, the analysis sheds light on yet more aspects of 
selective law enforcement and variations in how it may be employed for political purposes. 
5.3.1 The Legal Framework and Its Enforcement 
Judging by the annual Global Software Piracy Reports of BSA (2004-2012), the increased 
attention to copyright violations paid off. Klein Preston, an expert on the topic, asserted in 
2008 that “Russian law on copyrights provides a more than adequate legal framework for 
protecting intellectual property rights ... and has created an atmosphere of legal predictability” 
(Smith 2010, 141).  
Although homemade copies are still distributed openly, the statistics indicate a largely 
successful enforcement of copyrights in Russia in the period examined. In the period of 
inquiry, the percentage of pirated software went down every year despite challenging 
economic conditions. In 2006 the estimated share of piracy on the software market was 87% 
                                                 
54 Eastern and Central Europe, the Middle East, and Africa are together considered one region in the BSA 
organization chart. 
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(of total worth). Five years later, it was down to 63% (BSA 2004-2012). Indeed, in the years 
2007 and 2008 Russia could boast the greatest improvements in this regard of all the 110 
countries included in the BSA reports (BSA 2009). 
For the purposes of this thesis, the most relevant legal text is Article 146 of the Criminal Code 
(Violation of Copyright and Neighboring Rights). The basic outline of the article was laid 
down in 2003 and defined the scope of possible punishment for the illegal acquisition, use, 
and sale of illegal software. It contained (and still does) a set of aggravating circumstances, 
including “repeated violations or violations by a group of persons in a preliminary collusion 
or by an organized group,” and in 2003 allowed for a punishment of up to five years of 
incarceration for the most serious cases. 
It was not until the article was amended in the early spring of 2007 (Federal Law No. 42-FZ 
of 9 April 2007) that most of the controversial crackdowns based on article 146 took place. 
By these amendments, willful possession and use of software is considered a criminal offense 
if the total worth of the software exceeds an estimated 50,000 rubles. In addition, the 
amendments increased the potential punishment for aggravated crime from a five- to a six-
year sentence. Importantly, this increase implies that an aggravated violation is now 
considered a “grave” (tyazhskii) crime according to article 15 of the Criminal Code. 
The mere planning of a grave crime shall be punishable (Art. 30 of the Code); heavy 
fines (those exceeding EUR 15,000) may be imposed on an offender who commits a 
grave crime (Art. 46). … A person who committed a grave crime may be brought to 
justice for such an offence at any point within ten years from the date of wrongdoing 
(Art. 78). A convicted grave crime offender shall endure a sentence in a penal 
colony (Art. 58). A release on parole shall be a complicated and long-lasting 
procedure in the case of committing a grave crime (Art. 79). Finally, a person who 
was given a sentence shall only have the right to cancellation of a criminal record 
six years after his (her) release from custody (Art. 95). (Golovanov 2007) 
In other words, the changes turned copyright violations into very serious crimes, out of touch 
with the actual behavior of Russian end-users and their real expectations regarding the law’s 
enforcement. 
5.3.2 Controversial Enforcement  
The year 2007 became an important one in the history of political abuse of the laws on 
copyrights. In the spring, just a month or so after the new changes to the criminal code came 
into force, a conflict escalated in and around Samara, in which unlicensed software suddenly 
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became a hot topic. A Council of Europe summit was to be held in Samara-Tolyatti on May 
17-18, and Angela Merkel and other top-level politicians had announced their attendance. To 
benefit from the international attention regarding the event, the protest movement associated 
with the Other Russia umbrella group arranged to hold the annual “Dissenters’ March” on the 
same date as the said summit.  
The rally was sanctioned but simultaneously suppressed by a large-scale campaign involving 
mass arrests, intimidation, and harassment of local organizers, as well as other means. Shortly 
before the march was to be held, a special police department conducted several controversial 
raids in the city – allegedly in search of unlicensed software. The inspectors seized a number 
of computers from the purported suspects and initiated criminal proceedings for alleged 
violations of the mentioned Article 146. Not only are there strong reasons to believe that the 
raids were politically motivated, but it also seems the cases were completely uncalled-for 
legally speaking. The supposed “tips” that purportedly made the investigators conduct the 
raids were dubious. As the legal cases developed, the investigators (or hired expertise) even 
seemed to fabricate evidence in support of some of their cases. The prosecution eventually 
crumbled, and the Ministry of Finance was later required to pay compensation to the editor of 
Novaya Gazeta in Samara for the unlawful prosecution (Radio Svoboda 2011). 
In the same year and on the same pretext, a number of well-known targets experienced similar 
raids in Nizhniy Novgorod. Newspapers and human rights organizations were targeted, and 
once again criminal procedures were initiated against an editor of Novaya Gazeta, this time of 
the Nizhniy Novgorod edition.55 In these cases, the interviewees also share the view that 
ulterior motives guided the legal processes and that fighting software piracy simply served as 
a handy pretext.  
Yet another controversial case in the same year and on the same pretext was the raid against 
the organization in Tula supporting the presidential candidacy of Mikhail Kasyanov (who was 
denied registration, see 5.1). My material also includes an interview I did with Anastasia 
Denisova (17.12.2010), who experienced similar trouble in Krasnodar in 2009 and 2010. 
                                                 
55This editor happens to be Zakhar Prilepin (real name is Evgenii Prilepin and he sometimes writes using his 
second pseudonym Evgenii Lavlinskii), an internationally known author. Prilepin is also known as an activist and 
for his membership in Other Russia and the now-banned (for extremism) organization the National Bolsheviks, 
two organizations whose members keep being targeted by various means. 
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According to Chikov (22.06.2011), these incidents, together with one in Siberia,56 account for 
most of the very blatant cases of political abuse of this kind in Russia in the relevant 
timeframe, making it a relatively isolated phenomenon. 
Common to most of these cases and in clear contrast with the other two legal issue areas is the 
participation of private and international actors in the controversial prosecution. Not only the 
Russian state but also international firms and rights holders have intensified their fight against 
software piracy in Russia. Microsoft, in particular, was involved in many cases. Some 
observers interpret this circumstance as important. “Our law enforcement finally realized that 
computers are very important for their opponents,” said Vladimir Pribylovsky at the 
Panorama Research Center in Moscow, “and they have decided to take away these tools by 
doing something close to the West’s Agenda … I suppose you can say it is very clever” 
(quoted in Finn 2007). In this interpretation, law enforcers’ cooperation with private partners 
has made it more difficult for international actors (particularly in the USA) to criticize the 
selective crackdown. We can imagine that the effect of this would have been considerably 
more significant if so many of the cases had not turned out to be completely fraudulent. Only 
after the New York Times stressed the issue (e.g. Levy 2010b) did a Russian interest group 
representing the victims of selective law enforcement manage to meet with Microsoft. As a 
result, the software giant halted its support for selective law enforcement and instead took 
some initiatives to counteract it (Levy 2010a). 
Before we continue the analysis of the above cases, it should be mentioned that there is also a 
different category of cases that may still fall under selective enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. The selective and political use of intellectual property rights not only 
concerns raids against critical organizations accused of acquiring and using unlicensed 
software, but also deregistration of candidates for Russian elections. According to Russian 
law, a candidate standing for election may request an opponent to be disqualified for the 
elections if the latter can be proven to have violated intellectual property rights during the 
election campaign. A number of controversial cases have taken place on this pretext. 
Similarly to other ways of depriving candidates from standing for elections, creative 
                                                 
56 Another case that received significant attention in the period of inquiry is the one against the NGO Baikal 
Environmental Wave (a.k.a. Baikal Wave) in Siberia. It is in many ways very similar to the cases against human 
rights organizations and newspapers in European Russia. See the organization’s own presentation of the 
problems in the temporary English language account at http://baikalwave.blogspot.no/ [accessed 19.07.2013].   
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approaches in combination with an almost unbelievable formalism and completely 
disproportionate punishment are used in order to get unwanted candidates deregistered. In 
Perm, for instance, the central opposition figure Konstantin Okunev had his registration 
withdrawn after he had used photos of a public monument in agitation material, without the 
necessary permissions (Polina 2011b). A local source claims that at least one candidate from 
the party in power had done the same thing, but that the case against him was dismissed 
(Podvintsev 13.11.2011). Similar cases of controversial deregistration on the basis of such 
infringements have taken place on several occasions, among which the case against Evgenii 
Urlashov possibly is best known.57 
5.3.3  Indecent Enforcement of a Decent Law? 
Despite the positive remarks of BSA, the support and respect for copyrights in Russia remains 
underwhelming. According to a representative of Novaya Gazeta in Nizhniy Novgorod, for 
instance, the newspaper did “of course” not have all software licensed at the time. 
[One of the officials] told me personally that almost 99% of Nizhniy Novgorod’s 
newspapers have licensed software. Of course I knew that this was not true because 
it is not possible for a regional newspaper to have the money for licensed software – 
it is a very expensive thing. So of course I was supposed to be ashamed .. .but I just 
looked at him and said, “Oh please don’t tell me this lie because it is just ridicu-
lous.” (Novruzova 16.12.2010 ) 
According to Prilepin, who has been editing this newspaper, “it’s perfectly clear that up to 90 
percent of companies, and practically 99 percent of regional newspapers and medium-sized 
businesses, and 100 percent of private computers, have some sort of pirated programs on 
                                                 
57 Evgenii Urlashov won the mayoral elections in Yaroslavl in 2012 despite his critical attitude towards the 
incumbent regime. The victory was celebrated among the opposition all over Russia and even got some 
international coverage. Less well known is perhaps the case that was launched in order to get Urlashov 
deregistered for the unsanctioned use of “valentine hearts” and other clip art found on the Internet. On his blog 
(http://urlashov.livejournal.com [accessed 26.2.2012]), Urlashov states that the charges might indeed have 
threatened his registration had they been sustained. The opposing candidate, who earlier had filed the case, did 
however withdraw his claims in what seems to be the result of some sort of political compromise. Author’s 
correspondence with Ksenia Maltseva, GOLOS Yaroslavl, September 2012. 
In 2013, Urlashov once again made the headlines when he was relieved of his duties, arrested, and charged with 
taking kickbacks. Unsurprisingly, Urlashov has declared that he found the charges to be politically motivated. 
See e.g. Herszenhorn (2013). 
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them” (quoted in Osipovich 2007). Kurt-Adzhiev (18.11.2010) also suggests that the 
pervasive non-compliance with this law is part of the explanation as to why the search for 
software in 2007 turned into a popular tool “to calm down … the more intelligent part of the 
population.” Considering the massive non-compliance at the societal level, the odds of 
striking gold on randomized raids for pirated software would presumably be good.  
Adding to the insights from election law and the law on extremist activities, the example of 
selective copyright-enforcement indicates how a law need not be vague or otherwise weak in 
order to be effective. Because non-compliance with the legislation is so common, even a 
crystal-clear law has the potential to be used selectively and with some success against a large 
segment of the population. Several interviewees make sure to tell how “everyone” uses 
pirated software in Russia. The high degree of criminalization may be popular with 
international actors such as BSA, but the harsh punishment and the extensive mandate of 
investigators may be seen by others as draconian. It is also not easy to know at all times 
whether your software is indeed genuine, or if it is simply created to look like the real thing.  
The fact that interviewees bring up these issues, however, does not imply that the targets of 
selective enforcement are actually guilty of any violations at all. Most of the interviewees in 
fact stress that their software was indeed licensed. In at least some of the cases, the later 
development indicates that they were right. In the case against Sergei Kurt-Adzhiev, the chief 
editor of Novaya Gazeta in Samara, a second expert analysis (on the initiative of the defense) 
revealed that the pirated software was installed only after the day of confiscation, a discovery 
that won the case and embarrassed the prosecution (Andreeva 2009a). In the case against 
Kuzmina and GOLOS in the same city, the criminal case was based on alleged use of a 
pirated version of “Garant.” According to Kuzmina (19.11.2010), the law enforcers did not 
even care to remove the USB stick they had used to install the pirated software before taking 
photos of the computer screen as evidence: The message “a new USB device has been 
detected” still showed in the corner of the screen. By standard procedures, the investigators 
may themselves choose which experts will conduct the technical examination for piracy 
software, obviously no guarantee against the fabrication of evidence (Andreeva 2009b). 
Obviously, lack of evidence of legal violations did not stop the raids from taking place or 
criminal cases from being initiated in several cases. What explains the popularity of this 
suppressive ‘technology’ (see section 3.3.1) then is seemingly the combination of two 
circumstances.  
Legal Action for Extra-Legal Purposes 
 
~ 107 ~ 
 
First, the law enforcers enjoy a broad mandate to act upon weak or non-existing suspicions. 
As one official put it, “any person with a sense of justice” may file a request to conduct a 
search (Andreeva 2009b). This individual will also be safe from legal repercussions unless the 
accusations can be proven to be deliberate lies (ibid). In the case of Novaya Gazeta in Samara, 
the investigators formally acted upon a suspicion filed by a person completely unknown to the 
editor. When he was later called in for interrogations, this individual claimed to have read 
about the newspaper using unlicensed software on a website, but could not remember which 
(Andreeva 2009a). The case is not unique, and it is hardly very difficult for Russian police to 
find a person willing to produce such a request. In the case of the raids against the 
Volgainform news agency, one of the targets in Samara, the police had no permit at all, but 
instead subsequently acquired a backdated document (Kotova 18.11.2010).  
The second answer to why this practice has become so popular is probably the immediate and 
crippling effect of hardware confiscation, leaving the targets no time to react or defend 
themselves before they have come in harm’s way. The political context of the raids suggests 
that several cases have been timed to coincide with particular events. As Chikov observes, 
“they have suddenly decided it’s a great tactic … They can stop all the activities of a group at 
a key moment, before a march or during the election period” (quoted in Finn 2007). 
Furthermore, criminal cases are often accompanied with travel bans, and excuses can be made 
to hold computers for a prolonged period of time. In addition, raids can be an efficient way to 
gather intelligence on troublemakers. Even if the search and subsequent expert examination 
reveal no actual violations, the law enforcement officials’ efforts may have serious 
consequences. 
5.3.4 A Third Way to Selective Law Enforcement 
As was the case with anti-extremism, we can see how increased legal attention towards a real 
problem can create new opportunities for actors who want to pursue their informal interests. 
In both cases, we see how the resources poured into the legal system for fighting a general 
problem were also instrumentalized by elite groups for extralegal purposes. At the same time, 
the two legal issue areas are very dissimilar. The law on copyrights does not of course address 
political views. In addition, the examined abuse of Article 146 seems to be primarily a tactic 
to cripple the short- and medium-term capacity of the targets through confiscations, travel 
restrictions, and criminal investigations.  
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Yet, we can by no means rule out that the massive non-compliance with the law on copyrights 
in Russian society at large has also contributed to the decision to utilize this particular tool in 
selective law enforcement. Because the level of compliance is so low, the prosecutors had a 
statistically good chance of hitting substantial evidence upon which they could build more 
solid legal cases and thus hope for more severe punishment to be imposed. 
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6 The Role of Law in Selective Law 
Enforcement 
I have underscored the point that formal rules in selective law enforcement primarily function 
as a pretext for enforcing the informal rules of political conduct. We have also seen that 
Russians in general do not put much stress on the law in their conceptualization of legal 
abuse. While laws do not serve as the law enforcers’ “reason for action,” the legal rules, 
however, still have an important part to play in selective law enforcement. The previous 
chapter provided some answers to why different legal issue areas have become favored tools 
for selective law enforcement. In this chapter, I will synthesize some of the findings to 
explore how legal texts are put to use in quasi-legal repression on a higher level of 
abstraction. Towards the end of the chapter, I will also provide some tentative conclusions on 
whether it would be plausible that weak laws are being legislated on purpose. First, however, 
I will briefly examine some other relevant aspects to how the laws utilized influence the 
repressive practice. 
6.1 The Role of Law in Selective Law Enforcement 
Before I start to look at the role played by “prohibitive law” in selective law enforcement, the 
role of “secondary rules” should be mentioned. Various rules defining jurisdiction and 
procedures are important for selective law enforcement on several levels. On a fundamental 
level, the empowerment of rules and legal actors to implement them is at the core of the 
rational-legal mode of organization on which selective law enforcement is parasitic (Schauer 
1991). Just as it is impossible to envision a legal system without jurisdiction, it is also 
impossible to imagine selective law enforcement without it. The institutionalization of checks 
and balances between the executive and judicial branch is also crucial to how discretionary 
rules turn out in actual enforcement practices. In addition, jurisdictional rules shape selective 
law enforcement in a more direct fashion. Extending a law enforcement agency’s mandate to 
conduct surveillance or make inspections, for instance, may have a direct impact on how this 
agency is utilized in quasi-legal schemes. We have already seen how the mandate to conduct 
searches based on thin evidence has been important to selective raids formally initiated on 
suspicions of pirated software. 
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While all this is true, this study will not deal with jurisdictional questions at great length. 
Whereas the secondary rules are not a core aspect of my conceptualization of selective law 
enforcement, the formal predicates of prohibitive rules play a central role – namely the role of 
pretext. Even though selective law enforcement is theoretically speaking not law enforcement 
at all (see chapter 4), the choice of a particular legal pretext bears significance for at least four 
reasons: 
 Popular support may be a relevant aspect of selective law enforcement 
The choice of legal issue area may have relevance for the economic funding and popular 
support of the repression. As argued throughout in this study, there are reasons to be very 
careful when discussing how much popular approval the “legal veneer” (Levitsky and Way 
2010, 28) may lend selective law enforcement. This fact is abundantly true in Russia where 
trust in both law and its enforcers is extraordinarily low (see section 3.1).That being said, we 
cannot rule out that instrumentalization of formal rules on some occasions may resound 
positively with some parts of the population.  
There are presumably two minimum prerequisites for selective law enforcement to gain 
popular approval to any significant degree. First, the legal charges must have some degree of 
credibility. Second, the legal violations should resound with societal norms. In Russia, where 
law suffers from considerable disrespect and thus has a limited degree of normative authority 
in itself, we can expect that the violation itself must be in direct conflict with established 
norms if it should lead to social condemnation. For this reason, to prosecute politicians for 
large scale embezzlement will have greater chances of mobilizing society’s support than to 
prosecute them for copyright violations. 
The two requirements above are the very same that would make for an effective smear-
campaign. We may therefore reasonably question whether it is indeed the legal veneer that 
produces popular support or rather the enforcement of societal norms. If the prosecution of 
Khodorkovsky attained a certain level of popular support, it was not necessarily because he 
was believed guilty as charged, but because many thought he deserved punishment, morally 
speaking.  
A third factor influencing the popular support of selective law enforcement relates to how 
popular acceptance for legal acts may be manipulated through the framing of an issue. The 
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Putinist campaign against extremism provides a good example of a propagandized campaign 
designed to mobilize popular approval and simultaneously be used for repressive purposes in 
Russia. During his first two terms of presidency, Putin spent much time promising to fight the 
threat of extremism, and his successor Medvedev also stressed this topic. The clustering of 
extremism with other political issues such as political dissent, foreign interference, and 
political instability presumably made it easier for the government to prosecute political 
dissenters as extremists (Horvath 2013).  
Also legitimacy that can be achieved in this way is limited in Russia. As E.P. Thompson 
(1975, 262-263) said: “The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law, in its function 
as ideology, is that it shall display an independence from gross manipulation, and seem to be 
just.” If this precondition is too seriously undermined, legal façades “will mask nothing, 
legitimize nothing” (ibid). The obvious use of legal tools for repressive purposes will, over 
time, undermine any attempts to convince the general public that today’s Russia is ruled by 
law and not men: observers “will not be mystified by the first man who puts on a wig” 
(Thompson 1975, 262). In this way, to the degree selective law enforcement plays upon 
legitimizing aspects of law, it simultaneously undermines this legitimacy. With regard to anti-
extremist legislation, Rozalskaya (2011) reports that its continued abuse has led to an 
“ultimate loss of public confidence” in its enforcement.  
Campaigns may also generate a sort of pressure that can influence selective law enforcement 
indirectly. Many resources and much prestige may be invested in such campaigns, something 
which will also produce administrative pressure to produce statistics to justify the efforts. We 
have seen that law enforcers have rushed into inappropriate and unnecessary acts against such 
targets as schools and libraries. SOVA links this action to a need to “beefing up the numbers 
of anti-extremist activity” (Verkhovksy 2012). This element may also have affected law 
enforcement with political motives:  
For the people in power (dlya vlastei) it is very important to charge (obvinit’) civil 
activists precisely for extremism. A verdict of extremism is very important for them 
because the E-department is measured by the number of cases it produces within the 
frames of extremist legislation. They don’t want to catch real criminals as this is 
very difficult. But we are always nearby. (Karastelev 03.06.2011) 
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 The pretext may influence legal behavior 
Selective law enforcement may also retain a modicum of actual law enforcement – if not by 
intention then in practical consequences. So far, I have argued that selective law enforcement 
is not aimed at enforcing formal rules. Furthermore, I have stressed that at the end of the day 
it is the perception of predicates how people will react to a legal act. For this reason, I have 
suggested, selective law enforcement is not really law enforcement at all. 
In practice, however, even actors who claim to be prosecuted for political purposes may 
choose to respond to the legal issues. The interview material suggests that some self-
perceived targets do follow the law more carefully after they have experienced a crackdown, 
at least when the laws are internally coherent. While the above quoted co-editor for Novaya 
Gazeta in Nizhniy Novgorod found it unrealistic for a regional newspaper to use licensed 
software, she also pointed out that the newspaper acquired all the necessary licenses after the 
crackdown. To judge from a leader in the Russian Human Rights community, the example is 
far from unique: Numerous “activist groups across the country” reacted to the 2007 raids with 
checking upon the legality of their software (Finn 2007). 
With this in mind, one may argue that the enforcement is somewhat effective and possibly 
legitimate after all. In my opinion, however, neither claim should be credible. First, the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of enforcing formal rules must be seen in relation to the overall 
tasks of law enforcement. With regard to the above example, punishing minor end-users may 
be less than effective when considering the well-known leniency toward distribution of the 
very same pirated software literally around the corner. Second, and more importantly, the 
issues of legal violations and political selectivity should not be confused with each other. 
Even if a given organization “deserves” the law enforcers’ attention from a legal point of 
view, and even if such attention will increase the level of legal compliance in the future, this 
fact does not make a political selection any more legitimate. The modicum of actual 
enforcement of formal rules does not change the defining characteristic of selective law 
enforcement: legal procedures have been initiated based on informal criteria. 
 Laws define the scope for de jure punishment 
The choice of pretext is also important because it defines the scope of possible de jure 
punishment. This element of a law, the consequent in the above terminology, presumably 
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influences how a certain law is used in selective law enforcement. To get a well-known 
political activist behind bars in order to scare the politically active public, the initiators of 
selective law enforcement would need a different scope of de jure punishment and a different 
pretext than if they only wanted to temporarily impede the efficiency of an organization 
without creating a great scandal. An equally harsh punishment for every form of non-
compliance would also remove the incentive for petty violators not to radicalize and increase 
the severity of their infringements. In this way, the functional aspect of the proportional 
punishment principle is also valid for the enforcement of informal rules. 
 The laws constitute the backdrop for informal influence 
Finally, and most central to my analysis, the way laws are formulated may be important 
because some formulations invite informal influence into the legal system. Not all laws carry 
the same potential for selective law enforcement. A law that is coherent and clear yet not 
overly strict, routinely enforced, and generally respected could be manipulated only with 
difficulty. In such a case, law enforcers must base themselves on both real and substantial 
violations or on fabrications, at least if they are to push a case all the way to (and through) a 
court of law. Laws that contain vague formulations or bureaucratic demands that nobody 
adheres to may, for this purpose, be a much better tool. 
As will be discussed at length below, these laws contribute to a legal situation in which legal 
actors are granted wide discretion to make decisions based on legally irrelevant criteria. 
Instead of legislating laws that are openly targeted against liberal and leftist opposition, the 
skilled manipulator can, for the same purposes, use the potential inherent in weak laws. In this 
way, incoherent laws can decrease the need for manipulation beyond the initiation of a case – 
and increase the chances of an informal violation to end up in a formal sanction. 
6.2 The “Catch-All Theory” 
Most of the interviewees do not hesitate to share what legal prescriptions they have been 
accused of violating. Many claim that their cases were riddled with procedural errors or even 
that evidence had been fabricated. Some admit that they did indeed infringe on the law, while 
others reject this. All the prosecuted individuals, however, have a dismissive attitude to the 
legal pretext in common. They do not in any way feel that they have infringed upon any rule 
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of normative significance. In the previous chapter, we saw that the interviewees frequently 
argue how the laws used against them could be used against whomever the authorities 
pleased. Some also suggest that the laws are legislated for the particular purpose of selective 
enforcement against people such as themselves. 
I have noted (in section 2.3) how Russians’ colloquial phrases reflect a full subordination of 
law to power, leaving little room for complexities. And according to the framing of selective 
law enforcement I sketch out above, the law may indeed seem irrelevant. If it may be used 
against more or less everyone, it will have little impact upon the actions of the legal subjects 
and can be seen as completely peripheral to the practice. Yet, this argument may also be 
turned on its head. The law seems to be an important key to opening up the legal system for 
informal influence. It seems to be exactly the weakness of law that makes it so useful for 
repressive purposes. In other words, a law may be important by virtue of its unimportance. 
What the regime insiders would need for the purpose of quasi-legal repression would be a law 
that does not stand in the way between the informal initiative and the harmful consequence to 
the target. Rather, they would want a law to bend easily to give access to the coercive power 
associated with it. 
The proposition that Russia has a legislative framework according to which every critical 
voice may be found guilty of non-compliance in some way or another is a crucial aspect of 
my interviewees’ stories of selective law enforcement. In the following sections, I will refer to 
this idea about the legal environment as catch-all perceptions or catch-all theory. 
Below I will deal with the catch-all theory in three ways. First, I will explore the foundation 
for the catch-all perceptions. As indicated by the examination of the three legal issue areas, 
legal incoherence may be constituted in different ways and seem to contribute to selective law 
enforcement. As will be seen, these different sources of incoherence give the laws a broad 
field of possible application.  
Second, I will show why these sources of incoherence in themselves do not provide a 
sufficient explanation of how laws connect to actual quasi-legal practices. The argument is 
basically that while incoherence gives laws a broad field of possible application, so also do 
other discretionary laws – including laws that in positive terms may called flexible. I will 
argue that the essence of legal discretion concerns delegation of power and that the outcome 
of discretionary laws is entirely dependent upon the mechanisms that influence this delegation 
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of power. In other words, the idea of catch-all and hence the contribution of laws to selective 
law enforcement can only be understood in the cultural and political context. 
Third, I will explore and extend a concept used by Ledeneva to address legal incoherence in 
the specific Russian context. I will also discuss the possibilities for incoherent laws in this 
context to be legislated for the particular purpose of selective law enforcement.  
Finally, I will subject the catch-all theory to a number of objections and point out some 
weaknesses in the interviewees’ claims. As will be clear, we should not accept the pointed 
formulations on face value, yet neither should we dismiss them as irrelevant. 
6.3 A Typology of Incoherence 
Lon Fuller (1958/1977, 33-39) famously showed his readers eight ways in which a law can 
fail to be law. The dull King Rex in Fuller’s allegory has a sincere wish to attain a status in 
the history books as a “great lawgiver.” Despite relentless efforts, however, Rex simply fails. 
Subjected to one meaningless law after another, the king’s subjects fail to see their purpose 
and find no incentives to act upon them. Fuller’s point was that law has an “inner morality,” a 
set of traits necessary for law to succeed in being law. 
I have no intentions to actively participate in the voluminous and still ongoing debate that 
Fuller’s perspectives has raised on the inherent morality of law.58 Rather, I use the below list 
as an illustrative example of what Jeremy Waldron (2008, 1145) calls “legal principles” – and 
then especially “formal principles” – “principles about the form the legal norms should take”. 
In a non-essentialist meaning, these principles are not highly controversial as rules of thumb, 
albeit all of them may be subjected to exceptions if we look hard enough (see Marmor 2003). 
In “The Morality of Law” Fuller formulates the principles in the negative, summarized in a 
list of “eight distinct routes to disaster”: 
 
                                                 
58 The publication of Fuller’s “The Morality of Law” in 1958 came to be a subject of hefty debates, especially the 
one in retrospect known as the Hart-Fuller debates. See Fuller (1958), Hart (1958) for the original contributions 
and Cane (2010) for a recent collection of articles on the debates. For a criticism of Lon Fuller’s more 
controversial claims on the tight relation between morality and law, see for instance Kramer (1998) or D’Amato 
(1981). For an integrating perspective, see Waldron (2008). 
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The first and most obvious lies in the failure to achieve rules at all, so that every 
issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis. The other routes are: (2) a failure to pub-
licize, or at least to make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to 
observe; (3) the abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide 
action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them 
under the threat of retrospective chance; (4) a failure to make rules under-
standable; (5) the enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules that require conduct 
beyond the power of the affected party; (7) introducing such frequent changes in the 
rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them; and, finally (8) a failure of 
congruence between the rules as announced and their actual 
administration.(Fuller1958/1977, 39) 
While no real legislation would fail so utterly to regulate human conduct as did the laws in 
Fuller’s allegory, some laws do, if seen through critical lenses, come remarkably close. 
Russian laws that are utilized in selective law enforcement have been criticized as being 
difficult to understand, excessively burdensome, contradictory, too frequently changing, close 
to impossible to comply with, and marked by inconsistent and arbitrary enforcement. Rather 
than simply dismiss all Russians as legal nihilists, we should therefore also look at how the 
legislators are contributing to the uncertain legal situation by acting partly as King Rex did. In 
the following sections, I will outline some of the key ways in which Russian legislators create 
what may seem to be ineffective legislation. 
Rubber Formulations 
Clarity is often reported to be lacking in Russian legislation. Several of the legal issue areas 
that reportedly are used in selective law enforcement in Russia are regulated by laws that have 
been termed opaque, vague, or ambiguous.59 We may call the controversial passages rubber 
formulations, as their main quality for the purposes of selective prosecution is that they can be 
stretched to encompass a large number of cases.60 
With regard to anti-extremism, vagueness constitutes the most important foundation for 
selective law enforcement, not least in relation to the term “social group.” Alexander 
Verkhovksy (12.11.2010), director of the SOVA Center, suggests that the law on extremism 
offers no legal guidance whatsoever on how to enforce it: “It is very easy to accuse practically 
                                                 
59 Marmor (2003) underscores that vagueness should not be confused with ambiguity, the latter being a more 
technical deficiency in legislation such as those raised by homonyms. The reviewed literature and informants do, 
however, not consequently discern between the two terms. 
60 A similar colloquial term “rubber article” (rezinovaya stat'ya) exists in Russian. 
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anybody of extremism. Of course it is used selectively – how can it not be used selectively?” 
Verkhovsky’s position is not unfounded and certainly not unique– similar views are common 
among my interviewees. It should be noted that while some vague laws may be 
overextensions of their mainstream interpretations, rubber formulations may also provide 
legal foundations in cases in which there is no agreement between formal and informal 
predicates at all (see 5.2.4).  
The Legal Minefield 
Another good place for the regime to seek suitable legal pretext for quasi-legal crackdown is 
the infamous Russian bureaucracy. Bureaucratic overregulation has long been seen as a major 
problem in Russia, cutting into the power of the sovereign and keeping the population hostage 
to extortionist schemes (Karklins 2005). In the words of Vladimir Pastukhov (2002, 68), at the 
turn of the millennium, the Russian bureaucracy was reminiscent of that of the pre-industrial 
era: “A machine which is irrational and not subject to genuine control.” In the case of 
selective law enforcement, however, it is not the bureaucratic actors themselves who are seen 
as extortionists. Rather, they partake in the fight against political dissent on behalf of their 
patrons (see section 7.3). 
Ordering a legal subject to cross a legal minefield without making mistakes is in effect close 
to demanding the impossible. As Fuller (1958/1977, 37) puts it: “To command what cannot be 
done is not to make law; it is to unmake law, for a command that cannot be obeyed serves no 
end but confusion, fear and chaos.” Surely, there are no laws in Russia similar to his 
caricature legislation in which citizens summoned to the throne were given ten seconds to 
report (1958/1977, 36). The number of legal traps, however, compensates for such 
requirements. To quote Jackson (1940, 19) again: “With the law books filled with a great 
assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a technical violation 
of some act on the part of almost everyone.” 
The above review of election registration enforcement is full of examples of how a legal 
minefield may work in practice. With help from the best lawyers in town, the most 
experienced of politicians may possibly manage to get through the minefield unharmed, but 
this maneuver surely cannot be a meaningful requirement for participating in political 
elections in a democracy. 
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Sleeping Statutes 
Sleeping statutes are incoherent in a way that differs starkly from the rubber formulations. In 
fact, sleeping statutes may be both clear and internally coherent. They are also different from 
the legal minefield – to comply with a sleeping statute would not necessarily be so difficult. 
To the degree that we can speak of incoherence, it lies with the sleeping statutes’ lack of 
touch with the society they are intended to regulate. When a law is generally not enforced and 
is ignored by many or most legal subjects, its sudden enforcement can provide a handy pretext 
in quasi-formal schemes. 
Violations of sleeping statutes may in theory lead to severe repercussions, as in the case of the 
Russian law on intellectual property rights. Yet for the most part, few experience the sleeping 
statute as a major constraint. By definition, there is a mutual understanding between the law 
enforcers and the population that the law will be left sleeping or only enforced in grave cases. 
Such deliberately lax enforcement is sometimes referred to as gedogen after the (previous) 
Dutch policy on light narcotics.61 When suddenly the otherwise unenforced law is selectively 
and harshly enforced, it comes as a surprise attack.  
We have seen that international observers are very satisfied with the Russian progress in 
enforcing copyrights. One may argue that it does not, then, fit a notion of a sleeping statute. 
Considering the massive numbers of minor end-users who infringe on this law, however, the 
chance of being randomly caught must be seen as miniscule. 
Contradictory Rules 
Legal subjects may from time to time encounter legal situations in which the law requires and 
prohibits the same conduct at the same time, both “φ” and “not φ.” As Fuller (1958/1977, 65) 
points out, however, a requirement to do both “φ” and “not φ” simultaneously is not a 
contradiction in logical terms. While it is not logically contradictory to demand something 
and then impose a punishment for the very same act, such laws will surely be both mean and 
unfair. Given equal sanctions, they will also have poor (if any) capability to guide conduct 
                                                 
61 “Gedogen” is Dutch and roughly translates as “tolerate,” ‘permit,” or “condone” (www.wiktionary.org), though 
some claim it does not translate into English at all. As opposed to toleration, gedogen is an active government 
policy to deal with behavior that is legally forbidden yet culturally acceptable. 
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and will effectively ruin the legal subjects’ possibility to stay on the virtuous path of law. This 
latter attribute, of course, is exactly why contradictory rules may be exploited with success in 
quasi-legal schemes. 
Rasma Karklins (2005, 22) has stated that exploiting “contradictory rules” is “a common 
tactic” in Russian business, but today many of the more blunt legal contradictions have been 
removed. In the above analysis of controversial anti-extremism, however, I noted how 
libraries are trapped between two contradictory demands (see fn. 50).  
From my presentation of politically motivated law enforcement, we remember a similar 
situation arising from the signature verification process in Perm. When signers in Perm had to 
state their registered place of residence in the 2011 elections, many residents found 
themselves trapped in a situation in which two authoritative documents (passport and official 
name of the region) provided different answers to whether they officially lived in Perm 
oblast’ or Perm krai, and any answer might be found wrong at the discretion of the 
controllers. This trap of binary and mutually exclusive interpretations is not an inherent 
contradiction in the law itself, but rather is based on discretion of interpretation. Yet, the 
outcome is reminiscent of a catch-22. 
Lack of Promulgation and Frequent Changes 
If we stick with Schauer’s terminology (see fn. 36), a subject may “happen to comply” with a 
rule one does not know about but cannot be guided by this rule, and thus will not follow it. 
Therefore, while provisions unknown to the public may guide law enforcers, they cannot 
guide the conduct of legal subjects. No ordinary citizen or even expert may possibly know all 
legal rules in detail, but we may usually depend on the information being available when 
sought after. When rules are not promulgated, we have no certainty that we are complying 
with them. Secret laws and decrees exist in Russia and could in theory provide a powerful 
political tool. In practice, however, such laws are not seen as a big problem within the Russian 
human rights community and certainly not with regard to the examined legal issue areas.  
Closely associated with the lack of promulgation, and far more relevant to the examined 
cases, is the practice of amending rules so frequently that the legal subjects cannot react to the 
changes. The obvious example from the material presented above is the incredibly frequent 
amendments to Russian election legislation. Too often are amendments introduced just before 
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elections or “on the sly” (Bundina 06.11.2011) when opposition deputies are unaware (e.g. 
away on summer holidays). The idea (and concern) here is of course to amend the 
requirements so close to the election campaign that the opposition has no time to prepare 
properly and will fail to recognize all the subtleties of the new amendments until it is too late.  
6.4 Legal Discretion and the Delegation of Power 
Rules can never be equal to their justification. A rule is by definition an abstraction, 
sacrificing case-specific circumstances to more easily comparable criteria (see Schauer 1991). 
A legal formalist may argue that, for the benefits of an impersonal mode of governance, the 
few unfair or even absurd rulings may be justifiable. In Schauer’s (1991, 228) words: “It is 
exactly a rule’s rigidity, even in the face of applications that would ill serve its purpose, that 
renders it a rule.” Within this conception, we would normally expect legislators to delegate 
authority to the rules by making them coherent. By doing so, the rule-makers would entrench 
some generalizations of today to make these generalizations valid in the world of tomorrow 
(ibid). Only to the degree that the rules are clear will the legal actors understand what the 
rules (or rather the legislators) require of them. 
Even so, it is not rigidity but flexibility that has become the mantra of modern law: 
“Foregoing maximum clarity is a sign of compromise and pluralism” (Marmor 2003, 27). In 
this way, laws in modern societies are increasingly rules of thumb. In many cases, it makes 
sense for legislators to leave further specification of broader law to the experts in specialized 
departments. Leaving room for interpretation not only makes room for the more specialized 
legal actors to carve out details, but also makes it easier for them to more easily adapt if or 
when implementation reveals unintended consequences. To safeguard flexibility for dealing 
with yet-unspecified threats to the state, legal systems also tend to include rather lofty 
references to vital security interests. Political leaders do not want rigid rules to stand in the 
way when real threats are to be dealt with. In other words, the open-ended character of the 
Russian law on extremism is not unique.62 In general, security concerns seem too important to 
be left to law alone.  
                                                 
62 The principle that security can trump individual rights is even endorsed in the European Convention of 
Human Rights. As formulated in the Convention (article 2.10), some restrictions to civil and human rights are 
legitimate in the interests of “national security, territorial integrity of public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
Legal Action for Extra-Legal Purposes 
 
~ 121 ~ 
 
From this perspective, discretionary rules are good because they allow legal actors to take the 
context into consideration. We may hope, therefore, that legal actors will use this discretion to 
interpret the “purpose” or “spirit” of the law. In this way, “open flexible rules are arguably 
fairer, less harsh, more in tune with the sense of justice” (Friedman 1975, 35). At the same 
time, we have seen how in certain contexts any such hopes would be in vain. How then should 
we interpret the Russian catch-all theory? Why does discretionary justice turn out to be so 
radically different in different settings?  
6.4.1 The Delegation of Power 
Following Schauer (1991), I have suggested that legislating is normally done to entrench 
generalizations and to empower them so they will have real influence on decision-making 
elsewhere and in the future. However, if these generalizations are very broad or otherwise 
unclear, they are not very empowered at all because their ability to curb the discretion of the 
legal actor will be minimal. By legislating a discretionary law, therefore, the legislators 
delegate less power to the rules and more power to the legal actors; the legislators in effect 
grant the implementers de facto legislating power (Schauer 1991). In the words of Marmor 
(2003, 14), “the question is basically one of institutional choice.”  
When flexible rules are thought necessary, legal systems “must somehow keep discretionary 
rules in proper bounds” (Friedman 1975, 35). In other words, legislators grant the legal actors 
discretion by legislating flexible laws, but they are also responsible for controlling and 
delimiting this very discretion. Influences that limit the actual discretion may be many, but the 
power to define what is proper (in Friedman’s terms) does not transcend the power relations 
in a society. When the rules leave discretion with legal actors who are vulnerable to outside 
pressure, the outcome of this discretion will largely depend on the political context. Put 
differently, the discretionary law will never be better than the legal actors responsible for 
implementing it, the legal and political systems they are acting within, and the tradition they 
are part of.  
                                                                                                                                                        
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality 
of the judiciary.” 
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For these reasons, it would be naïve to trust a claim that discretionary rules necessarily take 
heed of our “sense of justice.” Instead, discretionary rules pave the way for extralegal 
influences, and they do this for better or for worse. Political and social tendencies may play 
into the actual enforcement as may particularistic interests. Because the legal actors are 
human beings, how the discretion plays out is contingent not only upon legal but also upon 
social and political contexts. In today’s Russia, the vacuum left by discretionary (or 
incoherent) laws tends, when stakes are sufficiently high, to be compensated for with 
particular concerns. In an environment with strong traditions of exploiting legal defects, 
incoherent formal rules turn out to be especially troublesome for those who run up against 
powerful interests. 
6.5 Catch-All in Russian Context 
The above analysis indicates that catch-all perceptions are at least partly justified and that 
selective law enforcement on the ground may not least hinge on the legal texts themselves. It 
also suggests, however, that the weakness of laws is not a sufficient explanation by itself. If 
weak laws open the way for discretionary (in)justice, so may also other laws in other societies 
where some room of maneuvering is seen as a common good. What is considered weak, then, 
is in part dependent on the context of the laws. In particular two elements of the Russian legal 
and political system play into this issue. 
First, the legal actors are highly dependent on the power networks in charge of the county and 
may thus be suspected to interpret rules according to their interests. The top-down dimension 
of legal nihilism in Russia will lubricate the willingness of regime insiders to instrumentalize 
the discretionary laws for their own purposes and the willingness of legal actors to participate 
in the scheme. The authoritarian and clientelistic incentive structures will presumably 
reinforce this tendency. 
Legal nihilism also has a second face. Not only state agencies, but also the population in 
general, are not particularly law-abiding and shows a dismissive attitude to law and legal 
institutions they do not trust. Many rely on informal practices to survive in the grey-zones of 
the Russian economy and also to deal with the state. The legal nihilism on the part of society 
influences the role of law in selective law enforcement because it lubricates its catch-all 
properties from below. The reason President Kuchma in Ukraine could use anti-corruption 
laws to keep his subordinates in line, we recall, was not least the pervasive level of corruption 
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(Darden 2001). Dazzled by the outstanding cynicism and apparent unfairness of the above 
cases, we should not forget this aspect of Russian quasi-legality.  
While I give ear mostly to self-identified targets of selective law enforcement in this work, we 
cannot understand the role of law without considering the legal nihilism among the 
population. The election committee member from United Russia, for instance, lamented how 
horribly bad the opposition, especially the local communists, filled out their registration 
documents: “What the communists do with their documentation show two things. First, they 
spit on the preparation of documents, on quality. The question is what are they hoping for? 
[They hope] for a scandal or for administrative resources!” In the categorization of the United 
Russia politician, there are three basic categories of candidates in Russian politics: first, you 
can be an edinoross (a member of United Russia). Second, you can be on the governor’s black 
list. Third, you can be a nobody. Every candidate wants to run for elections under the flag of 
United Russia, he claims, but at least “it is better to be in the black list of the governor than a 
nobody” (Anon. United Russia member 2011). 
The director of SOVA noted that claiming to be politically persecuted has become a viable 
strategy for individuals that are charged with extremist activates and also among those who in 
reality have little to complain about (Verkhovsky 12.11.2010). When I discussed selective law 
enforcement with Daria Miloslavskaya, who represents both the Lawyers for Civil Society 
and the International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, she was also quick to lament the 
opposition networks lack of legal compliance: 
From my point of view, it is easy to follow legislation … My colleagues whom you 
mentioned don’t like to follow the law, but rather to tell me or other lawyers that it 
impossible … If our oppositional groups and organizations were ready to follow the 
law, they would not have any problems. But unfortunately, they do not … And every 
time they think that [their problems] is because of their political orientation. 
(Miloslavskaya 16.11.2010) 
There is little reason to doubt there is a grain of truth in these statements, although they seem 
to be too sharply formulated to fit most of the cases I have examined.  
One scholar that tries to deal exactly with the interactions between the particular Post-Soviet 
Russian environment and incoherent formal rules is Ledeneva. In her most theoretical 
passages, Ledeneva (esp. 2006b, 10-27) discusses how the legal texts and path dependencies 
interact to form opportunity structures upon which actors form their strategies and practices. 
In her view, the legal dysfunctions cannot be seen independent of Russian historical 
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trajectories and legal culture. In other words, she does not challenge the potential of the laws 
to regulate behavior as such, but points to its shortages in the Soviet and Russian experience 
and how these shortages are reproduced. 
According to my interviewees, we might recall, the Russian laws utilized have certain 
properties that make everyone vulnerable for prosecution. Ledeneva observes the same 
phenomenon in her research on Russian informal practices: “The incoherence of formal rules 
compels almost all Russians, willingly or unwillingly, to violate them” (Ledeneva 2006b, 13). 
In other words, she stresses the legal dysfunctions in order to explain informal practices. In 
the very next sentence, however, Ledeneva shifts her focus to see the legal dysfunctions as 
products of the economic and social context: “Anybody can be framed and found guilty of 
some violation of the formal rules because the economy operates in such a way that everyone 
is bound to disregard at least some of these rules.” 
In other words, the laws may not be exceptionally well-written in themselves, but they are 
particularly dysfunctional because they are not in line with the society they are expected to 
regulate. Ledeneva makes no attempt to hide her disregard for post-Soviet lawmaking but 
underscores that it is the totality of the legal situation rather than independent laws that 
reproduces the legal situation. Where corruption pervades a system, even anti-corruption laws 
may be easily adapted for corrupt purposes.  
Because of the pervasiveness of rule violation, punishment is bound to occur selec-
tively on the basis of criteria developed outside the legal domain […] ‘Unwritten 
rules’ compensate for defects in the rules of the game and form the basis for selec-
tive punishment. The violation of unwritten rules can result in the enforcement of 
written ones, which paradoxically makes it just as, if not more, important to observe 
the unwritten rules as the unwritten ones. (Ledeneva 2006b, 13) 
In this way, we can see the role of weak laws in the specific Russian context and identify a 
link between catch-all (as construed by both incoherent laws and path dependencies) and the 
penetration of informal criteria into law enforcement. The result is a situation where the 
individual is extremely vulnerable to the system: “While everybody is under the threat of 
punishment, the actual punishment is ‘suspended’ but can be enforced at any time” (Ledeneva 
2006b, 13).  
The punishment is left suspended in most cases, because the state has neither the capacity to 
nor an interest in punishing everyone (Ledeneva 2006b, 13). Punishment, therefore “becomes 
a resource in short supply” (ibid). Ledeneva seems to argue that the influence of extralegal 
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criteria is not only a possible consequence but also structurally necessary to compensate for 
the legal vacuum.  
The idea of suspended punishment is in many ways reminiscent of kompromat, the gathering 
of compromising material for purposes of direct or (more often) indirect blackmailing. In both 
cases, the individuals are kept under constant pressure, what is sometimes called “on the 
hook” (na kruchke) in Russia (section 7.2). In the case of suspended punishment, however, 
the collection of compromising material is downplayed. As the argument goes, because rule 
violations are everywhere (at least according to a strict interpretation), the manipulators do 
not need to search extensively to find them. As noted in the introduction of Darden’s 
“Blackmail State” (section 1.3.2), the regime insiders have no need for massive surveillance 
to find a legal basis for prosecution if the legislation itself is really catch-all. As we have seen 
by now, the legal system and its misfit with society produce a “pool” of formal pretexts. It is 
this pool that constitutes the source of catch-all legality in the Russian context – a pool 
consisting not only of laws but also of a legal system unable to curb grave manipulation and a 
political system where informal patronage is an important form of organization.  
While the above-mentioned legal vacuum created by pervasive rule violations may possibly 
encourage the penetration of extralegal rules into the legal domain, it does not in itself provide 
a sufficient explanation as to why this happens. Indeed, we may reasonably claim that no 
modern state has ever had the capacity to punish everyone guilty of infringements. Due to a 
lack of resources, punishment is therefore a resource in short supply everywhere. Law 
enforcement agencies are hardly able to catch every criminal or regulate every bureaucratic 
exchange, and pervasive non-compliance is common worldwide in fields like software 
licensing. Yet, the degree and character of extralegal influence vary across time and space. 
There is more than one way for the regulators to solve the issue of distributing punishment. 
Legitimately it might be solved by establishing a transparent policy of priorities, like 
selectively investigating the potentially gravest violations before minor infringements within 
the same field.63 To effectively combat software piracy or narcotics criminality, smart law 
enforcers will prioritize catching the big fish or limiting supply rather than arresting private 
                                                 
63 As mentioned in the introduction, some scholars also use the term selective law enforcement about such 
legitimate priorities in a reality of limited resources. 
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end-users. If we presuppose that law enforcers are rational (and disinterested), they will seek 
the best overall accomplishment of their tasks within the frames of their limited resources.  
Second, the limited “supply of punishment” may give room for the norms and values of the 
legal actors, which in general would be expected to more or less reflect that of the population 
as a whole. In this form of discrimination, there are in general no immediate material benefits 
involved for the prosecutors. A typical example would be systematic administrative racism 
through systematic, but not necessarily conscious, prosecutorial bias. 
Third, the mechanism of suspended punishment may lead to selective law enforcement. As 
stressed earlier, the actual outcomes of legal discretion are highly contingent upon political 
context and legal culture, something my study serves to illustrate. 
6.6 Weak Laws on Purpose? 
With the assistance of Ledeneva’s idea of “suspended punishment,” I explored above how 
incoherent laws in Russia contribute to create a legal vacuum that may open a door for 
selective law enforcement. The institutional insufficiencies, it may thus seem, have certain 
“enabling aspects” that actors can exploit. One implication of this line of thought is worthy of 
separate attention: those who are able to fill the legal vacuum may have an interest in creating 
it in the first place. In other words, because authoritarian leaders are in a position to benefit 
from the non-transparency and incoherency in legislation, they also have incentives to 
contribute to its reproduction; weak laws are not necessarily weak for everyone. 
The interviewees predominantly find regime insiders to be behind the initiation of their cases. 
Not seldom do they blame individuals associated with the same elite group that also legislate 
the rules that are subsequently manipulated (section 7.3). On occasion the manipulator may 
even be a legislator himself.  
In the years under examination, the regime was possibly at its strongest to date. In 2008, 
Russia’s political leadership successfully transferred presidential power to the preferred 
candidate and controlled the State Duma through the party United Russia, which enjoyed 
about two-thirds of the seats. From this position, despite processes of hearings, reviews, and 
sharp criticism of draft laws, Russian legislators kept acting like dull king Rex in Fuller’s 
allegory, not least with regard to laws on extremism and elections. It is pertinent to ask why. 
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While we cannot conclude on the intentions of law-makers, we can make assessments of 
incentives and legal output. We know from experience that Russian legislators are not 
reluctant to use legislating power for furthering private or group interest (e.g. Karklins 2005; 
Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2009). The interview material also shows that several 
interviewees believe that laws are created to be incoherent on purpose. In the particular field 
of election law, various ways to tweak the system in the incumbents’ favor are known in 
many countries. What is new in this regard is the allocation of repressive power to legal actors 
instead of, or in addition to, authoritative legal documents. As Wilson (2005, 84) notes: “the 
authorities have a vested interest in not cleaning the system up. As long as all are guilty to an 
extent, the state decides who is punished.”  
We have also observed how selective law enforcement on many occasions seems to take place 
directly after controversial amendments whose incoherence may lead the way for abuse. It 
would be reasonable to assume that a certain proportion of the subsequent abuse is influenced, 
if not triggered by, these changes, giving the political leaders windows of opportunity to crack 
down upon their adversaries. Yet, we may also suspect that the laws are created for the 
purpose of cracking down in periods of increased political tensions. In this way, the laws and 
their abuse may paradoxically be aimed at the same target. 
Several scholars on post-Soviet legality seem to have thought along the same lines, though the 
length and complexity of such arguments is lacking, and evidence remains circumstantial:  
Formal rules [in Ukraine] are often purposefully designed in such a way, that 
informal patron-client relations must be used in order to act successfully and that 
all actors are rendered potentially vulnerable. The legal framework creates uncer-
tainty and can simultaneously be used as an instrument to exercise control and 
power. (Zimmer 2008, 268) 
Hendley (2010, 6) notes how Soviet law was often drafted in a purposely vague manner with 
the goal of preserving maximum flexibility for the state in enforcing it. Robertson (2011, 193) 
holds that the amendments to NGO legislation in 2006 were intended to create “a legislative 
framework that can be used selectively.” Also Ledeneva suggests on occasion that 
incoherence in fact may be the legislators’ ulterior purpose and not necessarily a work 
accident: 
The government could set up selectively targeted but accountable tax policies to 
regain the profits that were made by the oligarchs in the 1990s. But this would 
‘liberate’ the oligarchs, enable them to play further with such clearly set formal 
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constraints, and deprive the state of informal means of control. Reserving informal 
leverage against oligarchs in order to make them stay in line is an effective tool and 
an essential feature of political power in Russia. (Ledeneva 2006b, 194) 
Ledeneva thus strongly suggests that the political regime refrains from legislating better laws 
because they want to stay on top of the situation. 
The weak formal institutions and their manipulation, Vladimir Gel’man (2004, 1030) 
concludes, are not a “legacy of the past” but a result of political institution building. In his 
conception, it is exactly according to this blueprint that Putinism is built.  
From this perspective, this use of quasi-legality to an extensive degree violates what Waldron 
(2008) calls the “formal principles” of legality, exemplified in Fuller’s list. In sharp contrast 
to Fuller’s King Rex, however, Putin’s regime has some success to show for it. For purposes 
of regime consolidation and keeping dissent down short- or medium-term, at least, selective 
law enforcement has been a very useful tool and incoherent laws have been part of the success 
story in this regard.  
Fuller’s point of departure was that the law is necessarily intended to guide human conduct. I 
build upon rather than challenge this basic premise. What other purpose may rules possibly 
have which does not fall within this general purpose? Fuller did not, however, account for the 
possibility of the law promoting the ability to shape human behavior in a different fashion. 
More than anything, selective law enforcement is a mechanism of rule-enforcement and is 
thus aimed exactly at guiding human conduct. While the mechanism of selective law 
enforcement utilizes law, however, it does so in a very different way from what Fuller 
considered. 
In our case, goals are achieved through a domination of the whole system, including 
legislators, law enforcers, “neutral expertise,” and partly the judicial branch. For this reason, 
there is no need to draw the rules for exercising power clearly on the legislative level. Even 
though the laws are unclear, they can be used to carry out an important instrumental function 
in the political system. As we have seen, incoherent rules may assist the repression of 
diverging views and the reproduction of the regime. Obviously, the incoherent rules do not 
achieve this by themselves, isolated from the system they are part of. They only guide human 
conduct when supported by informal institutions. In themselves, we might contend, they are 
not much more than hollow shells. But then again, no laws work independently of their 
implementation. 
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What selective law enforcement lacks in clarity and structure, it gains in applicability. 
Selective law enforcement can promote interests and enforce rules where ordinary law 
enforcement is hindered by democratic or constitutional constraints. In fact, had these rules 
been perfect laws in a Fullerian sense, they would have been all but defunct for what we now 
speculate is their designated purpose. The Fullerian model not only assumes that law must 
guide behavior in order to be a law, but also that law must do this in a special way. In other 
words, it does not take into account a political system in which laws may work in a 
completely different fashion and be legislated with quasi-legality in mind. Yet all laws are 
legislated in a particular context, and their meaning cannot be grasped outside it. 
6.7 Validity of Catch-All Claims 
Above, I have discussed the catch-all theory in a broader perspective of legal discretion. So 
far, I have largely accepted the foundation of this discussion, namely the catch-all theory. In 
this section, I will adjust the perspective somewhat by subjecting the catch-all theory to some 
validity tests. While a notion of catch-all may be useful, not least in discussions like the one 
above, it should be used with care and benefits from being employed in a moderated version. 
Maria Rozalskaya (2011) is correct when she observes that “while expressing opinions on 
extremism, a person is likely to note that in our country [Russia] this concept is “‘elastic,’ and 
virtually everyone can be labeled as extremist.” She is also correct, however, when she adds 
that this is not an “entirely accurate” description of reality. Many critics that promote such a 
view lack “sufficient command of the necessary facts or legal issues to be able to expand on 
their statement” (ibid). The analysis in Chapter 5 indicated that several Russian laws have 
properties that make them valued tools for selective law enforcement. Yet it would be a 
simplification to simply accept that “everybody may be found guilty” according to Russian 
law.  
Perhaps the strongest argument against the belief that every Russian may be found guilty of 
legal violations is that many indeed are not, even when powerful interests seem to be pushing 
the case against them. While investigations have been initiated on a great variety of pretexts 
that may give us the impression of catch-all legislation, the cases are filtered through a system 
of legal actors who do not always support the accusations. Prosecutors may refuse to run 
cases handed to them, and judges turn down many selectively initiated cases on the grounds 
that nothing illegal has in fact been done. 
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Within the interview material, there is a frequently appearing inconsistency. While many of 
the interviewees make claims supportive of the catch-all theory, several of them 
simultaneously exempt themselves from its validity; they themselves are not guilty. The 
interviewees that blame the law simultaneously lament the various illegal elements within the 
legal cases. I have already mentioned the cases of planted evidence in Samara. Another 
illustrative case is the trials in Khimki, Moscow region. For his alleged leading role in the 
storming of the Khimki administration building, the anti-fascist activist Aleksei Gaskarov was 
charged with aggravated hooliganism motivated by hatred. Gaskarov rejected the charges, 
however, and claimed that the prosecution used small-time criminals to produce false 
witnesses in court: 
The police did not put them in prison, but used them for their own ends. Usually, 
they go to the court to give [false] explanations. These guys have taken part in many 
court cases earlier … When the court case began I had the first opportunity to speak 
with these guys. After three questions it was obvious that they worked for the police 
and had never even been in Khimki. (Gaskarov 02.06.2011) 
Less serious violations on the part of the law enforcement seem to be very frequent in the 
examined cases, at least if we are to believe the interviewees. Procedural errors are a big 
problem in the execution of justice in Russia’s legal system, and it does not seem less 
prominent in selective law enforcement. Many cases are filed on claims that are later rejected 
by procuracy or courts as too far-fetched, and legal experts are not always impressed by the 
legal veneer: “You don’t have to be a lawyer to understand the absurdity of these claims,” 
writes Buzin (undated) commenting on a case from the Moscow region: “But being a lawyer I 
will say that this is, I beg your pardon, judicial drivel (bred).” 
The legality of cases is often up in the air as the secondary rules and judicial practice are also 
subjected to interpretation. Far-fetched “interpretation” of vague formulations, formalistic 
enforcement, disproportional punishment, dubious expert analysis, and raids on poor 
foundations are all elements whose legality is not always easy to determine.  
The great advantage of selective law enforcement as an instrument of repression, writes 
Riabchuk (2009b, 269), is that it allows “persecuting political opponents with clearly non-
political charges, in full conformity with the letter of a law.” My own research indicates that 
the cases are often not so clear after all. And if the laws had indeed been so incoherent that 
they would make everyone guilty of violating them, this form of manipulation would be 
superfluous. 
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If we turn to the reactions of the prosecuted targets, we also see here an element that forces us 
to adjust the catch-all theory. As indicated in the beginning of this chapter, some targets of 
selective law enforcement adjust their legal behavior in order to “remove the pretext.” In the 
same way as highly dubious manipulation, this behavior is, from a legal point of view, also 
inconsistent with the full implication of a catch-all theory. If there is an indefinite number of 
pretexts in the pool, it would make no sense to remove one or two of them. 
In conclusion, Russian law is probably not a tool of universal application from which no 
political activist can escape, even in an environment that in many ways seems to encourage 
particularistic use of laws. In many cases, at least, the legal filters are too strong (or not weak 
enough), and at the very least the success of the cases is contingent on how much political 
power is put behind them. Russia is not a lawless society, only one in which the law is 
frequently manipulated. Also, Russia is not a repressive machine whose only interest is to 
please its leader. The police, the bureaucracy, different special agencies, the secret services, 
the procuracy, and the courts in many cases do not act in unison, even when a case is 
selectively initiated by powerful forces. Rather, they operate in a complex social reality and 
are, like other human beings, subjected to several impulses and capable of independent 
thought. 
At the same time, the incoherent laws do seem to play an important role in how the political 
authorities and law enforcement agencies suppress critical voices. Many of the controversial 
cases are founded precisely on the most criticized legal formulations and often shortly after 
new amendments provided the opportunities. While we should be aware of the limitations, 
there are several reasons to take a moderated catch-all theory seriously. 
First, in order to be a meaningful concept, catch-all should of course not be understood 
literally. Catch-all does not refer to all legal subjects as such, but rather to an unreasonably 
high proportion of them, the exact numbers being less interesting for my purposes.  
A second observation that makes a notion of catch-all relevant is that, while a selectively-
initiated case against a regime critic will not always get that individual convicted, the 
legislation seems to provide sufficient grounds to initiate legal action. As will be elaborated 
in Chapter 8, the interview material suggests that even when no punishment is officially 
recognized as taking place legal acts have preventive and punitive qualities in themselves. To 
a considerable extent, therefore, law enforcement agencies can enforce the agenda of the 
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political regime without extensive support from the judiciary. At the very least, incoherent 
laws seem to be a sufficient pretext to engage in quasi-legal harassment.  
Third, the catch-all theory is possibly more relevant to targets who lack the resources and 
capabilities to defend themselves adequately. Because a well-organized defense can mobilize 
public support and draw on informal networks in addition to providing legal assistance, it 
would be reasonable to suspect that overly speculative accusations will have a lower chance 
of success in these cases. We can only suspect that targets with less to put up against selective 
charges will buckle to unfair proceedings and court rulings more quickly. 
Finally, we should note that the hypothetical question of whether everyone may be found 
guilty cannot be answered; we can only see that not everyone in practice is. What potential 
lies with the incoherent rules and what may be realistically effectuated are different entities. 
When it comes to building a selectively initiated case “properly” with good chances of 
achieving its purposes, the manipulative and legal skills of the prosecution are hardly 
unimportant. In Bækken (2009, 97-98), the lack of skills in preparing cases seemed to be an 
important factor in why human rights NGOs often won cases in court when subjected to 
selective law enforcement. The poor preparation of selective cases is obviously relative to the 
skill of the defense in counteracting them. In Bækken (ibid), the lack of ability and experience 
of state actors to frame a case upon NGO legislation became starkly evident when contrasted 
to the skill and professionalism of civil society lawyers specialized in exactly this legal field.  
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7 Perceptions of the Game 
The idea of selective law enforcement as a complex mechanism of rule enforcement 
presupposes a set of conceptual components. In this chapter, the conceptual components 
related to the informal workings of the mechanism will be examined in more detail. In the 
second part of the chapter, I will also look more closely at how the interviewees come to 
interpret the cases as political. These indicators of selectivity are necessary for the legal acts 
to be interpreted as informally motivated and thus tell us how the political regime may 
transmit its informal rules to actors within society. 
On some issues, the perceptions of actors who see themselves as subjected to selective law 
enforcement are crucial to the functioning of the mechanism itself. Perceptions of informal 
criteria, for instance, directly influence how actors act upon the legal problems. Information 
as to why the interviewees come to believe in these criteria, moreover, tells us something 
about how informal rules are transmitted and reproduced in society. How the interviewees 
experience this politicized law enforcement is part of what selective law enforcement is and 
how it works. 
On other issues, the perceptions themselves are not of crucial impact with regard to how the 
mechanism functions. Here, our interest therefore lies not with these perceptions, as was the 
case in the above examples. Rather, we seek empirical data about informal political games to 
which my methodological approach has no direct access. Questions of this type include who 
the initiators of selective law enforcement are, what their motives are, and how they 
communicate their wishes to the legal actors who act upon them. The answers my 
methodology can produce on these issues are second-hand. Considering the interviewees’ 
field of work and their experience with selective law enforcement, their statements on these 
topics should be approached as those of experts, albeit clearly biased ones, considering their 
personal or professional stakes in the cases. 
As will be seen, the research presented on the informal components in many ways stirs up 
more questions than the explorative research design is able to address adequately. Yet the data 
is sufficient to sketch out the great variation within the conceptual components of selective 
law enforcement, and it suggests how the variation can be addressed in further research. For 
the sake of textual fluency and the considerable interconnection between various components, 
some elements are addressed outside of their designated subsection. 
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7.1 The Informal Criteria 
The words, faces, and voices of my interviewees indicate bitterness, frustration, and possibly 
contempt for the individuals responsible for their problems. Yet, their narratives are strikingly 
matter-of-fact. Often, the interviewees rationalize the legal actions against them as dictated by 
the logics of power and by reference to the path dependencies of Russian politics. The 
adversaries are not depicted as demons but as cynics within a corrupt system. Selective law 
enforcement is in this view the product of instrumentalism, pragmatism, and ideological 
nihilism. The successful manipulator is the one who is willing and able to instrumentalize 
both formal institutions and informal networks. In other words, the interviewees tend to see 
selective law enforcement through the lenses of instrumental rationality.  
If I were to articulate one core rule that guides selective law enforcement in Russia, it would 
be something like this: If you threaten the interests of powerful groups or individuals –by 
criticizing or otherwise drawing negative attention to them – you stand a substantially higher 
risk of experiencing quasi-legal trouble. According to the interviewees, problems occur for 
those who are “not agreeing” (Starkov 15.11.2011), “not pleasing” (Anon. journalist 2010), 
“unwanted” (Eshanu 05.09.2011), “who speak their mind” (Slautina 13.11.2011), or are 
“critical to the authorities” (Vishnevskii 26.08.2011). One interviewee gathers that the main 
principle is always the same: “to pressure those who think and speak differently” (Kuzmina 
19.11.2011) 
There are certain costs in terms of time and resources to arrange a selective legal crackdown. 
Although Putin’s regime as a hybrid political system may be particularly vulnerable to 
political dissent (Robertson 2011), we would expect intervention to take place only when it is 
assumed to be worth the price. The more substantial, visible, and personal the criticism is, the 
more likely it will be picked up as a considerable threat by regime insiders and the greater is 
the risk of reprisals. Vadim Karastelev explained how the Novorossiysk Human Rights 
Committee had been working consistently and purposefully against the interest of the regional 
authorities for years. 
[The krai authorities] want to create a good image for themselves. We talk about the 
ugly stuff which is going on, and this contradicts what they are saying in the mass 
media. And because we also point to facts, laws, experts, and so on, they don’t like it 
at all. If we just shouted “Aaaah, everything is bad here,” they would hardly pay 
any attention. But when we come up with facts, take them to court, write letters, 
meet journalists – they don’t like it. This has gone on for more than ten years, so 
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now they simply hate us. If somebody put a gun in their hands, they would shoot us 
immediately. (Karastelev 03.06.2011) 
Some of the prosecuted interviewees see their cases primarily in terms of a long-lasting bad 
relationship with the authorities. Others see the prosecution first and foremost as triggered by 
a specific act or acts that preceded the legal crackdown. Typically, this trigger may be the 
publishing of a critical report, conducting a journalistic investigation, or organizing (an) 
oppositional event(s). In the case of tax claims against the Kazan Human Rights Center, for 
instance, one of its lawyers sees the tax claims as a direct response to the human rights 
organization’s (successful) initiative to bring a high-ranking police officer to justice for 
violent behavior under the influence of alcohol: “This was the main and obvious reason, there 
can be no other reasons” (Khrunova 13.12.2010). She explains that the NGO repeatedly put 
forward such cases against the regular police, but that they first experienced trouble when 
they touched one of its leaders (ibid). 
In a third set of cases, the selective law enforcement takes the form of preemptive actions 
aimed at limiting the impact of planned events, such as meetings, conferences, rallies, and 
similar activities.  
While we may categorize the informal criteria in such groups, the informal criteria are often 
more mixed. Frequently, the legal crackdown is part of a dynamic conflict that has lasted for 
some time. Commonly, for instance, a sour, long-term relationship culminates over specific 
issues or actions. In more than one case, a bad relationship culminates in specific events 
leading to legal pressure that again is sustained into election campaigns, in which the political 
leadership is particularly sensitive to criticism. In the case of Nikolai Gusak, the trouble 
started with repeated conflicts at work in which he attained some legal experience. Then the 
trouble escalated after he became involved in a property dispute and went further as he 
decided to run for office with the opposition in the local elections. As he summed it up 
himself, referring to the local power networks: “My activity was too high for them”. After 
Gusak found a reason to take rumors about his planned mutilation or assassination seriously, 
he sent letters of caution to various state agencies, including FSB, in order to protect himself. 
As it seems, the letters unleashed a chain of legal charges, starting with accusations of 
planned terrorist bombings of the local court. Gusak states that the court chair personally filed 
a total of 38 accusations against him in the following months (Gusak 10.06.2011). 
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The complexity and time-span of legal cases allow for considerable improvisation in the 
duration of the process. Actors on both sides have time to adapt to changing circumstances 
and engage in informal bargaining. The motives for initiating a case are not necessarily the 
same as the motives for sustaining it over time. While selective law enforcement is phased in 
the meaning that a selection by definition precedes the first legal acts, this does not imply that 
the informal influence is limited to the initial selection only. On the contrary, there are reasons 
to expect informal interests to keep pushing cases in which they have stakes.  
In addition, in the few cases in which we would possibly have expected informal criteria to be 
more clear-cut, the improvisation upon changing circumstances makes the informal criteria 
more complex and context-bound. The raids that took place in Samara may serve as 
examples. Circumstantial evidence and the timing certainly indicate that the raids were related 
to the suppression of the so-called Dissenters’ March (marsh nesoglasnykh), a planned 
opposition rally that was set to coincide with a major EU-Russia Summit in the region. The 
rally was officially sanctioned, but its potential for mass mobilization was suppressed by a 
number of means, including the mass arrest of activists in several Russian regions (Horvath 
2013, 194-195).  
In the days preceding the planned rally, the editorial office of Novaya Gazeta in Samara was 
searched and its computers confiscated. Criminal proceedings were initiated against the 
newspaper’s editor-in-chief, Sergei Kurt-Adzhiev. Officially, the raid was conducted on 
suspicions of unlicensed software, but according to Kurt-Adzhiev (18.11.2010) the crackdown 
was intended to paralyze Novaya Gazeta’s activity as one of few local media outlets which 
authorities suspected could mobilize readers for the Dissenters’ March. They also raided the 
neighboring office of the news agency Volgainform, presumably to stop them from lending 
Novaya the necessary hardware to continue publishing.64 The leader of the agency, Lyudmila 
Kotova (18.11.2010), who is also Kurt-Adzhiev’s spouse, is unsure whether the agency’s 
political attitudes may have influenced the decision to take away their computers, but she is 
positive that the raid was based on improvisation and not part of any prearranged plan. 
 
                                                 
64 In contrast to the planned raid of Novaya Gazeta, the raid against Volgainform seemed unorganized and 
lacked an official permit, Kotova (18.11.2010) explains. Days later, a permit was issued and backdated.  
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Almost simultaneously, the regional office of GOLOS was subjected to similar treatment. The 
office computers were confiscated on alleged suspicions of copyright violations, and a case 
was opened against its leader Lyudmila Kuzmina. The NGO’s staff was locked out of the 
premises with access neither to documents nor hardware. Like Kurt-Adzhiev, Kuzmina is a 
well-known critic in the area. Before the rally, a chain of related events unfolded in which 
Kuzmina became involved in criticizing how the police tackled the situations arising as 
tensions grew. One day when the rally drew near, she had just given a critical address on a 
radio program on Ekho Moskvy when she was informed that the GOLOS office had been 
raided by a special police unit. 
Although these raids were presumably part of an initiative to suppress the “Dissenters’ 
March” in Samara, the two targets of the raids were not released from the hook when this task 
had been completed. The computers of Novaya Gazeta were not returned, and criminal 
proceedings against Kurt-Adzhiev (18.11.2010) were sustained for more than two years. 
Criminal investigation against Kotova (18.11.2010) was dropped, but another case was 
opened against Volgainform, in which Kotova had official status as a witness.  
Although the procedures against Kuzmina in person were cancelled in December 2007, both 
Kuzmina and other GOLOS staff experienced continued harassment. Kuzmina (19.11.2010) 
suggests that someone had hopes of paralyzing GOLOS’ ability to monitor elections the same 
year. While the case against her was already cancelled in 2007 due to lack of evidence, she 
was not informed until March the next year, two days after the presidential elections (Kalatch 
2008). Novaya Gazeta was not able to function without hardware and ceased publication.65 
While the crackdown seemed triggered by the Council of Europe summit, this is only part of 
the story. As Kurt-Adzhiev has explained, he and his newspaper have always been a “bone in 
the throat” of the regional government (Arutyunov undated). The fact that his daughter is a 
prominent activist complicates the issues further.  
The interviewees’ perceptions of informal criteria in general fit with the core rule as 
formulated above. Beyond that point, however, the answers bear witness to the complexities 
of informal schemes. Informal rules are never fixed, but must always be seen in relation to the 
complex context in which they are acted upon. A skillful player in this game will understand 
                                                 
65 A new edition of Novaya Gazeta based in the same region (Novaya Gazeta v Povolzhe) began publication in 
March 2010. 
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the applicability and implication of both formal rules and informal norms under any given 
circumstances (see Ledeneva 2006b). Within the interview setting, the interviewees are 
“forced” to articulate these complexities, and the informal criteria thus become more tangible 
for outsiders who want to put labels on them. Yet, the reasons for the trigger are contingent 
upon a more complex background which makes it difficult to isolate the informal criteria from 
each other and from the broader context. 
In the case of selective registration denials, some interviewees also repeat the by-now-familiar 
claim that candidates from the opposition and candidates that have a reputation as 
troublemakers will have a particularly hard time getting registered. In addition to these 
criteria, however, there is a widespread view that opposition candidates “will get special 
consideration from the committee” if they have some weight to throw around (Cherkasov 
05.09.2011). Regardless of policy preference or political stance, candidates may be removed 
from the race if they appear to stand a fair chance of winning against incumbents or friends of 
the incumbents. When the Duma party Just Russia (Spravedlivaya Rossiya) was denied 
participation in some municipal elections in Vladimir oblast, its leaders took this almost as a 
compliment: “We had a quite strong team, they just feared us” (Godunin 06.09.2011). These 
findings echo Maria Popova’s (2012) research on election disputes, which uncovered a 
significant statistical correlation between election disputes and competitive districts where 
more than one candidate had real chances of winning. Competitiveness increases the 
incentives not only for more active campaigning and thus more violations, but also for getting 
the main competitor de-registered before Election Day so as not to risk defeat. 
Precisely who the candidate is running against can be assumed to be particularly important in 
single-mandate districts, of which there are many in the Russian regions. If you are serious in 
challenging an important incumbent from the ruling party or a favorite of the governor in a 
single-mandate district, the chances are good you might just as well start readying yourself for 
an appearance in court. The Perm candidate Andrei Starkov was young and rather unknown in 
the region, as were his personal attributes and political views. According to Starkov 
(15.11.2011), his registration was blocked only when the incumbents realized that he might 
actually win the seat. The ruling elite could not afford to lose this seat to an outsider, explains 
Starkov’s political advisor, because the governor’s favorite was the general director of a 
Lukoil subsidiary and “one of the sponsors” of the current regime (Podvintsev 13.11.2011). 
Khaibrakhmanov is another candidate who was eventually denied registration to the same 
elections. He was seemingly in agreement with the regional leadership about his candidacy, 
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but fell out of favor when his opponent’s business associates in Moscow used their channels 
to convince the Governor to change his priority (Anon. political advisor 2011). 66 
7.2 Perceived Motives 
Most of the interviewees of this study rejected any suggestion that the legalistic veneer had 
been intended to provide the harassment with any popular support. Denisova reacted in 
disbelief when I hinted in this direction. 
No, no, no, they are not trying [to look legitimate]. Why? Everybody understands! 
Come on! It’s funny, because when you speak to the public you don’t have iron clad 
proof that this is selective [law enforcement], but to say that [the prosecution] is 
done for the sake of protecting somebody’s rights [would be] simply unbelievable … 
The majority of the people says that this is bullshit. (Denisova 17.12.2010) 
Once again, the façade theories have a poor fit with my findings on the ground. Instead of 
interpreting their experiences in terms of deception and hidden repression, the interviewees 
tended to talk about selective law enforcement in the context of power relations As noted in 
the methodology section, however, the interviewees did not speak explicitly in terms of 
informal rules and their enforcement – this terminology is my own extension for purposes of 
concept-development. Yet, the way interviewees frame the issues is clearly reminiscent to me 
of a rule enforcement perspective. They speak about “scaring” (deterrence), “setting an 
example for others” (general deterrence), and “hindering” the working of an organization 
(preventive acts). In their statements, the communicative aspect of rule enforcement is also 
evident. 
Just as the informal rules that guide selective crackdowns are complex and context-bound, the 
related perceptions of motivations behind selective law enforcement are similarly multi-
faceted. If we exclude the special case of selective denials of election registration (whose 
purpose is relatively straight forward), most interviewees that had experienced legal attacks 
believed that the prosecution had several motives. “I think it was 80% to prevent young 
people from taking part in such actions and 20% against me personally,” said Aleksei 
Gaskarov (02.06.2011), one of the young men prosecuted for the riots against the city 
                                                 
66 Incidentally, Khaibrakhmanov was the previous director of the Lukoil subsidiary, whose new director opposed 
Starkov in a different electoral district. Khaibrakhmanov’s opponent held a high position within the Russian 
Military-Industrial Complex. 
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administration building in Khimki in 2010. Anastasia Denisova, a human rights activist who 
worked for the NGO Memorial and headed the NGO ETHnICS in Krasnodar krai, had her 
computers confiscated and was charged with copyright violations and with “creating, using 
and distributing” illegal software.67 Simultaneously, she was investigated for possible 
extremist activities. According to her interpretation, the initiators wanted:  
to grab the information from my laptop and personal computers to see how much to 
expect from me, to divert me from human rights activities, and to engage me in[to] 
self-protection at the expense of my mission. I think [the proceedings] were 
[intended] to make me busy with something else rather than making projects and 
working … They wanted to scare [me], they wanted to stop me. The best scenario 
for them would be that I went away from the region, which actually I am on the 
brink of doing because I don’t want to follow Karastelev68 and be beaten up. 
(Denisova 17.12.2010) 
Several of the self-perceived victims use the term davlenie (pressure) when describing what 
motives they see behind the legal acts. In two separate cases, the state media monitoring 
agency, Roskomnadzor, issued formal warnings for extremist content to two branches of 
Novaya Gazeta. “It [the warning] is a way to keep us under pressure, so that we don’t get too 
deep into these issues,” explains Natalia Pruzenkova (22.06.2011), press secretary of the 
newspaper’s federal edition in Moscow. Boris Vishnevskii (26.08.2011), part-time journalist 
for the St. Petersburg branch, has a similar view, but with a greater stress on the informal 
criteria. “It is a way to pressure,” he explains, “you see, this is also a signal that if you are 
going to criticize the authorities [vlast’], we can arrange for a second warning.”69 By adding 
pressure, the selectors communicate a warning to discourage a target from repeating the 
unwanted acts, and they build up psychological stress by showing attention to a specific case 
or actor. In other words, the term davlenie is strongly related to deterrence. 
As discussed above (section 5.3), easily fabricated “suspicion” allows law enforcers to 
conduct searches and confiscate documents and computer hardware, not least on the pretext of 
enforcing copyrights. In these cases, some interviewees hold that the gathering of information 
may indeed be an important goal of law enforcers or their patrons. As the interviewees see it, 
                                                 
67 The Criminal Code, Article 146.3 and 271.3, respectively. 
68 This person is likely the same Vadim Karastelev who figures in this study. 
69 While a first warning for “extremist activity” from the media monitoring agency Roskomnadzor has no direct 
legal effect, a second warning will open the way for liquidation procedures in court. 
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the raiders do not primarily seek unlicensed software or signs of extremism –which may be 
the pretext for the raids– but try to find any internal documents and correspondence that may 
give them some form of leverage in ongoing or future political conflicts.  
The gathering of information (not least kompromat) and the exertion of pressure are 
connected in the Russian term povesit’ na kryuchke (to hang on the hook). When a 
troublemaker attracts the attention of authoritarian leaders, legal investigations may both 
communicate a warning and help to gather information on the subject. The information 
obtained from raids may give the law enforcers a possible edge in a conflict, and the opened 
case makes it easier to pull (potyanut’) the hook when or if necessary. The investigations 
against Denisova for conducting extremist activities and cybercrime were eventually closed as 
she went into (internal) exile in Moscow. But as Denisova (24.5.2011) said: “They open and 
close criminal cases just like that. If I go back [to Krasnodar Krai] and become active [again] 
they may reopen it. They already did it three times, [so there is] no guarantee there won’t be a 
fourth, a fifth, and so on.”  
In the case of Sergei Simak, the law enforcers confiscated a computer, but at the time of the 
interview the case had hardly moved forward: “They are only doing an investigation … In 
Russian, this is called to keep (derzhat’) on the hook. They know if they bring the case 
forward at this time, they will probably lose. At the same time, they do not want to close the 
case” (Simak 22.11.2010). We should also recall the case in which Volgainform’s leader 
Kotova had status as a witness. According to her husband, this was also a political move – a 
way to “keep her on the hook” (Kurt-Adzhiev 18.11.2010). It would not be hard to change her 
status back to accused in the middle of the investigation, he explained (ibid). 
In the special case of selective registration denials, the motivations are often seen as less 
complex, because the electoral context makes the stakes obvious. As noted in the section 
above, a wish to get rid of an unwanted candidate from the election race may simultaneously 
be an attempt to increase the chances of a favored candidate to win a seat. 
7.3 The “Selectors” – Who Are Seen as behind Selective 
Law Enforcement? 
The interviewees rarely identify the informal interests behind a case to be actors within the 
law enforcement structure itself, though there are also examples to the contrary. When the 
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blogger Robert Zagreev was sentenced to a penal colony for various extremist activities, for 
instance, his lawyer believed that the FSB initiated and pushed the case because they were 
themselves targets of Zagreev’s criticism (Ural 08.06.2011). Denisova (17.12.2010) finds 
reasons to believe that the FSB was also involved in initiating the legal process against her, 
and Dmitrievskii (16.12.2010) makes a similar claim, though both of them also stresses the 
role of regional authorities in the background. In some cases, the Federal Security Bureau 
seems to act as the middleman between the state administration and less politically active law 
enforcement agencies. In one spectacular case from the Bashkortostan town of Tuimazy, the 
court chair himself repeatedly tried to get the engineer-turned-activist Gusak (10.06.2011) 
convicted, amongst other things for planning terrorist attacks.  
More commonly, however, the law enforcers are seen to act on behalf of patrons or networks 
external to the formal law enforcement structure. Selective law enforcement takes place not 
only by means of pro forma laws, but also most often through straw men.  
In the majority of the examined cases, the interviewees link their problems to powerful figures 
in the regional administration, typically governors or their close associates. Some insist that 
the head of the region himself had issued an order; others mention names of bureaucrats or 
advisors within the administration. More than one electoral candidate denied registration in 
Perm, for instance, claimed that the selective registration denials were arranged by a certain 
individual within the governor’s “team” (komanda). Yet other interviewees are less specific in 
their accusations. They may have little knowledge or interest in these details or are hesitant to 
make personal accusations. 
A point worth noting is the difference in the degree and nature of the Kremlin’s perceived 
involvement in the regional conflicts in which selective law enforcement is used. Not in a 
single examined case did the interviewees suspect the personal involvement of the President 
or Prime Minister in initiating a case. One of the interviewees even held that criticizing Putin 
in general is safe, while criticizing local authorities may be fatal. Igor Averkiev’s article 
comparing Putin to Hitler did, however, provoke the attention of the state monitoring agency 
Rossvyaz’okhrankul’tura in 2007, but Averkiev (15.11.2011) also doubts that the President or 
his office were involved in the processes. 
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That being said, many of the interviewees claim that top political figures are involved in the 
informal schemes leading up to their prosecution, including not only the regional elite and 
governors, but also other higher federal officials and the presidential administration. The 
cases examined leave us with the impression that the links between the rulers in Moscow and 
the regional elites do not follow a simple chain of command but take many different forms. 
Several interviewees have suggested that federal interests were at stake in the March 2010 
elections in Vladimir, in which a large number of serious candidates were denied registration. 
Lyudmila Eshanu, a journalist who also works for GOLOS in the region, suggests that the 
purge (zachistku) was orchestrated by a central figure within United Russia:  
He acts like he is the “ruler (khozyain) of all Rus.”70 He comes here and starts to 
whisper and everyone for some reason fears [him] … He headed the staff, so there-
fore everything went through him – All these lists, whom to purge, whom to crush. 
(Eshanu 05.09.2011) 
Prior to the elections, many territorial election committees in Vladimir received additional 
support from officially neutral advisors, hired from various parts of the country. Part of their 
work was directly concerned with the registration process. These “highly qualified lawyers 
knew all the election laws … and they approached the opposition candidates in a very 
scrupulous way and tried to deny them registration,” Eshanu claims (ibid). In a short article 
for GOLOS Vladimir, she (2011b) strongly suggests that these lawyers in fact worked 
unofficially for United Russia and for money from outside the city. 
In the crackdown against several offices in Nizhniy Novgorod in 2007, Moscow was 
allegedly involved, but in an indirect fashion. The raid and confiscation of hardware took 
place the same year and in a manner outwardly similar to the one in Samara. According to the 
journalistic investigation of Viktor Demeniev (e.g. 2007), the governor travelled to Moscow 
to get clearance from a top figure in the Presidential Administration for the use of “active 
measures” against a number of organizations.71 The plan was already developed locally, and a 
list of organizations was apparently ready in advance. The human rights activist Stanislav 
Dmitrievskii was among the targets. If the decision to crack down was cleared with Moscow, 
                                                 
70 “Ruler of all Rus” is a reference to early eastern Slavic tribes and the medieval Russian/Ukrainian state. 
71 Demeniev’s findings, according to Novruzova (16.12.2010). 
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the tactical details on how to engage the task had to be decided locally, he explained 
(Dmitrievskii 16.12.2010).  
A journalist charged with extremist activities reported that the legal cases against him were 
undertaken on local initiative. At the same time, he suspected that Moscow provided 
protection (lit. roof, krysha) to his antagonists and blocked his efforts to resolve the conflict 
within the formal system (Anon. journalist 2010).  
In many cases, the interviewees stick to regional explanations and do not mention Moscow at 
all. In the examined claims about selective registration denials in Perm, nobody mentioned 
anything but regional elites, and Gusak presented his problems in Tuimazy as locally 
constituted. Densiova (17.12.2010), whose problems originated in Krasnodar Krai, even 
reported that she felt “more or less safe” in the capital, where she had gone into internal exile. 
Although she believed that her problems originated with regional authorities and the highly 
centralized FSB, her antagonists seemed to lack the influence or willingness to act outside of 
their own region.  
In conclusion, the interviewees depict regional elites very capable of pulling the strings of law 
enforcement and administration in their region on their own. Moscow may be involved in 
many cases, but not in the classical notion of a power vertical or chain-of-command. Instead, 
federal interests play a multitude of roles. There is little in the research material to suggest 
that selective law enforcement in all its forms and shapes takes place according to an 
unwritten master plan. Whatever patterns we may discover in the material should therefore 
more plausibly be interpreted as more or less uncoordinated actions which are all based on the 
same rules of the game. Similar incentives give birth to behavioral patterns and thus 
perceptions of unity. These perceptions of unity, however, produce the effects associated with 
rule enforcement on a higher level of abstraction. The individuals, networks, or institutions 
that the interviewees see as behind their cases are primarily seen as representatives of vlast’ 
(see section 3.3). 
Moreover, even if the initiatives are often local, it would be reasonable to expect that the 
federal elites will take action whenever they find regional rulers who act beyond their 
(informal) mandate and in conflict with Moscow’s interest. Even if a case is initiated by 
regional law enforcement, administration, or private interests, the initiators may act also with 
intentions to show off in front of their patrons in the Kremlin. The perceptions of the activist 
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and politician Damir Garifullin (09.06.2011) may illustrate the point. He suggested that the 
legal case against him was initiated by a local political leader. At the same, time he sees this 
action as dictated by the logics of power: If this person had not taken action then somebody 
else would have and the former would have lost his job. 
From my methodological perspective, it is hard to tell whether or not the regional actors acted 
as they did with the explicit or implicit blessing of Moscow, and we should, moreover, be 
careful about inferring more general conclusions based on limited material. The findings do 
not undermine the assumption that there is centralized and large-scale repressive campaigns 
similar to those which Horvath (2013) has called the “preventive counter-revolution” under 
Putin’s second term. It does, however, remind us that we should resist the temptation to reify 
the ruling elite in authoritarian systems, by imagining the multiplicity of actors as a real and 
compact collective entity. When we are studying authoritarian or autocratic regimes, non-
transparency and popular myths make an exaggerated belief in central authority and control 
especially tempting. Even the tsars, however, were not as autocratic as they wanted to be. 
Although Putin has introduced a centralistic form of governance, the huge, non-transparent, 
and highly corrupt country is by no means easy to rule, whether by formal, informal, or quasi-
formal means. For more details on how the cases come to be patterned and institutionalized as 
informal rules, see the next chapter. 
7.4 The Lines of Communication 
As was laid out in the previous chapter, the laws that underlie many cases of selective law 
enforcement grant legal actors broad or at times almost indefinite discretion in decision 
making. Or so it may seem if we look at law alone. As everywhere, the discretion that the 
legal actors may at first seem to possess is in reality strongly compromised by a range of 
influences, including professional, social and political expectations of their work. Some of 
these expectations are in Russia also backed up with quasi-formal sanctioning mechanisms, 
reproducing the logic of selective law enforcement within the broader legal system. 
In the cases examined, the interviewees claim that the legal actors pass on most of their 
decision-making power to their patrons within the regime, letting the political preferences of 
these insiders determine against whom legal acts should be targeted. What power the 
discretionary or incoherent legal rules allocate to the legal actors, then, is in these cases 
largely illusory. In the narratives of interviewees, therefore, the legal actors predominantly 
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operate as cogwheels in an authoritarian machinery. In another words, the initiators of 
selective law enforcement not only instrumentalize laws, but also the manpower within the 
law enforcement system. Subservient legal actors are a key prerequisite for selective law 
enforcement to be effective.  
A catch-all legal framework, corruption within the system, and a culture of legal manipulation 
provide incentives to instrumentalize the legal system. These incentives are, however, in 
theory present to any actor. The political leadership needs to ensure that selective law 
enforcement takes place in a way not contrary to its own interests. The discretion must, as I 
noted in the previous chapter, somehow be controlled and delimited. 
These goals require some sort of coordination between the political elite and the legal actors. 
In order to be successful, selective law enforcement is therefore dependent upon the legal 
actors’ ability to distribute punishment effectively and accurately, according to the interests of 
the ruling elite and according to the informal rules of which they are the main beneficiaries. In 
other words, the ability to constitute a consistent link between the informal rules of political 
conduct and the formal legal acts is dependent upon both the coercive and the cohesive 
capacity of the regime. The coercive ability is a direct function of law enforcement capacity. 
The cohesion is measured as the degree to which the political leadership is able to control the 
direction and severity of selective law enforcement.  
In my interviews, I asked the self-perceived victims of selective law enforcement to share 
their perceptions on how the selectors’ motivations get translated into concrete legal acts. As 
is the case with most of my other questions, I inquired about the interviewees’ personal 
experiences of selective law enforcement, but did not stop them from voicing more general 
opinions. I sought to explore not least whether the political bias was internalized within the 
law enforcement system itself or dependent on constant reinforcement by commands from 
higher up in the hierarchy.  
A considerable proportion of the interviewees explicitly stated that the cases against them 
were initiated by means of direct commands from officeholders in political or administrative 
positions. In other words, they perceived the power to work according to the logics of 
“telephone justice” in a narrow sense.  
This view was particularly evident in case of selective denials for election registration. “There 
were direct orders, of course,” said Sergei Godunin (06.09.2011), who is the former mayor of 
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Suzdal (Vladimir oblast’) and a politician with considerable experience in regional politics. 
Eshanu (05.09.2011), the above-mentioned journalist and GOLOS-worker, shares Godunin’s 
interpretation of the regional and local elections in Vladimir: “the lawyers had direct orders to 
purge this, this, this, and this [candidate].” In Perm, Andrei Starkov (15.11.2011) was denied 
registration and blamed a politicized registration process organized by telephone. In Starkov’s 
mind, the process is very simple indeed: “They just call and say ‘hello, this man needs to be 
rejected.’” 
Outside of the election registration context, a part of the interviewees also believe that the 
insiders control the selective initiation of legal cases by means of clear-cut orders. “[There 
were] direct commands. They don’t talk to each other in other ways,” said Karastelev 
(03.06.2011) in Novorossiysk Human Rights Committee. He continued: “It’s very simple. 
They called and said that [our organization] had to be closed. They sent lawyers to show up in 
courts and the judge did what he had to” (ibid). In another case, Irek Murtazin served a 
sentence in a penal colony for extremism-related crimes and slander against the President of 
Tatarstan republic at the time. Unsurprisingly, the President as the offended party was heavily 
involved in the case. Murtazin’s wife, however, believed that somebody else close to the 
President exerted pressure from outside of the courtroom: “I think that here we have 
something called telephone justice when everything is decided by telephone calls,” she said 
(Sitdikova 13.12.2010). Another example of perceived direct commands may be found in the 
Nizhniy Novgorod raids in 2007, where the governor allegedly operated with a list of specific 
organizations that needed attention. 
In other situations, the interviewees depicted a less direct transmission of informal agendas 
from the political actors and the law enforcers. “I don’t think [the case] has a direct link [to 
regional authorities],” said Denisova (17.12.2010) from Novorossiysk. “Instead, it shows the 
general attitude and the environment – the general flow of things in the region. It is a silent 
agreement between the regional authorities and the law enforcement agencies.” A source 
close to Gaskarov believes that the police feared that their careers might have been in danger 
if they had not taken action in response to the Khimki riots: “[the Governor] said that they had 
to find the person that did this, but he did not say who. They just needed a scapegoat” (anon. 
social activist 2011). Neither of the two interviewed representatives of Novaya Gazeta in 
Moscow thinks that there were any explicit political orders to issue an extremist warning to 
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the newspaper. Rather, “it was their [Rozkomnadzor officials’] personal initiative to please 
the Kremlin,” the press secretary Natalya Prusenkova contended (22.06.2011)  
Finally, several interviewees also take a third position. They talk about the translation of 
informal criteria into legal acts neither in terms of their complete internalization by law 
enforcers nor as the result of direct commands. Instead, they focus on signals and political 
discourse. Although Emilia Novruzova in the regional Novaya Gazeta sees the situation in 
Nizhniy Novgorod as an explicit order from the governor, she stresses how political signals 
often are more subtle:  
[selectivity] is a primary characteristic of the whole political system in Russia. 
These commands are not just given when somebody calls somebody else. A political 
will is expressed and spread to all the [administrative] branches. [The branches] 
accept it and work in the way that they think necessary. (Novruzova 16.12.2010) 
Kuzmina (19.11.2010) in Samara explained how administrative leaders might provide public 
signals which agencies interpret as start flags: “Such a signal sounded from the President’s 
representative (glavnyi federal’nyi inspektor) in Samara oblast … And naturally, the lower 
part of the vertical reacts to such signals in its own way and executes a persecution.” In the 
particular case, Kuzmina pointed to a newspaper article and some anonymous Internet 
postings that warned against spies and saboteurs in relation to the upcoming EU-Russia 
Summit. These postings explicitly mentioned the names of Kuzmina and Kurt-Adzhiev, both 
of whom were soon subjected to similar raids and subsequent criminal procedures (ibid). 
It seems safe, then, to say that both direct commands and internalized practices among legal 
actors are relevant to the phenomenon. There is no real contradiction between the direct 
commands stressed by some interviewees and the vaguer signals from above emphasized by 
others. Rather, the different explanations reflect particular cases and tell different parts of the 
same story. The two forms of communication are complementary rather than conflicting. The 
core rules of Russian authoritarian politics ensure a certain level of “automated” repression of 
regime critics, but also that the law enforcement agencies must adjust their routine to signals 
or direct commands from above. On the level of the political regime, therefore, the 
combination of internalized bias and the continued practice of telephone justice make perfect 
sense. Although heads of law enforcement agencies are politically conscious in their work 
(see below) the political leadership will still need to encourage and direct this bias by pulling 
strings manually from time to time. To make a successful career in law enforcement, the rules 
of the game dictate not only that you must be aware of the political signals and take active 
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measures to curb political dissent, but they also dictate that you are ready to serve your 
patrons more directly when prompted, even when this may contradict the law. 
Yurii Cherkasov’s (05.09.2011) statement supports this interpretation: “[The election 
committees] know there is a general arrangement, let’s say you should never register Yabloko 
under any circumstances. Here there is no need for telephone justice, they will do this 
themselves.” Cherkasov, who is a member of the Communist Party, moves on to explain a 
more complex case where an earlier member of Edinaya Rossiya was denied registration. 
“Here,” he concludes, “we have an outright order. Here, of course, we have telephone justice” 
(ibid). 
One should also note that any direct order from a patron is likely to influence the client’s 
interpretations of the future situation. For this reason, direct commands will also influence the 
institutionalization of patterns and expectations about how selective law enforcement works 
within the political regime. In other words, direct orders are strong normative expressions and 
for this reason also carriers of informal rules. 
7.5 Indicators of Selectivity 
What I call indicators of selectivity are basically what would elsewhere be called 
circumstantial evidence for ulterior motives. For my purposes, however, the indicators of 
selectivity are of great interest not least because they are the manifestation of the link between 
informal politics and law enforcement as interpreted by the interviewees. It is these indicators 
that determine how targets and observers alike come to interpret legal acts as motivated by 
particularistic and extralegal interests. Following the logic of deterrence, the indicators of 
political selectivity are first and foremost flags to signal informal rules of political conduct. 
This section shows some examples from the interview material on how this flag is set up 
(consciously or not) and identified in actual cases.  
Even though the political motivations are often denied publicly, my research indicates that 
legal actors in Russian make little if any attempt to hide the informal underpinnings. While 
the exact reasons for initiating these cases may sometimes be difficult to ascertain and the 
ulterior motives hard to prove legally speaking, the cases look like anything but apolitical. As 
will be clear, then, the findings give little support to façade theories that would see selective 
law enforcement as a smoke screen to hide repression from observers (cf section 1.3.5).  
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7.5.1 Extraneous Elements 
The targets of selective law enforcement may sense political motivations by identifying what 
they see as extraneous political elements in a given setting. As the argument goes, if a legal 
case had indeed not been politically initiated, it would not be paid attention to by political 
actors. Irina Khrunova worked with the Kazan Human Rights Centre before she engaged 
herself in the defense of Pussy Riot. In an interview about what she sees as politically 
motivated tax charges against the human rights NGO, Khrunova explained her suspicions 
towards the regional authorities in part by referring to their awkward presence at a press 
conference: 
When we arranged a press conference in relation to this case [on police violence], 
lots of journalists arrived and the victims [of the beatings] also came to Kazan. They 
explained how everything happened, and the journalists listened. And at this press 
conference arrived also the head of the Internal Security Agency of Tatarstan 
Republic72, though what he wanted to do there is not known. The deputy head of the 
regional press service of Tatarstan MVD73came too, and also others … A cop 
filmed the whole thing. (Khrunova 13.12.2010) 
“Why would employees on such high level come to some [minor] press-conference?” 
Khrunova asks rhetorically (ibid). In another case, Novruzova in Novaya Gazeta in Nizhniy 
Novgorod detected a political element in the composition of the law enforcement group that 
raided their editorial office: 
One of them, I don’t know what he would do in that delegation, was connected with 
the agency that fights against terrorism and extremism … He was one of the threats 
for oppositional activists in Nizhniy Novgorod, always doing his best in order to 
make problems for those who try to work in the political sphere. (Novruzova 
16.12.2010) 
While such incidents in theory may occur for several reasons and need not necessarily signify 
anything on its own, these indicators of ulterior motives are often supported by others. 
7.5.2 Timing and Coordinated Crackdown 
The timing of events is commonly referred to when interviewees explain why they see a case 
as triggered by extralegal criteria. As Dmitrievskii (16.12.2010) noted after the occurrence of 
                                                 
72 Glavnoe upravlenie sobstvennoi bezopasnosti MVD RF. 
73 Ministersvo vnutrennikh del, Ministry of the Interior. 
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subsequent raids and interrogations: “all these inquisitional acts related to this case happened 
against us precisely when we arranged some kind of event.” For the purpose of communi-
cating informal criteria or rules, the timing of crackdown with specific events has the 
advantage of showing rather precisely what action is considered unwanted and de facto 
punishable. 
Another common indicator of selectivity is the coordination of crackdown upon several 
organizations sharing a similar critical profile or operating in the same sphere. In Nizhniy 
Novgorod, for instance, the Tolerance Foundation was raided the same day as the cooperation 
partner Committee against Torture in Nizhniy Novgorod (Dmitrievskii 16.12.2010). The 
regional Novaya Gazeta edition had the abovementioned visitors the following week 
(Novruzova 16.12.2010).74 Dmitrievskii (16.12.2010) also notes that the law enforcement 
officials produced identical documents to sanction the raids against all three organizations, 
something he found peculiar. A similar coordination of raids took place in Samara where, 
among others, the two offices of GOLOS and Novaya Gazeta were raided more or less 
simultaneously. 
The multiplicity of similar cases does not need to coincide in time in order to be interpreted as 
related. In some cases, it may be sufficient that they follow similar trajectories. Denisova for 
instance, saw her own case in relation to the above-mentioned conflict between regional 
authorities and Vadim Karastelev, who experienced legal charges and later was hospitalized 
after severe beatings in the same region of Southern Russia (see OMCT 2010): 
I see that in my situation the succession of events is the same. It is some kind of 
informal scheme. If a person is not easy to approach to make him loyal and less 
critical, they make a checkup against his organizations or open criminal cases 
against him in person. And if that doesn’t work, they beat him up. (Denisova 
17.12.2010) 
That several similar organizations and individuals experience similar crackdown on formally 
unrelated grounds gives observers a reason to seek out the informal criteria by looking at what 
                                                 
74 To deny the political selectivity of these raids, the police claimed that “more than 100 businesses and other 
organizations” had been searched for unlicensed software this year. A police spokesman also stated that a bread 
factory had been raided the same week as Novaya Gazeta, presumably to show that various incidents may very 
well be unrelated. Unlike the more standard answer of the Samara police, referring to legal violations (which 
turned out to be fabricated), the Nizhny Novgorod police thus actually attempted to deny the accusations of 
selectivity (see Osipovich 2007). 
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characteristics the targets have in common. The coordinated crackdown provides a signal as 
to what elements of civil society are currently moving beyond the borders of what is seen as 
acceptable by the authorities. In this way, informal rules concerning unwanted attitudes of 
fields of work are transmitted by means of enforcement patterns. 
7.5.3 Consistent Harassment 
Whereas, in the campaigns discussed above, many targets are hit at the same time, campaigns 
may also take another form. In many cases, one and the same target is hit again and again to 
make it keep its head down and to remove all doubt that the prosecution is a matter beyond 
formal regulations. Many informants have found themselves in a situation in which a number 
of punitive measures are initiated against them at the same time, be it legal charges, 
harassment by police officials, smear campaigns in mass media, or physical attacks by 
unidentified assailants.  
“In short, it was such a nightmare,” said Leisan Sitdikova, the wife of Irek Murtazin, who at 
the time faced very powerful interests in a Tatarstan court:  
I don’t want to think about it. Every day, court bailiffs packed at our doors saying 
that he [Irek] had not paid aliments. They wrote some kind of drivel and posted 
some kind of porn clips [on the Internet] in which he allegedly participated. 
(Sitdikova 13.12.2010) 
Through local newspapers and Internet portals belonging to Tatmedia, the largest media 
corporation associated with the regional government, the smear campaign was made public. 
Then, Sitdikova recollected, it became physical: “in November 2008 they attacked him in the 
parking lot by the house and beat him up. He was hospitalized.” Sitdikova explained how she 
lost her job, and how even relatives of the couple were experiencing serious pressure (ibid). 
The prosecution and harassment of Kuzmina provide another example of creative 
campaigning “coinciding” with legal problems. Uniformed police warned neighbors against 
her alleged drinking and troublemaking (chto ya p’yu i deboshiryu) and suggested that she 
may be spreading extremist literature. In the investigation that originated in claims of 
unlicensed software, the investigator had her examined for mental illness and drug abuse. 
Rumors were spread that Kuzmina, as well as other named critics (including Kurt-Adzhiev), 
planned to sabotage the said summit by blocking the doors. Today, she still gets strange looks 
on the street, she added with a short laugh (Kuzmina 19.11.2010). 
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The persecution of Dmitrievskii, a human rights worker concerned with human rights 
violations in the Chechen Republic, is rather notorious within the human rights community75 
even abroad:  
In the start of 2005 the process of destroying the organization had begun. It started 
with a criminal case initiated against me, where I got a two years suspended 
sentence in 2006 and the organization was liquidated for extremism. We registered 
a new organization, but there were also serious tax attacks. In short, it was such a 
war. (Dmitrievskii 16.12.2010) 
To show how the various forms of harassment are interrelated, Dmitrievskii explains how the 
Anna Politkovskaya Memorial Conference was “torn apart” (sorvana) on the 7th of October: 
Firstly, all our guests who arrived from Great Britain, the USA and the National 
Endowment from Spain were informed that all pre-booked rooms allegedly leaked 
water from the ceiling. Repairs began immediately and nobody was allowed to move 
into the hotel … A similar disaster struck in the hall we had rented for the 
conference and press-conference. One hour before the event, we were suddenly 
notified that the lights were out and that the keys to the [seminar] room had 
accidentally been lost … In addition, the car that we used was confiscated, 
purportedly because it was on a list of stolen cars … Finally, we move on to our 
topic. On the first day of the conference I was summoned for urgent interrogations 
related to my criminal case. When I refused to testify, they did a new search to get 
documents and possible hard drives with piracy software that could’ve been at the 
office, and in short to not let us work. The search went on for about three hours, and 
at the same time the whole day a car from the OMON76 circled [our building]. 
(Dmitrievskii 16.12.2010) 
The concurrence of selective law enforcement with (other) harassment techniques is important 
for several reasons. First, this campaign obviously serves as a very strong indicator of 
selectivity, leaving no doubt about the extralegal nature of the conflict. As Dmitrievskii 
himself concludes: “This whole circus was very telling” (vot takoi tsirk byl ves’ma 
pokazatel’nyi). 
 
                                                 
75 For more on the persecution of Dmitrievskii and the banning of Russian Chechen Friendship Society (RCFS), 
see for instance the special Human Rights First (2006) report. Since I interviewed Dmitrievskii in Nizhniy 
Novgorod, he has again been detained and charged with legal violations. His organizaton had been attacked at 
least twice – on one occasion with Molotov cocktails. For the year 2012 alone, see for instance the short reports 
of Front Line Defenders (2012a, 2012b, 2012c). 
76 Otryad militsii osobogo naznacheniya, generic name for special police units in Russia. 
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Secondly, the concurrence of selective law enforcement with other forms of low intensity 
coercion illustrates that selective law enforcement is not merely a high-profile issue 
concerning diplomatic rows over political prisoners. In its more common form, selective law 
enforcement may be less dramatic (drowned out by even more serious attacks), yet it 
contributes over time to strongly deter civic activism (see chapter 8). Finally, to see selective 
law enforcement in this context goes a long way towards explaining why Russians tend to see 
the practice as not fundamentally different from other means of repression, including those of 
a purely illegal nature. It seems clear that the legal actors (and their patrons) actively 
contribute to the reproduction of “legal nihilism” in Russia (see section 3.1). 
7.5.4 Informal Criteria and Blackmail 
We have seen a multitude of ways that insiders may signal that extralegal interests are at stake 
when a target is prosecuted by quasi-legal means. The informal rules, however, are 
transmitted in a more direct fashion as well, namely through blackmail. Through more or less 
overt threats, the prosecuted party will get to know in more detail what criteria may unleash 
legal acts and sometimes also who is behind the initiatives. 
Karastelev (03.06.2011) reports that in the very first meeting he and his colleagues had with 
the regional authorities, the persons he met with “offered (predlagali) us their cooperation and 
said that if we would not cooperate, they would use the law on extremism against us. They 
said this to us themselves.” 
Gusak (10.06.2011) had just been blackmailed for half a million rubles by a man previously 
unknown to him when the court chair (and leader of a criminal network) called Gusak to 
make him understand: “I am the one sending people to prison in this town, and not you.” The 
sum was presumably a reference to an earlier legal claim made against Gusak in relation to a 
conflict at work in which all his problems began (ibid). In another case, a police officer told 
one of the interviewees directly  
… that he would do anything to get me jailed … They said specifically that they 
would initiate a criminal case against me if I did not stop writing... They beat me up 
after the meeting where I said openly that our city authorities steal money […] They 
beat me up just there at the meeting – three thousand witnesses [watched] and not 
one of them reacted. (Anon journalist, 2010)  
Other cases show that the direct communication does not simply come in the form of 
blackmail. When there is a mutual understanding of informal motives, the various actors do 
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not necessarily take any care to pretend there are not engaging in blackmail. To make it all 
even easier, some political leaders personally file requests to the procuracy to initiate criminal 
cases against their critics. In this form, anti-extremism has in part taken the form of an 
extended defamation suit where there is a general agreement between the prosecutors and the 
targets of what acts caused the law enforcement. There are, however, also cases in which the 
criticized individuals initiate cases formally unrelated to the criticism. The court chair who 
had been confronted by Gusak (10.06.2010) in Tuimazy, for instance, not only blackmailed 
him but also personally filed requests to the procuracy to take action after he allegedly had 
heard talks of Gusak planning to join an Islamic group to blow up several buildings in the 
town center.  
A third form of direct communication would be to provide hints of why a reaction already has 
taken place in order to stop similar things from happening in the future. The interviewees of 
this study actually fall short of mentioning this possibility, but my own experiences with the 
FMS officials (see the introduction of chapter 1) may illustrate the point. 
In conclusion, the practice of blackmail is not insignificant in the observed cases, but neither 
can it be called a corner stone for the promulgation of informal rules (cf Darden 2001) 
7.6 Some Concluding Notes on Communication 
Making law enforcers act in specific ways and according to certain patterns is obviously 
central to the mechanism of selective law enforcement. Knowledge about how the internal 
communication takes place may contribute to our understanding of how well selective law 
enforcement is institutionalized (see also the next chapter). The interviewees are divided with 
respect to whether direct orders or political signals provide the primary form of transmitting 
informal criteria downstream in their individual cases.  
Instead of seeing this division as different interpretations, we may see them as different sides 
of the same coin. There is a common understanding that interpreting informal rules is an 
important skill to promote one’s careers in the state machinery, including law enforcement 
and the courts. Research such as Ledeneva’s (2013) fieldwork among regime insiders 
confirms the importance of signals and subtlety within the ruling networks and law 
enforcement. This understanding of political agendas, an awareness which makes legal actors 
Selective Law Enforcement in Russian Politics 
~ 156 ~ 
 
pro-active and sensitive to political winds, presumably make the actors more open also to 
direct interference with their work.  
This chapter has again shown that the importance of communication in rule enforcement is 
twofold. First, the authorities in the regime must provide guidance to legal actors on how to 
implement the law selectively. Second, communication is also needed in order to make the 
targets –and not least other potential critics– interpret the legal acts in a way that makes them 
reconsider their political activity and oppositional stance. 
Although the task is thus at least twofold, the challenges may to some degree be met by the 
same means. If legal actors are ready to interpret political signals, so also is the more 
politically conscious part of the citizenry. The core rule of Putinist repression, as formulated 
by Marie Mendras, (2012, 231-232) is loyalty – “expressed in the negative [passive] – do not 
criticize or hinder the center of the constellation, and in the positive [active] – take action 
against disloyal actors.” Partly as a result of historical experiences and path dependencies, at 
least parts of the citizenry are ready to interpret political signals within this frame of 
interpretation in both the positive and the negative expression of this core rule. 
In the wave of repressive measures following the orange revolution in Ukraine, Putin actively 
participated by explicitly condemning their activities. 
When non-governmental organizations are financed by foreign governments, we see 
them as an instrument that foreign states use to carry out their Russian policies. 
(Putin quoted in Schofield 2007) 
I object categorically to foreign funding of political activity in the Russian 
Federation. I object to it categorically. Not a single self-respecting country allows 
that and neither will we. (Putin quoted in McMahon 2005) 
Then-head of FSB Nikolai Petrushev and President Putin himself have also accused these 
NGOs of outright espionage (Kaban 2006; Saradzhyan 2006). Simultaneously, as this harsh 
rhetoric took root, the NGOs received an extraordinary level of quasi-legal attention. What is 
striking, however, was that the NGOs within this group accused of Western espionage were 
overwhelmingly attacked with completely apolitical charges, mostly concerning issues of 
taxation or alleged infringements of the NGO-law (Bækken 2009).  
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Alexander Verkhovsky has observed the same phenomenon and explains it in the following 
way: 
People here they have a vast Soviet experience in understanding the general line of 
the ruling group, not from legal books but from the front page on the Pravda news-
paper [*laughs]. So when we see something, or hear, that Putin as president said 
something about those Western spies or something like that – everybody will under-
stand what will happen next. (Verkhovsky 12.11.2010) 
While the Russian media is less than free, the active citizen will easily get to information 
about the political connotations of selective law enforcement. The politically interested public 
does not need to frequent underground clubs in dark basements or read illegal periodicals to 
get information on selective law enforcement. The political context of the raids in Samara 
(section 5.3), for instance, were discussed openly in the mass media locally (e.g. Zverev 
2007), domestically (e.g. Chernova 2007), internationally (e.g. Levy 2010b) and even in 
scholarly works (e.g. Horvath 2013, 195), in addition to various blogs, forums and similar 
sites on the Internet. Whereas a few may possibly see the Samara crackdown as an offensive 
against counterfeit software, most interested individuals will quickly interpret the situation in 
a political light. Because the political interpretations circulate more or less freely, the informal 
rules are also spread horizontally, a fact which eases the job of rule promulgation for the 
authorities. 
When properly institutionalized, this is a very powerful tool of control for the government. 
The society may react to the mass media’s headlines as Americans in the Wild West would 
react to a “Wanted poster”: Most will hide, but some will go bounty hunting. As Verkshovsky 
concluded his above line of thought: 
... The prosecutors also know this. So they do not need formal orders to take action. 
They understand that this is a new line in politics, and [that] they have to do some-
thing. If they do not have orders they will not be too enthusiastic of course, but at 
least they will do something. If they do get orders, they will of course do anything 
[requested of them]. (Verkhovsky 12.11.2010) 
I thus arrive at a model of communicating informal rules that may be lubricated by path 
dependencies, but whose existence is dependent upon both encouragement and enforcement 
from above (figure 4).  
Once again, my evidence does not support a façade interpretation. As Mendras (2012, 220) 
put it: “no effort has been made to keep up appearances [since 2004]. The crushing of 
opponents is shown on television.” Though Mendras takes an active stance against façade 
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interpretations, I would suggest a small but important revision to her interpretation: The fact 
that the crushing of opponents is shown on television may just as well be interpreted as if the 
regime does care for its domestic appearance. The overt suppression of certain elements in 
society does not therefore necessarily indicate a careless attitude, but may more likely be part 
of an active policy to “demarcate the limits of permitted opposition in Russia’s sovereign 
democracy” (Horvath 2013, 172). 
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8 Rule Enforcement and Political 
Repression: The Impact of Selective Law 
Enforcement upon Society 
I have defined selective law enforcement as a rule enforcement mechanism. In the above 
chapters, I have argued that the phenomenon seems to fit this conceptualization well. In the 
previous chapter, I also presented some suggestions as to what the motivations behind the 
practice may be and what informal criteria may trigger quasi-legal action. What is still 
missing is an examination of to what degree selective law enforcement actually brings about 
any consequences for the targets or for society at large. If the mechanism is indeed a rule 
enforcement mechanism, it ought to enforce rules. While most interviewees would not admit 
to being deterred from continuing their oppositional and critical activities, the material still 
suggests that the suppression of constitutional rights is substantial. 
8.1 Punishment as Experience 
Unsurprisingly, many of the cases of alleged selective law enforcement presented here 
resulted in legal sanctions. In the legal issue area of election registrations, court rulings in the 
examined cases validated the election committees’ decisions to deny registration. With regard 
to anti-extremism, both administrative and criminal punishment was enacted against the 
interviewees. The Moscow and St.Petersburg editions of Novaya Gazeta attempted to 
overturn the formal warnings of Roskomnadzor in the judicial system but without success 
(Vishnevskii 26.08.2010; Prusenkova 22.06.2011). Irek Murtazin and Robert Zagreev were 
sentenced to deprivation of freedom for their purported extremism (Sitdikova 13.12.2010; 
Ural 08.06.2011). Many travel bans were issued while investigations were pending, not least 
connected to alleged copyrights infringements (e.g. Kurt-Adzhiev 18.11.2010; Kuzmina 
19.11.2010). Gaskarov was subjected to pre-trial detention for many weeks, as was Gusak 
(Gusak 10.06.2011; Brusnikin 2012).  
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Other cases, however, were never taken beyond the investigative phase, and some were 
eventually closed by court decision due to lack of evidence.77 Several of the interviewees who 
were charged with unlicensed software not only escaped formal punishment, but also received 
official apologies and financial compensation (e.g. Denisova.yhrm.org 2011, Samara Biznes 
Konsalting 2011). Also Gaskarov won his case and was later awarded compensation for moral 
damages (Brusnikin 2012). 
From the evidence of the research material below, one element appears as strikingly 
important. Even when charges are dropped and even if the targets are later compensated for 
prosecutorial misconduct, they have little reason to celebrate. While observers at times 
suggest that won cases are ‘celebrations of justice’ (e.g. Arutyunov undated, 
Denisova.yhrm.org 2011), most of the interviewees would probably object. While legal 
sanctions would presumably be even worse on most occasions, the legal processes are 
harmful even when won. For this reason, even “successful” cases can be considered lost, and 
there might be more to come around the corner. Indeed, some interviewees suggest that the 
very aim of the processes is not to win cases, but to sustain pressure and keep the targets 
preoccupied.  
I understand this criminal case as one attempt in a series of other attempts … simply 
not to let the organization work by any means. The task was not so much to put me 
in prison, for instance, as it was to torment me with these actions every day, every 
hour. (Dmitrievskii, 6.12.2010). 
As noted above, the litmus test of what can be considered punishment is whether or not non-
compliers are put in worse situations than those who comply (Macrory 2008, 37). The legal 
acts can evidently bring about both punitive and preventive effects, even when these effects 
are not officially recognized. As will be shown below, the law enforcement agencies of the 
executive branch successfully impose de facto punishment without the support of the judicial 
system. As in the U.S. (see Gershman 2008; Shields 2010), the prosecutorial power is of great 
importance, as are the indirect effects of its abuse even under judicial review.  
                                                 
77 The acquittal rates are incredibly low in the Russian court system, especially with regard to criminal cases 
(below 1% on average). The low percentage is contingent on a legal tradition in which courts have been seen as 
an extension of the law enforcement apparatus and acquittals as a failure on part of either the judge or the 
prosecutor. The low level of acquittals, however, does not imply that every initiated legal case leads to a formal 
sanction. While acquittals are rare, cases are more often rejected, aborted or withdrawn earlier in the process. 
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The difficult situation with authorities induced for instance both Denisova and Karastelev to 
move from Krasnodar to internal exile in Moscow, and their organizations stopped 
functioning. Novaya Gazeta in Samara had to close when the criminal procedures dragged on 
and the confiscated computers were not returned. Also the Nizhny Novgorod edition of the 
same newspaper was temporarily shut down when they were deprived of their hardware 
(Novruzova 16.12.2010). It is not difficult, then, to see why selective law enforcement may 
work to enforce rules even in cases in which no official punishment is enacted. 
Most interviewees assured me that they would keep on challenging the regime despite the 
troubles associated with it. Several of them were hardened critics who expected no less 
harassment than they got. Some of the interviewees, however, contended that the obvious 
incentives to change could not simply be ignored. 
First of all, I will try to do less journalism, and in particular of the investigative type 
… I quit because I have now been through all the stages. They have threatened me 
and beaten me up, and the next stage would be … simply to kill me and that’s it. 
Why would I want that? I want to live! (Anon. journalist 2010) 
Needless to say, in cases like the one above, quasi-legal repression seems to be of secondary 
importance to even more serious threats. In many other cases, what is the outcome of quasi-
legal practices and what is caused by the other harassment become impossible to discern.  
8.1.1 “It Simply Takes Years off Our Lives” 
If the broader legal system through its acts cannot deter its selected targets, it may still have 
the capacity to curb their efficiency by keeping them preoccupied at all times.  
Eshanu was among those who by no means were satisfied even when candidates were able to 
get registered after several rounds with election committees and courts. After all, she said, 
“the candidates have lost time, energy and often considerable sums of money – everything to 
fight off some absurd charges” (Eshanu 05.09.2011). Many interviewees report similar 
problems of time and resources spent on legal processes: “It just deprives us of so much time 
and energy,” said Kurt-Adzhiev. “It simply takes years off our lives,” Kotova added to her 
husband’s point. “It would be much easier to pay some bribes or sign some papers about 
cooperation with police of FSB,” Kurt-Adzhiev concluded (Kotova and Kurt Adzhiev 
18.11.2010). 
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For Dmitrievskii and his colleagues, repeated episodes of quasi-legal attention made an 
already strained situation almost unbearable: 
We already had very limited resources, depleted from this judicial war with every-
one. At the end of the day, we faced this question: Should we appeal all the unlawful 
decisions and try to fight this criminal case or should we concentrate all our efforts 
to finish this monograph [on human righs violations in Chechnya]. We considered 
the preparation of this book to be our most important task so we had no possibility 
to get involved in all of these episodes. After half a year, they once again took our 
equipment on some other pretext. In the end, we had to finish the work from our 
private apartments. (Dmitrievskii 16.12.2010) 
Dmitrievskii regretted the fact that he could give me little information on the latest 
developments in recent proceedings against him, and explained how he simply refused to let 
these pretexts take more time from his work than they had already done.  
Researchers know the importance of working undisturbed. It is not hard for us to imagine that 
constant inspections, interrogations, and requirements to produce documentation for 
investigators will make effective work considerably more difficult, not least when the hassle 
come in addition to already burdensome standard requirements of registration and reporting. 
Add confiscated hardware, the occasional beating with subsequent hospitalization, harassment 
of your family and staff. The eventual legal sanctions often come on top of this form of 
pressure. 
In this regard, the initiators of selective law enforcement have little to lose. If a case fails, the 
state will pay the cost, and it will at least serve the purpose of harassment and an informal 
warning. If a case happens to lead to a legal sanction, it may very well be considered a bonus. 
In the case of election registration denials, a legal sanction (a denial) would presumably be a 
clearly favored outcome for the initiator. Yet, even in this field there are indirect benefits to 
be reaped from instrumentalizing the legal system. To quote a pair of Russian “political 
technologists”:  
We are talking about legalistic attacks on the competitor on absolutely every move 
he makes … Here it is not important if he wins all the processes. The important 
thing is that it will wear out his nerves … The important thing is to keep him in 
suspense and make him careful. He will refuse to participate in some plans and 
events, and act more modestly or restricted in others. This is all in our favor … And 
of course nobody can exclude the possibility of some case ending up in success and 
you will finally have succeeded in denying registration to your competitor. 
(Matveichev and Novikov 2003, emphasis in original) 
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8.1.2 Additional Pressure for Legal Compliance 
An indirect effect of selective law enforcement is an additional and informally constituted 
pressure to comply with law. While extra incentives to comply with law at first glance may 
look like a healthy side effect of selective law enforcement, they actually contribute to 
suppressing criticism. If the violations of informal rules increase the risk of a law being 
enforced, a link between the informal rules and the final punishment has been established. If 
legal regulations are enforced selectively against a certain segment of the population, this 
segment will have stronger incentives for complying strictly with these regulations. The bias 
will lead to an unequal situation, and the additional incentive to comply will work to enforce 
the informal rules.  
The situation of the opposition party Yabloko in Perm may provide an illustrative example. 
Because the party expected extraordinary scrutiny on the legality of their campaign, they 
spent a considerable amount of time preparing for every eventuality. When I visited the party 
at their premises, one of their members showed me some flyers showing two hands holding an 
apple.78 Because the party is arguably systematically suppressed and since the opposition 
candidate Konstantin Okunev had been denied registration on the basis of unlicensed use of 
photos in the previous election campaign, Yabloko had made sure to get all the documentation 
necessary to verify that their campaigning material was strictly in accordance with the law on 
copyrights. To be on the safe side, they obtained a written permission of the person whose 
hands were on the photo, the party representatives explained. Considering the tremendous 
problems surrounding both copyright violations and election campaigns in Russia, the irony 
of such strictly law-abiding behavior should be obvious.  
The problem is certainly not limited to party politics. According to one prominent human 
rights NGO leader in Russia, human rights activists all over the country reacted to the raids in 
Samara (discussed in section 5.3) by rushing to make sure that their software was licensed 
(Finn 2007). The behavior of the activists in this situation suggests that there were two 
important factors determining their decisions. First, we can see by their increased efforts to 
follow the law that this is perceived as a meaningful defense against quasi-legal charges. At 
the same time, it is obvious from the timing of the human rights activists’ sudden care for 
licenses that it was not the legal prohibition as such that prompted them to take action. Rather, 
                                                 
78 The name of the party, Yabloko, means apple in Russian. 
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they found the risk of enforcement to increase because they shared some informal 
characteristics with the organizations that were targeted in Samara (and a bit later in Nizhniy 
Novgorod).  
This behavior not only indicates the semi-institutionalization of informal rules, and how 
broadly selective law enforcement may impact the relevant actors. It also shows how running 
an oppositional party or a critical NGO requires more resources than working in less 
contentious fields. As we can see, extraordinary pressure for compliance in effect eats into the 
organizational resources of regime critics and political opposition. It should be noted that the 
extra time and resources Yabloko spent on getting documentation for the legality of their 
apple photo were a direct outcome of an increased risk perception stemming from challenging 
the incumbents.  
8.1.3 Recruitment and Stigmatization 
Russian veteran activists may be incredibly hard to scare away from their mission. 
Presumably, the experiences of quasi-legal repression may even strengthen the determination 
of some activists to fight against the status quo. If the goal of punishment is to get this hard 
core of regime critics to reconsider their critical attitude, it is likely to backfire. We have seen, 
however, that the restrictive aspect of rule enforcement is still operative in these cases. 
Moreover, deterrence is believed to have a much broader impact through the effect of general 
deterrence.  
Karastelev continued to work on human rights issues even after he moved to Moscow, and in 
a form similar to what he did before. He believed, however, that cases like the ones against 
him and his organization have a serious impact upon society: 
[After the crackdown] organizations fear controls, fear that they may be closed. […] 
Now they stopped working with [these matters], or they started to work for the 
administration. [People] are generally not criticizing nowadays. They have gone 
either into business or they work with children, with pensioners, with the handi-
capped. Well, with any topics not connected with criticism [of the authorities]. 
The effect of general deterrence hits a broader segment, in principle anyone aware of the rule 
and its enforcement (Friedman 1975, 72-73). Recruitment to this sphere of political or human-
rights oriented activity may therefore be considerably limited by the kind of deterring 
measures presented in this study. Most young professionals would not want to work in a 
human rights organization in order to fight selective legal claims against the organization. In 
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this way, we can see that even preventive acts carry a deterring potential. By means of 
systematically targeted suppression, the state apparatus makes organizations with a critical 
mission become less attractive workplaces. Youth that know how the state de facto punishes 
political disobedience have strong incentives to make the most of the situation within the 
system instead of challenging it. In addition comes the economic uncertainty of working 
under constant threat of quasi-legal bombardments and possible liquidation of one’s place of 
work. 
Several interviewees experienced that parts of the surrounding society reacted to their 
persecution by withdrawing their support. Denisova and Murtazin not only lost their jobs but 
their partners lost their jobs, too. “When they initiated criminal procedures against my 
husband, they fired me from my work. They also fired his [partly] retired father who just had 
some work on the side … They tried to manipulate (vozdeistovovat’) my parents [too],” 
Sitdikova (13.12.2010) explains. Selective law enforcement hits the social environment of the 
targets like bad news on the stock exchange as the surrounding actors with less political ardor 
withdraw their support.  
Harold Garfinkel (1956) has called the criminal trial “a status degradation ceremony.” The 
legal punishment is often just the tip of the iceberg for convicted criminals, and the shame 
associated with legal prosecution leads to social ostracism and stigma that may linger on for 
longer than it takes to serve a sentence. We should not assume, however, that the effect would 
be equally strong in Russia. That is, even if we can see a similar effect of stigmatization, it 
comes from a different source. As Garfinkel (1956, 423) noted, for the status degradation 
ceremony to be successful, the “denouncer” has to convince the audience that he or she is 
condemning on the basis of commonly shared norms and not for his own purposes. If the 
denouncer cannot do this, the status degradation ceremony will misfire. Because the informal 
backdrop of the cases is obvious to most relevant observers, also stigmatization must be 
understood with reference to the informal rules. We have already seen that the law in itself 
has limited normative power in Russia. 
In the case of selective law enforcement, observers do not shun prosecuted individuals 
because they believe them to be criminals. Most social actors would, even if they had believed 
in the charges, care little as to whether an NGO has infringed on the copyrights of Microsoft 
or Adobe. On the contrary, the society shuns the prosecuted critics exactly because the 
political links are understood and most Russians want to stay clear of trouble. In this sense, 
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the selective law enforcement has the effect of stigmatizing the targets as troublemakers. To 
Russian society, the prosecution signifies a controversy with the ruling elites and the power 
networks – with vlast’. The golden rule, Mendras (2012, 191) maintains, is to “keep away 
from anyone in trouble, because the machine is likely to also destroy those who express their 
support for the victims.” 
8.2 Capacity and Willingness: Explaining Non-Sanctions 
Concluding from the last section, it seems clear that punishment is enacted and that the targets 
of selective law enforcement are affected by the practice. While I have focused on the less 
obvious indirect effects of legal acts, the direct legal punishment should of course not be 
forgotten, and is in several cases more substantial. The legal sanctions, moreover, come on 
top of all the other experienced punishment and strengthen the total effect with regard to both 
special and general deterrence. In some cases, the consequences of official sanctions are 
similar to the indirect consequences of quasi-legal or other forms of harassment. From an 
outcome perspective, it may be less important for the staff whether an organization is 
liquidated in court or forced to cease its operation for other reasons.  
That being said, the cases that have not lead to legal sanctions are worth considering. 
Unfortunately, the question of why some cases are dismissed by legal actors is not easy to 
answer definitively. From the formal documents we get little information about whether these 
cases are dismissed for reasons associated with formal rules, informal rules, or a more 
complex mixture of the two. If the charges are pro-forma, so may also the “legal” decision to 
abandon them be. 
Some of the most flagrant cases of manipulation reviewed above, not least those built on 
alleged copyrights violations, were rejected by the courts. This rejection may suggest, albeit 
tentatively, that legal concerns are not irrelevant to their dismissal. The material in this regard, 
however, is inconclusive, as several interviewees find that poor or non-existing legal 
foundations may also lead to formal sanctions (e.g. Ural 08.06.2013). With regard to election 
registrations, for instance, Lyubarev suggests that while the election committees seek a sound 
legal basis for their denials, more casual or even invented foundations may also work at times: 
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As candidates turn more and more experienced and more and more careful to align 
their documentation [internally and with the requirements], the election committees 
will see that there are no clear errors and start to look through and through in 
search of non-existing insufficiencies or sometimes just think up something. 
(Lyubarev 02.06.2011) 
Considerable sums are spent on legal service to deny candidates, hinting to the importance of 
a quasi-legal cover to the initiators. We get the impression that the more the election 
committees can do by purely legal means, the better. In other words, selective law 
enforcement is favored over means without a legal backup; selective law enforcement on 
good legal foundations is better than selective law enforcement on poor legal foundations.  
A veteran in this game, however, suggested in my interview that the legality or illegality of 
political technologies is not necessarily the most relevant attribute when they are considered 
by “technologists.” More important, he maintained, was the amount of noise a technology 
would make when employed. When somebody wants to remove a candidate from election, he 
explained, they will start with the most “silent” (tikhie) technologies: Informing the candidate 
about the situation and adding soft pressure behind the scenes. If these attempts do not work, 
“then they will ‘turn on’ (vklyutchat’) the level of committees and lawyers who must find 
some hook or pretext to deny registration to the unwanted candidate. If this also fails, then the 
“political techologists” may “plug in” (podklyuchat’) absolutely illegal stuff”. The authorities 
will never hesitate to use any form of pressure, the interviewee assured: “If they have to use 
them, they will use them. If they don’t need to, they will not” (anon. political advisor 2011). 
The legality of many cases is often up in the air as the secondary rules on jurisdiction and 
legal procedures are also subjects of interpretation. Far-fetched “interpretation” of vague 
formulations, formalistic enforcement, disproportional punishment, dubious expert analysis 
and courts strong reliance on this evidence, committees’ failures to provide due warnings to 
lacking registration documents, and copyright raids on thin evidence are all elements whose 
legality is not always easy to determine. To conclude, it seems like a certain legal backing 
would possibly make it easier to get a case through court, but the borders of legality are 
unclear and a solid legal foundation is not absolutely necessary in all instances to get a court 
to impose legal sanctions. 
Another element that we cannot ignore, yet not check for, is the possibility that the targets of 
selective law enforcement or their associates and defenders engage in informal bargaining 
behind the scenes. They may have been able to come to an agreement by themselves or 
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worked to lobby actors higher up on the ladder to intervene on their behalf. We can also 
assume that some cases are counteracted at the initiative of political forces higher up in the 
system if they see the level of manipulation becoming exaggerated. In the case of Gusak 
(10.06.2011), for instance, the criminal activities of his antagonists finally made the regional 
FSB turn the heat on them. To what extent situations like this are the outcome of political 
games or simply a matter of law enforcement is beyond my research to answer. Since the 
issue of informal bargaining is not explored, I can only restate a suggestive statement by one 
of my interviewees: “We are all experts with high education – we know how to adapt to 
Russian realities” (Anon. NGO-leader 2008).  
To seek further explanation for the cases in which no legal punishment is imposed on the 
targets, I will briefly consider the political dependence and relative empowerment of the 
Russian judicial system. Then I will move on to see how the organizational and moral costs 
associated with its (overly) severe manipulation may influence the failure to bring about 
sanctions. Maybe the most important reason that legal sanctions are not imposed on some 
occasions, however, is the one suggested in the previous section: selective enforcement works 
effectively even without engaging the judicial branch. 
8.2.1 The Relative (In)dependence of the Russian Judiciary 
To the extent that the issue of judicial independence was discussed in my interviews, 
interviewees tended to assess the courts extremely negatively. Judges were, in the same way 
as all other legal actors, regarded as pawns in the hands of the regime: “Absolutely, 
absolutely. One hundred percent. It’s not even a question for the courts of first instance. They 
are completely subordinated” (Godunin 06.09.2011). Indeed, that Russian courts are 
vulnerable to pressure when handling politically salient cases must be considered 
conventional wisdom among observers of the country.  
Despite the interviewees’ harsh judgment of the Russian courts, however, the judiciary has 
not only refused to convict some of the targets but also granted them compensation. 
Interestingly, this judicial action is part of a growing tendency in Russia (see Trochev 2012). 
Administrative justice has even been called one of Russia’s “great success stories” (Solomon 
2008b, 279), and Hendley’s (e.g. 2009) research indicates that selective law enforcement is of 
little relevance to common people’s use of the legal system. In Putin’s early years much was 
done to strengthen the legal system, including efforts to limit corruption within the judiciary 
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(Smith 2010). In non-political cases, at least, the Russian legal system has greatly increased 
its role as arbiter. 
While this fact is true, two additional factors must be taken into account when we consider 
cases of selective law enforcement. First, cases that are seen as important for the regime may 
fall out differently because of the informal awareness among judicial actors. Cases with 
political significance do not automatically take on similar patterns as those without. Second, it 
is exactly in politically salient cases that external actors may add the most pressure through 
informal channels. Partly for this reason, we see a distinction in how political and ordinary 
cases are dealt with. As I will argue in the next chapter, this duality is a crucial feature of 
legality in Russia. In the words of Hendley (2007, 99): “Justice is possible and maybe even 
probable, but cannot be guaranteed”. 
An important factor in understanding the regime’s grip on judicial decision making lies with 
the strongly hierarchical judicial system. A strong hierarchical judiciary may at first glance 
seem appropriate to Russia, considering the high level of corruption. As the argument goes, 
securing bureaucratic accountability within the organization will protect the judges from 
extraordinary pressure from local interests. At the same time, individual judges within the 
organization lose most of their independence to actors higher up in the hierarchy. Partly 
because of a non-transparent system dominated by unclear procedures and vague criteria for 
appointment, promotion, and disciplinary measures, the careers of ordinary judges in Russia 
are highly dependent on chairpersons, who are in turn dependent on their superiors (Schwartz 
and Sykiainen 2012). The hierarchy is reinforced by the fact that rulings reversed by higher 
court instances are seen as errors on the part of the lower court judge (Popova 2012, 137). The 
incentives are very much present, therefore, for the judges to make an all-things-considered 
evaluation of the situation and base their ruling on what they believe their superiors would 
have done, instead of considering the legal issue independently (see Scheppele 2010).  
The strong dependence within the organization is presumably a part of why judges reportedly 
lean on advice from court chairpersons in politically salient cases (Popova 2012, 137). A 
report from 2009 concludes that these chairpersons are political animals that “have the know-
how and are able to intercept and interpret hints dropped by the Kremlin, the local 
administration, the local administration, or an influential official, politician or businessman” 
(Centre for Political Technologies in Ledeneva 2013, 151). In this way, political questions 
move up the hierarchy for decisions. At the higher level of politics, the federal executives 
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influence the judiciary through the appointment of judges and various special departments in 
the Presidential Administration that are closely connected to the judiciary’s leadership 
(Popova 2012, 139-143). In Popova’s view, the result is a mechanism through which political 
input at the top of the pyramid may result in politicized justice at the bottom: 
In Russia, the Kremlin could impose its preferences on individual case outcomes 
through the following mechanism – the Kremlin’s position would be communicated 
to the higher echelons of the judiciary through the close informal ties between 
politicians and the judiciary’s leadership, then these preferences would get passed 
down to the lower courts through the highly effective hierarchical relationship with 
the judiciary. (Popova 2012, 146)  
The political dependence is also formally constituted. By taking the most important decisions 
on judicial careers and monitoring the performance of individual courts, the Judicial 
Qualification Collegiums may be said to serve as the guardians for the judicial hierarchy. 
Until 2002, these collegiums consisted exclusively of judges, but after the legal reform that 
year they became a direct channel for ulterior influence on the judicial system. Since 2002, 
one-third of their members are representatives for “the public,” that is, appointed by the 
regional legislatures. Also the President of the Russian Federation is entitled to one 
representative in both the federal collegium and in every regional collegium (Schwartz and 
Sykiainen 2012, 977-979). As a consequence of this system, Popova (2012, 135) argues, the 
collegiums “actually serve as monitors for the federal executive of judicial behavior at the 
district court level”.  
Powerful individuals within the regime also possess informal channels to influence judicial 
decision by approaching judges directly. The combination of an informal political culture and 
a tradition of legal manipulation may strongly impact judicial independence when political 
pressure is added in individual cases. My research documents all too clearly that life is by no 
means easy for Russian “dissenters” who fail to cooperate with authorities and refuse to 
subordinate themselves to the system. There is little to indicate that such dissent would be any 
easier for judges (see e.g. Ledeneva 2013, 152-159). The Russian legal system does little to 
limit the vulnerability of judges to officials who express their preferences in informal 
conversations, which in Russia reportedly is seen as “an acceptable practice, even when it 
involves judges and politicians” (Popova 2012, 133). In this regard, Schwartz and Sykiainen 
note that Russia has a long way to go. While a formal ban on such contact can be made (and 
should be, the two authors argue), “the emergence of truly independent and effective courts 
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require changes in the broader culture and in the formal practices which connect to the work 
of the courts” (Schwartz and Sykiainen 2012, 1061).  
Finally, it may be worth pointing out an aspect related to the role judges play in selective law 
enforcement in particular. Because ordinary judges in the Russian system seldom apply the 
constitution directly (Solomon 2008b, 227), they will need to refer to more narrowly 
applicable laws when handling politically motivated cases. As I have stressed repeatedly, 
claims to selective law enforcement and questions of legal guilt are in principle separate 
issues. Therefore, even an unbiased judge may contribute to sanctioning what originated from 
political motives. In other words, even if the Russian judiciary had been living up to the 
highest ideals of neutrality and was able to work in isolation from all external influence, the 
legal sanctions imposed by the state would have been statistically biased in favor of regime 
insiders and against regime challengers. A judge without the possibility of challenging the 
political selection has no means to entirely eradicate the upstream law enforcement bias. One 
exception is of course if the judge is willing to ignore the legal question in an attempt to 
actively counter a politically motivated case. Such judges will hardly live long within the 
Russian legal system, however, unless of course they have informal clearance for their 
decisions. 
8.2.2 Capacity, Willingness, and Cost of Interference 
The analysis above suggests that the Russian judiciary is autonomous up to a point, yet very 
vulnerable to political pressure through both the judicial hierarchy and direct intervention 
from politically powerful forces. When these two channels of pressure operate in concert, the 
local judge will have an incredibly hard time opposing them. The laws that are frequently 
utilized in selective law enforcement are too opaque to serve as a powerful counterforce to 
political pressure. In other words, powerful actors within the state structure have considerable 
capacity to interfere in legal cases to influence judicial output. 
That certain actors have the capacity to intervene, however, does not mean that they have the 
willingness to do so. In a revealing study of politically sensitive cases in Russian and 
Ukrainian courts in the years 2002 and 2003 respectively, Popova (2012) found a significantly 
greater bias in the judicial output of the Ukrainian cases. Because there is little in her study to 
indicate that Ukrainian incumbents had greater capacity to interfere with judicial decision-
making than had the Russian incumbents, Popova suggests that the reason for the difference 
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must be sought elsewhere. In Ukraine, the period was marked with great political strife and 
huge political stakes, providing actors with strong incentives to manipulate courts in order to 
tilt the balance in their favor. In Russia, on the contrary, the authorities had less interest in 
interfering much (or often) in legal processes because their political dominance was more 
consolidated. There is a long way from capacity to interfere with judicial decision making to 
actually doing so. Both capacity and willingness are relevant in explaining bias in judicial 
output.  
In cases of selective law enforcement, the willingness to interfere with legal processes is 
implicit in the definition. At first glance, then, willingness may seem irrelevant to explain 
variations of judicial outcome in cases of selective law enforcement. While the willingness to 
initiate a case on political basis is implicit in the practice, the degree and level of interference, 
however, is not: 
The relative marginalization of the courts as a tool of political competition is that 
during Putin’s second term in office and during the Medvedev-Putin tandem term, 
the Kremlin has been able to neutralize and sideline political opponents through 
means other than politicized justice. … In short, incumbents in Russia’s 
authoritarian regime simply do not need to resort to using the courts to achieve their 
ends. (Popova 2012, 166) 
This point may be particularly relevant in a situation in which the judiciary shows some 
degree of autonomy. Because the Russian judiciary has a certain level of autonomy and 
because the law is far from unimportant in Russia, pushing a poor case through the legal 
system may be possible but would imply significant costs. These costs include organizational 
resources but also the risk of scandalizing the regime, which after all is not immune to popular 
sentiment. To let flagrant falsifications pass is in general not acceptable within the current 
regime and would require considerable political will (Mendras 2012, 147).  
Compared to the courts, it is both easier and less controversial to control law enforcement 
agencies through formal and informal incentive structures. The upstream law enforcement is 
more directly subordinated to the executive branch and more readily accessible. The very fact 
that observers so often speak about interference with judicial independence presupposes that 
there indeed is something to interfere with. The independence of law enforcement and 
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administrative agencies is less of an issue in academic or political discourse because their 
political dependence is largely taken for granted.79 
Not only are the law enforcement agencies of the executive branch easier to access for actors 
within the state administration, they are also more flexible in use. They may initiate 
investigations or raids on vague suspicions and have manpower and a broad mandate that 
makes it easy for them to engage in harassment. Moreover, these types of acts have a 
relatively low potential to mobilize protests. While harassment may lead to some negative 
publicity now and then, it is criminal proceedings and severe sentences that produce the 
international headlines. When confronted by critics, accusations of selective investigations, 
interrogation, or otherwise soft reactions will presumably be easier for initiators to publicly 
dismiss as paranoia than would a sentence. The less tangible the harassment, the less potential 
it has to scandalize the regime. 
At the same time, small but multiple incidents may still influence the choice of a politically 
interested public not to engage in oppositional activities. We have already seen how the law 
enforcement agencies are capable of imposing substantial punishment upon their targets 
without enacting legal sanctions. We have also seen that their harassment successfully 
restrains the targets’ abilities to conduct activities that are unwanted by the regime. The court 
proceedings may possibly be as much of a nuisance as an eventual sanction would be.  
Finally, when the Russian judiciary acknowledges cases of prosecutorial misconduct and 
awards compensation, this makes cases less likely to end up with international embarrassment 
at the Human Courts of Human Rights (ECHR), an issue which has been taken quite seriously 
by the Russian leadership (Bowring 2005; Solomon 2008b). Rather frequent appeals to the 
ECHR, not least by human rights activists, may in part explain why authorities seem hesitant 
to pressure courts to make decisions with no legal backing. Ledeneva (2013, 251) even sees 
the ECHR as a possible source of change to the deeper dynamics of the current system of 
governance – an external challenge to pervasive quasi-legality.  
 
 
                                                 
79 On the dependence of Election Committees upon the state administration, see fn. 43 
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8.3 The Predictability of Quasi-Legal Coercion 
In this study, I have treated informal rules as analogous to formal rules. This decision is not to 
deny there are serious differences between the two notions.80 Informal rules are by definition 
opaque, always rules of thumb, and by necessity in flux even though the core principles are 
usually highly resistant to change. For this reason, the interpretation of informal rules will 
always be a matter of context. Informal rules will always be formulated either on a high level 
of abstraction or alternatively explained through their implications in individual cases.  
Yet, throughout the study I have also shown how a conceptualization of informal rules as 
analogous to formal rules may be beneficial for purposes of concept building. I have 
suggested that informal rules can (or must) be promulgated and that they may or may not 
guide behavior, be complied with, or followed in the same way as formal rules. Moreover, we 
have seen that the analogy between formal and informal rules may help explain how the 
practice distorts and deflects criticism (section 4.4). Finally, we have seen how the conception 
of informal rules as analogous to formal rules conforms to the interviewees’ explanation of 
selective law enforcement as intended to block or deter unwanted activity.  
For the above-mentioned reasons, however, it makes little sense to talk of the enforcement of 
this or that particular informal rule, as if they were formal. Instead, I prefer to talk of the 
enforcement of informal rules in the plural, alternatively of rule sets. I also use the notion of 
(a) core rule(s) as a broad generalization for the rules’ implications. For the purposes of this 
chapter, the idea of informal rules serves to illustrate how the cases of selective law 
enforcement have certain commonalities that Russians interpret within an existing 
understanding. It is the sum of these commonalities in the logic of predicates and consequents 
that constitutes the informal rules as observable entities. It is the entrenchment of these 
generalizations and their ability to guide behavior that constitutes the institutionalization of 
selective law enforcement. 
In themselves, institutions always increase predictability. Indeed, to increase predictability is 
essentially what institutions have in common, regardless of their otherwise different attributes 
(North 1990). For this reason, we should not assume that when institutionalized selective law 
enforcement makes the ruling of Russia more arbitrary or unpredictable. Or to be more 
                                                 
80 For a critique of the analogy, and of the notion of informal rules in general, see Ledeneva, 2006a, 14-22. 
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precise, the degree of arbitrariness and unpredictability must necessarily be seen as relative to 
other arrangements. In a dysfunctional legal system, selective law enforcement may indeed 
increase the level of predictability. After all, selections are done according to a pattern. 
Friedman (1975, 43) illustrates this point through a hypothetical example reflecting his time: 
Even if rules were meaningless or totally ignored, it would not follow that chance 
and caprice would govern the courtroom. It would mean only that something other 
than the official rules –the judge’s attitude and values, for example –would 
determine decisions. Imagine a secret, fanatical Marxist taking office as a judge in a 
non-Marxist country … his ideology would decide his cases for him. The outcomes 
would not be random or accidental; once one cracked his code, they might be easy 
to predict. 
Certainly, the outcome may differ from that of the other judges in the same country. Yet, for 
an expert on Marxism at least, the sentences would be no less predictable. A person not 
acquainted with Marxism will need some time to predict the rulings of the “fanatical Marxist” 
above. In the same way, an observer would have to be acquainted with the ordinary 
jurisprudence in the country if he were to predict the behavior of a more conventional judge. 
In the case of selective law enforcement, this fact is germane. The informal rules that guide 
Russian politics are non-transparent to us and may therefore appear as more unpredictable 
than they actually are for insiders (see also Hendley 2009). Something not expressed by the 
interviewees of this study is surprise. 
8.4 Putin’s Twofold Consolidation of Repressive 
Capabilities 
As we saw in the previous chapter, selective law enforcement takes a great variety of forms, 
and we can identify subcategories within most conceptual components. It was also clear from 
the findings, however, the way the interviewees across cases and legal issue areas tended to 
generalize from the informal background to the same core rules. The interviewees see 
punishment as consciously brought about in order to hit political dissidents: those “not 
agreeing,” “not pleasing,” “unwanted,” and “critical to the authorities” (section 7.1). Selective 
law enforcement is seen as a message that the ruling elites are at the wheel and that their 
prerogatives are not to be challenged. Selective law enforcement all over Russia is hardly the 
result of a grand conspiracy, it is not unreasonable then to suggest that the Kremlin allows for 
the practice to be replicated and used for personal or group benefits in the regions. 
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With regard to the core rule of authoritarianism, the interests of the various insider actors are 
well aligned. The core rule of political obedience by necessity favors those in power. The 
central authorities are left with the task to make sure that actors further down the hierarchy do 
not overextend their mandates and make moves that either challenge the regime or create 
scandals that are not worth the efforts. As it seems, Putin’s policies have approached this task 
in a twofold consolidation of repressive capabilities. First, the political regime’s cohesion has 
been boosted by means such as of formal institutional reform, but also unofficial recruitment 
policies and coercion against dropout and powerful outsiders.  In a second and related move, 
the access to law enforcement capabilities has been centralized. 
To produce a loyal and subservient bureaucracy, the regime under Putin has been increasingly 
recruiting new members to key positions based on loyalty rather than professional skills 
(Ledeneva 2011a; 2013). The earlier so fragmented elite groups with oligarchs dominating 
politics from outsider positions have either been chased out of politics or consolidated within 
the state structures. Even the “Russian shadow spheres are formed not next to and contrary to 
the state but, instead, within the state’s own functioning machinery and in collaboration with 
it” (Pastukhov 2002, 66).When Putin rebuilt state power vertically, this was not only in an 
effort to strengthen the state vis-à-vis regional networks and make governmental policies 
more effective. The centralization of power is in part an attempt to centralize corruption and 
access to exploits (see e.g.Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2009; Gans-Morse 2012). Today, 
therefore, the formal hierarchies and the most prominent power networks are both headed by 
the current president (Kononenko 2011; Hale 2010).  
As is conventional wisdom, one of Putin’s greatest projects was to centralize the state to 
consolidate the regime and increase stability. This was achieved partly through reform, such 
as the doctrine of a “Unified Legal Space”; the establishment of seven Federal Districts under 
the President’s administration; new fiscal policies; and the abolition of gubernatorial 
elections. In part, the centralization was also unofficially constituted for instance by the 
“deoligarchization” and subsequent amassment of economic capabilities within the regime 
(Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2009; Gans-Morse 2012). Also, Putin and Medvedev’s 
presidential terms saw a consolidation of a centrist party of power to coordinate the regime’s 
activities.  
An important aspect of the centralization process under Putin was the increased control of the 
Kremlin over the broader legal system (Petrov 2011). According to Taylor (2011, 143-144), 
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the political abuse of police, FSB, and the procuracy were all centralized in this period.81 The 
new cadre policies for the state administration in the regions also strengthened central control 
over the operation of regional power networks (Petrov 2011).  
While the control over law enforcement under Putin was centralized under the justification of 
centralizing control and reducing abusive practices, it did not make the agencies more 
accountable to the population (Ledeneva 2013, 179-210). Instead, the access to abuse their 
power shifted. In the words of Arkadii Vaksberg (in Ledeneva 2006a, 24), the law 
enforcement agencies were transformed under Putin “not only into simply obedient but into 
zealous executors of political orders”. As a result of these developments, the law enforcement 
agencies have gradually shifted from being loose cannons to be subordinated the interests of 
the executives (figure 5).  
The effect of such broadly constituted centralization may be seen in selective law enforcement 
as well. One of the interviewees (Anon. human rights activist 2010) notes how copyrights had 
earlier been used as pretext in extortion schemes and between rival businesses. Only recently, 
she contended, had the scheme been rediscovered as a political tool. The corrupt actors were 
the same, she believed, but they now served new masters. Put in the naked rationality of 
Douglas North (1990, 59): “if the state has coercive force, then those who run the state will 
use that force in their own interest at the expense of the society.” 
Also with regard to judicial developments, we can identify similar tendencies of moving 
power away from corrupt elements outside the state structures and hoarding it among the 
executives. Instead of increasing the judges’ independence, the dependence has in part been 
shifted. The answer to how independent Russian judges are today compared to earlier will 
greatly depend on what we mean by the question. Most importantly for our purposes, we must 
ask: independence from what and independence from whom? Although formal insulation, 
demands for transparency, and increased wages may have reduced the judges’ dependence 
upon illegal sources of income, one may argue that both formal and informal mechanisms 
have simultaneously made them more dependent upon the political regime. One outcome may 
be that courts are harder to privatize for outsiders, yet at the same time accessible for political 
heavyweights within the regime.  
                                                 
81 On the political use of the Russian procuracy, see also Burger and Holland, 2008. 
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As much as restraining these elites, the formal institutions provide channels for their informal 
influence. The state apparatus of suppression also works to suppress legal dissent against its 
leaders. Instead of increasing state quality, Taylor argues, Putin has increased central control 
and strengthened the state capacity to harass opposition and critics (ibid). For the political 
leadership in Russia, the formally democratic and law-based state thus turns out to be their 
main guarantee for authoritarian and quasi-legal control. The result, in the words of Ledeneva 
(2013, 240), is a bureaucracy in which the lower level individuals “are keen to seek 
[commands], read signals and display compliance before the command is even given.” This 
willingness to serve the regime’s bidding is important to greasing the machinery of selective 
law enforcement.  
8.5 A Regime of Repression 
Despite their indisputable importance, the coercive features of authoritarian systems are 
reportedly underrepresented in research on regime trajectories (Levitsky and Way 2010, 54-
57). One explanation for this lack of representation may lie in the stabilizing role of effective 
coercion: Who wants to do research on something that does not happen? To a considerable 
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degree, the difference between dissatisfaction with a regime and open revolt against it may lie 
in the effectiveness of the coercive apparatus. “If the state’s coercive apparatus remains 
coherent and effective, it can face down population disaffection and survive significant 
illegitimacy”, Eva Bellin (2004, 143) observes, paraphrasing Theda Skocpol’s (1979) seminal 
work on revolutions. As noted above, the ability and willingness of the coercive apparatus to 
serve the regime is not only needed to crack down upon mass protests. Just as important in 
many contemporary authoritarian regimes is the ability to deter protest or “nipping it in the 
bud” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 58). 
In consolidating the enforcement apparatus and intensifying suppression of dissent, the 
political leadership under Putin gradually strengthened a regime of repression, as coined by 
Mark R. Beissinger. According to him, the regime of repression is 
... a set of regularized practices of repression and the internalized expectation about 
the ways in which authority will react punitively toward challenging acts that result 
from these practices. Repression exercises its effect in part because it functions as 
habitus. That is, part of the effect of repression occurs because individuals “have 
internalized, through a protracted and multi-sided process of conditioning, the 
objective changes they face”82 in challenging authority and what types of penalties 
they would most likely suffer on the basis of prior responses of authority to 
challenge. (Beissinger 2002, 326) 
As I argued in section 7.6, the two-fold promulgation to both law enforcers and subjects of 
selective law enforcement is an important requirement for selective law enforcement to be 
institutionalized. For a regime of repression to be established, Beissinger (2002, 327) 
contends, the practices involved need to be institutionalized so that they may reproduce 
shared expectations of how the system will react to challenges. We have seen that selective 
law enforcement takes many different forms, yet that it is still marked by a level of 
“consistency, regularity, and predictability with which repression occurs, the internalized 
discipline that emerges as a result, and the institutional resources necessary to produce such 
patterning” (ibid). A pointed summary of how selective law enforcement institutionalizes and 
impacts Russian society, then, comes from the unlikely source of a study of nationalist 
mobilization.83  
                                                 
82 Here Beissinger quotes Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, 130). 
83 The use of Beissinger’s term for contemporary Russia is an idea I borrow from Taylor (2011). 
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By means of systemized and consistent distribution of preventive and punitive acts, the 
activities of the opposition movement and other activists are suppressed, but the movement is 
also radicalized. The harsh suppression of dissent leaves little space on the barricades for 
ordinary people. To be active in the protest movement in Russia is therefore no longer 
possible as a side activity, but turns into a lifestyle. A regional GOLOS coordinator, for 
instance, claimed that the FSB had blocked his opportunities to pursue his academic career, 
and he did not see any other options than to keep fighting for democratic elections and cross 
his fingers for change (anon. representative GOLOS 2013).  
In this way, the regime’s way of dealing with criticism as if it were extremism has in a way 
become a self-fulfilling prophesy – criticism is extreme in Russia because of how it is dealt 
with. As Robert Horvath (2013, 207) remarks, it takes a serious narrowing down of political 
space to “lend revolutionary pathos to the opposition’s demands for the unshackling of the 
mass media, the observance of the constitution, freedom to demonstrate, and the return of free 
and fair elections.” 
While some societal elements may be radicalized, many more will be deterred by the 
systematic crackdown on attempts to hold the regime accountable. Selective law enforcement 
may also be part of the explanation for the so-called political apathy in Russia. The lack of 
political initiatives from below is not exclusively a cultural phenomenon but is also policed 
from above by a regime that discourages such initiatives unless they happen to fit with its 
informal agendas. It has been pointed out that a key to the survival of Putin’s regime (and his 
relative popularity) has been the lack of alternatives. While this is true, the dearth of 
alternatives is not a product of chance. What is sometimes attributed to loyalty is at least in 
part “a form of submission stemming from the fear of trouble” (Mendras 2012, 195).  
This reminds us that while the informal institutions are often contingent on cultural 
specificities, they are not culture themselves. For externally enforced rules to survive through 
time, their enforcement through punishment cannot halt. The fact that the rules of political 
conduct are indeed enforced by quasi-legal (and other) means suggests that they are in no way 
self-enforcing or “natural” to Russia. The institutionalization of selective law enforcement 
“embod[ies] the interests and preferences” of the ruling elite (Nee 1998, 87). 
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9 New Perspectives on Political and Legal 
Dualism 
At the time when the research was carried out Russia had a consolidated authoritarian regime 
that was to a significant degree in control of both the legislative process and the networks 
responsible for legal manipulation. Considering the considerable amassment of power within 
the Kremlin, it is pertinent to ask why the regime employs such intricate schemes of 
repression as selective law enforcement. Why did the regime not amend the constitution to 
formalize its rules so that political dissent could be cracked down upon more effectively and 
in a more systematic fashion? Or alternatively, why did it not simply ignore legal aspects 
when suppressing political dissent? It was exactly the coexistence of the conflictive rule sets 
of authoritarianism and formal democracy that spurred theories of transitions and façade 
politics. In this chapter, I provide an alternative interpretation to explain the logic of 
contradictions in today’s Russia with particular attention paid to selective law enforcement. 
Readers should note that my approach to this task is instrumentalist. I do not focus on the 
origins of the existing tensions but attempt to see how what appear to be contradictions make 
sense when seen from the perspective of authoritarian or neo-patrimonial governance. 
Instrumentalism also see the actors and their interests as separate from the institutions and 
structures that they can utilize, manipulate or circumvent in order to reach their goals.  
Selective law enforcement, I will argue, can be seen as a way to organize political and legal 
exceptionalism84 in a state of institutional tensions. By means of a Dual State perspective, we 
may incorporate both the tensions and the exceptionalism of selective law enforcement within 
one broader framework. With these building blocks, I seek to explain the duality in Russian 
politics in terms of pragmatic dualism, focusing on the instrumental benefits of the Dual State 
but acknowledging its historically contingent genesis. 
As a launching pad for my discussion, I use Ernst Frankel’s (1941) model of the Dual State, to 
which I will refer frequently below. Because of the controversy inherent in any references to 
                                                 
84 Note that I use the term exceptionalism not in the common cultural sense (like Russian exceptionalism or 
American expcetionalism) but to denote cases that are dealt with according to special rules. See especially section 
9.3 below. 
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the Third Reich, which provides the background for Frankel’s research, I must underscore that 
I use the comparison purely to explore theoretical issues of dual jurisdiction and draw no 
moral or ideological parallels between the regimes in Nazi Germany and today’s Russia.   
9.1 The History and Chief Characteristics of the Dual State 
The model of the Dual State was introduced by Ernst Fraenkel in the book bearing the same 
name and published for the first time in English translation in 1941. The theory was based on 
his research on pre-war Nazi Germany after the Reichstag-decree in 1933 until about 1938. In 
this period, Fraenkel was himself practicing as an attorney at the Berlin Court of Appeals 
(Guardze 1942, 603). In 1938, Fraenkel emigrated to the U.S. but returned after the war to 
become one of the founding fathers of political science in Germany. Much of the appeal in his 
work stems precisely from the ability to explore the issues of politics and law in concert and 
interaction. 
In brief, Fraenkel’s work deals with how the Nazi regime in the 1930s eliminated the 
Rechtsstaat in Nazi Germany and did so with the legal85 system that was to take its place. In 
this new system of dual jurisdiction, the Nazis enjoyed uncontested prerogatives unchecked 
by legal principles. At the same time, certain spheres of administration were de facto 
exempted from this arbitrariness. Fraenkel dubbed these pockets of rational-legal control the 
Normative State and accredited their continued existence to the self-restraint of the 
Prerogative State and the necessity to keep the German capitalist economy afloat.  
In 1977, Fraenkel’s work was picked up by Robert Sharlet in a study on legality and legal 
culture under Stalinism. Sharlet (1977) was careful to point out several important differences 
between the forms of dual legality under the two regimes, but convincingly explained why the 
parallel is illuminating. Stalin’s regime reserved the right to execute control over legal cases 
that were found to be of political importance. In a way comparable to Nazi Germany, the 
increasing scope of what could be regarded “political in the broad sense” had tragic 
consequences. In the regime’s effort to “normalize” the Soviet Union from the mid-1930s, 
however, Stalin also headed a large-scale reform program to strengthen the rationality, 
                                                 
85 The degree of legality to this system was a major topic of debate within legal philosophy after the war. Most 
well-known perhaps are the so-called Hart-Fuller debates that still resound in legal philosophy today. For a 
recent collection of articles on the relevance of the debate today, see the collected articles in Cane (2010). 
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professionalism, and functioning of the legal system. The state that emerged, Sharlet (1977, 
155) argued, was “a dual system of law and terror.” 
While the elements of change in between Stalinism and Putinism are obvious, “the division 
between politicized and non-politicized cases has continued” (Hendley 2009, 261). The Dual 
State, I will argue, has reemerged in a new form. I am not the first to point this out. Hendley 
(2007, 99) explicitly refers to Fraenkel and Sharlet’s works and contends that “the legal 
system [under Putin] is best conceptualized as a dual system, under which mundane cases are 
handled in accordance with the prevailing law, but under which the outcomes of cases that 
attract the attention of those in power can be manipulated to serve their interests.” Hendley 
(2010, 24) is for the most part eager to show how the non-political part of the legal system 
works and makes no attempt to hide her revisionist project to counter the “steady drumbeat of 
the media”. For her, a frequent reference to legal dualism thus becomes a framework within 
which she can examine the functioning of the Russian legal system bottom-up, without 
rejecting that a very different logic prevails in political cases. 
A quite different approach to connect Fraenkel to Putinist Russia resulted in the theoretical 
framework of Richard Sakwa’s (2011) book on the “crisis of Russian Democracy.” In his 
adaptation of Fraenkel and Sharlet’s thoughts, Sakwa (2011, esp. 37-45) makes a series of 
quite wide reaching changes to the key terms. While the parallels to Fraenkel’s work in 
Sakwa’s very broad and open-ended approach may sometimes seem unnecessary, Sakwa’s 
reconceptualization also produces some valuable insights that I will pick up on below. Finally, 
Geert Jan Alexander Knoops and Robert R. Amsterdam (2007) may be mentioned for their 
use of the Dual State model to characterize Putinist Russia and the prosecution of 
Khodorkovsky in particular.  
In Fraenkel’s original model the Dual State was constituted by a Normative and a Prerogative 
State. By the Normative State, Fraenkel (1941, xiii) understood “an administrative body 
endowed with elaborate power for safeguarding the legal order as expressed in statutes, 
decision of the courts and activities of the administrative agencies.” The Prerogative State, by 
sharp contrast, is “that governmental system which exercises unlimited arbitrariness and 
violence unchecked by any legal guarantees” (ibid). After the implementation of the 
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Reichstag Fire Decree86, the Prerogative State gradually secured the exclusive jurisdiction to 
decide what were to be considered political threats and thus exempted from the ordinary legal 
system. At the same time, “insofar as the political authorities do not exercise their power, 
private and public life are regulated either by the traditionally prevailing or the newly enacted 
law” (Fraenkel 1941, 57). It is the coexistence of these two jurisdictional spheres, their 
conflictive logics yet complementary outcomes for the political project, which in a nutshell 
constitutes the idea of the Dual State. 
The model of the Dual State provides a promising perspective for the purposes of 
conceptualizing selective law enforcement within a broader theory of legality and politics. In 
Russia, we have seen that there is a considerable gap between formal laws and the informal 
rules of authoritarianism that both contribute to regulate political life. These tensions between 
different components have provided various theories on contemporary authoritarian regimes 
and not least on Russia (see section 1.3.5). Whether we conceptualize these tensions as 
tensions between state and regime, democracy and authoritarianism, patrimonial and rational-
legal governance, or the rule of law and the rule of men, these dichotomies seem to deal with 
largely overlapping issues. The Dual State not least deals with tensions between two spheres 
of jurisdiction and between the rational-legal order and arbitrary forces in the political 
leadership.  
It is undoubtedly the aspect of tensions in the Dual State that Sakwa seeks to incorporate in 
his model. His project can thus be seen as an effort to integrate the Dual State model with 
current mainstream approaches to Russian politics. Sakwa’s (2011, viii) explicit goal is to 
create a more dynamic framework to read Russian politics from within. He is ambitious in his 
approach: “The tension between the two pillars is the matrix through which the Russian 
political landscape can be understood.” Following the same lines as in earlier chapters, I will 
primarily address the tensions within the conception of partly contradicting rule sets. My 
approach to the dualism is thus the coexistence of partly contradicting formal and informal 
rules under the same political leadership. Compared to Sakwa, my contribution is 
considerably closer to Frankel’s original instrumentalism, looking at how the dual 
components both contribute to the political project. 
                                                 
86 “Decree of the President of the Reich for the Protection of the People and the State … of February 28, 1933.” 
The full decree is provided as an appendix in Fraenkel’s (1941) book. 
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There are several theories that address tensions in Russia, but the Dual State model also 
provides a point of departure for examining political and legal exceptionalism. As in 
Fraenkel’s original model, the tensions in Russia have given birth to two distinct subsystems. 
To be sure, the clear-cut separation of two spheres of jurisdiction in Nazi Germany was quite 
different from the muddier institutional landscape of today’s Russia. Yet, as I will argue, the 
idea of dual jurisdiction is appropriate to illuminate exceptionalism also in Russia.  
9.2 Dual State Building in Putin’s Russia 
As suggested in the previous chapter, state-building under Putin and Medvedev may seem 
paradoxical. In the first decade of the century, Russia again rose in power and both state 
capacity and quality increased in many ways. This development, however, went hand in hand 
with an increasing authoritarianism and lack of tolerance for everything that vaguely 
threatened the incumbents’ grip on power.  
With regard to legal reform, many steps were taken to improve the ability of the legal system 
to provide justice to the common citizen of Russia. The Russian legal system has changed 
greatly over the last two decades, and the positive developments should not be neglected. 
Many of these reforms are of Putinist origin, while others were sufficiently funded only under 
Putin’s presidency. In fact, the decision to invest in the judicial system depended largely on 
the personal initiative of the President, if we are to believe Solomon (2008a, 3). Especially 
Putin’s first term of Presidency saw major legal reforms.  
Maybe most significantly, the Russian state has poured considerable resources into 
strengthening the financial situation of its judiciary, both to increase its independence from 
corrupting interests and to raise the prestige of judges. Salaries have increased appreciably, 
court buildings have been improved, and courts have been allocated better “staff support, 
facilities and equipment in order to enhance their independence, effectiveness, and prestige” 
(Smith 2010, 144). 
Among other positive developments are greater computerization of the courts; measures to 
increase transparency and give observers open access to databases on the Internet; initiatives 
to improve juvenile justice; and attempts to reduce the system’s dependency on harsh prison 
sentences. A large-scale reform moved much of the total caseload over to Justice-of-the-Peace 
courts, which relieved the pressure on the courts of general jurisdiction and boosted 
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efficiency. In 2010 the Justice-of-the-Peace courts dealt with almost all administrative claims, 
three-quarters of civil claims, and half of all criminal claims (Hendley 2012a, 377). Thanks to 
their efficiency and not least their accessibility, Hendley (2012b, 337) has even called these 
courts “the unsung heroes of the Russian judicial system.” Solomon (2008a, 31) also praises 
the efficiency of the court system, claiming that even before the computerization program 
“the bulk of cases were processed more quickly in Russia than in Western countries.” Recent 
research on legal professionalism in Russia also indicates clear changes for the better (Panina 
and Bierman 2013). 
Moreover, while the trust in legal institutions remains low in the population, the citizens are 
nonetheless willing to use them to an increasing extent. In the first decade of this century, the 
number of civil cases dealt with in Russian courts more than doubled (Hendley 2009, 241). 
The chances of winning when litigating against the state are also high, not least for firms 
(Trochev 2012). In addition, the compensation awarded to these litigants has increased 
sharply over the last decade (ibid).  
The rule of law, Gordon B. Smith (2010, 151) concludes, “appears finally to be taking root” 
in Russia: 
In recent years we have witnessed not only the enactment of new laws and efforts to 
bring laws and rules enacted by regional governments into conformity with the 
Constitution and federal legislation, we have also observed progress toward 
improving the functioning of the judiciary and enhancing its independence. (Smith 
2010, 141) 
Against the backdrop of my analysis, these conclusions may seem close to absurd. Rather 
than being absurd, however, they point to the other subsystem of the dual legality we can see 
in Putin’s Russia. 
Despite this bombardment of positive initiatives, the authoritarianism and neglect for 
constitutional freedoms have not come to a halt.87 On the Freedom House index, for instance, 
Russia’s ratings have declined every single year since the organization started the reporting 
project “Nations in Transit” in 2003 (Orttung 2013). Although legal abuse was rife in the 
1990s, its current role in a regime of repression seems to be a Putinist phenomenon (Taylor 
2011). As my analysis in the previous chapter suggested, the political leadership has 
                                                 
87 For a discussion on the link between regime type and legal system, see Root and May (2008). 
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increasingly subordinated and centralized law enforcement agencies, and judicial 
independence has also been seriously compromised.  
The coexistence of strengthening and undermining tendencies are rarely missed even in 
positive evaluations like those of Solomon, Smith, and Hendley referred to above. The 
success stories and the scandals, then, seem to be operating side by side. All of these 
researchers acknowledge the problems of judicial independence that I identified in the 
previous chapter. Yet, as Hendley observes:  
“Telephone law” [telephone justice] has been a reality in Russian life for decades, 
if not for centuries. Yet, it has not resulted in a full-fledged “rotting” of the entire 
legal system. Instead, this Russian version of “rule by law” has peacefully coexisted 
with the “rule of law” in more mundane cases. (Hendley 2010, 258) 
Taylor explains the duality in terms of “routine” and “exceptional” law enforcement tasks: 
Routine ones are those that are the core functions of an organizations as set out in 
laws and regulations, whereas exceptional ones are set by superiors but are extra-
legal or even illegal … Russian law enforcement agencies were much better at 
implementing exceptional tasks than the routine ones established by law. (Taylor 
2011, 3)  
In this way, the state administration works part-time for the regime and part-time for the state. 
Russia’s coercive apparatus enforces not only formal rules, but also the informal rules 
dictated by the interests of their patrons. In this way, the informal interests carve out an 
exclusive space for themselves within the state. This is the Dual State in Russia, and the 
arrangement gives rise to a certain blur between state and regime, between the public and the 
private sphere. The two subsystems, however, are still distinct and evident not least in the 
output of the system. 
Whereas in Germany the Prerogative State was superimposed on a pre-existing legal order, 
the two subsystems have under Putin been strengthened at the same time. On the one hand, 
Russia has witnessed legal reform, legalistic rhetoric, arguably also a more genuine rational-
legal operation, and certainly a great expansion of the legal system’s capacity. On the other 
hand, the same period was also marked by more prerogative power to crack down on 
opposition. In this way, the dualism in Putinist Russia has been in a process of intensification. 
The contradictions between the two rule sets have not been solved by formalizing separate 
jurisdictional channels as in Germany. Instead, the two rule sets have produced a form of 
hybrid governance that continues to confuse observers.  
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9.3 The Importance of Exceptions 
Selective law enforcement as defined in this study is not “how Russia works.” Selective law 
enforcement is merely how Russia works in exceptional circumstances. The vast majority of 
Russians are not selected. That selection is limited to the few is arguably implicit in the term 
“selection” itself. Selection is also out of the ordinary. In selective law enforcement, cases are 
taken out of the ordinary legal system and dealt with somewhere else (according to different 
rules). The selection, then, presupposes a notion of normality and itself constitutes an 
exception to this normality.  
The degree of importance we give this limited number of cases is crucial for how we evaluate 
the functioning of the legal system, judicial independence, or rule of law. Importantly, if we 
employ a pragmatic outcome perspective and look at the bulk of “produced justice,” Russia 
will score increasingly well thanks to the strengthening of the Normative State and of 
administrative justice in particular. As Russians increasingly come to use the legal system for 
solving their disputes with both each other and the state, the picture is increasingly becoming 
one of a modern country. If we look at the exceptional cases, however, our judgment will be 
different. 
The exceptional cases show that constitutional guarantees are not guarantees after all, but 
merely rules of thumb. Moreover, we can see that the state itself is actively involved in 
undermining its supposed cornerstone of constitutionalism. It is in these cases, when the two 
rule sets are in sharp conflict, that their interaction provides good indications of their relative 
empowerment. If the exceptional cases tell us little about how the legal system is experienced 
by the common Russian or how it contributes to keeping law and order in society, they are 
very good indications of the potential of informal interests to penetrate the rational-legal 
logic.  
When Russian citizens observe a case of selective law enforcement, they often interpret it as 
political repression. Within the logic of rule enforcement, this indication of a potential is 
exactly what is needed to create a threat perception that can influence the rational risk 
calculation among concerned parties (Friedman 1975, 82-84). Because the Russian citizens 
understand that the political cases are exceptional, their occurrences will not scare people 
away from the legal system in fear of telephone justice (see Hendley 2009; 2010). As Hendley 
(2009, 261) has convincingly argued, the division between political and ordinary cases, 
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although “opaque to outsiders, is clear to Russians.” Because the population interprets the 
exceptional cases as political, however, they are given incentives to keep a low political 
profile. For this reason, and as argued in the previous chapter, we should not consider the 
exceptional cases to be marginal just because they are aberrations. Quite the contrary, the 
exceptional cases deserve attention because they are a barometer of the underlying 
mechanisms and power relations in society. 
9.4 Tensions and Exceptions in the Dual State 
Fraenkel devotes a considerable part of his book to describing the years leading up to the 
establishment of the Dual State (1933-1937). This rather detailed study of jurisdictional 
struggle is not least a story of clashes between the old legal order and the new logics of the 
time, a logic of “material justice”88 that demanded political expediency above everything else. 
In this period of internal jurisdictional strife, the tensions between the two rule sets were more 
visible than later: The old order put up several fights as it was gradually forced to retreat.  
However, also after these years, when the Dual State was fully established and the Rechtsstaat 
eradicated, the tensions were still present even if tamed under the political will. These 
remaining tensions, however, did not take the form of a power struggle since the Prerogative 
State was firmly in the lead. Rather, the tensions stemmed from two different rule sets with 
different ultimate reasons for legitimacy.89 Whereas the Prerogative State played the role of a 
demiurge with the right to administer the deeper “material justice,” the Normative State was 
tied to the logic of rule-based administration and “formal justice.” The two coexisted and 
were allowed to coexist because the political leadership was dependent upon both subsystems 
to support its political ambitions. 
The Nazi regime solved the contradictions this coexistence created by establishing two 
separate jurisdictional spheres, which became the two counterparts of the Dual State. To solve 
                                                 
88 Logic in a broad sense. Fraenkel sees the basis and operation of the Prerogative State as fundamentally 
irrational and compares National Socialism to an inquisitorial church, “a theocracy without a god” (Fraenkel 
1941, 48). 
89 The use of conflictive rule sets is not inconsistent with Fraenkel’s interpretation. Although Fraenkel 
conceptualized the Prerogative State as de jure arbitrary, he contended it was de facto taking on (more or less) 
predictable patterns in the same way as the informal rules in my conceptualization. 
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the issue of what question belonged within what sphere, the jurisdiction of jurisdiction was 
curiously given to one of the subparts. In other words, the Prerogative State could itself define 
what cases it had jurisdiction over. Cases which the Prerogative State did not declare as 
politically relevant were decided upon in the ordinary legal system, by the Normative State. In 
this way, one of the subsystems became completely subordinated, yet was by the political 
leaders allowed to function more or less unblemished in whatever cases the Prerogative State 
did not take an interest. After the political regime had secured this mechanism of political 
control, it could safely leave normal life to rational-legal procedures. The machinery of 
rational legal governance thus continued to work, but was disarmed and politically 
emasculated. 
In post-Soviet Russia, by sharp contrast, the extra-legal prerogative power never came to be 
formalized. In Russia, this power does not take the form of legally constituted prerogatives 
but of mechanisms such as selective law enforcement. From the Constitution of 1993 it is 
clear that the state should guarantee the freedoms of speech and association as well as equality 
before the law. In practice, however, the political leadership suggested in its doublespeak that 
political dissent, be it legal or not, must be contained. The Normative State stipulates the right 
for everyone to stand for elections, but the incumbents seemed bent on suppressing 
competition. Not only do the interviewees often claim that legal cases against them are 
fraught with all sorts of manipulation, they also claim that there is a selection process. In this 
process, as I have argued, certain targets are subjected to exceptional attention based on a rule 
set in which political obedience is key. 
Most importantly for our use of the Dual State model, Russian courts enjoy full jurisdiction 
over politically sensitive cases, formally speaking. In Russia, in other words, there is no 
Prerogative State: “Instead we have informal behavior … that fulfils some of the functions of 
the prerogative state but has no independent legal or institutional status of its own” (Sakwa 
2011, 42). 
Selective law enforcement became a solution to solve the above contradictions, weaving 
together the fabrics of formal and informal politics. It was also a solution that reflected the 
ambivalence of governing Russia. On the one hand, it shows the relative autonomy of the 
Normative Order and its ability to shape the strategies of the ruling elite. Even in exceptional 
cases, the political leadership cannot easily step out of the legal sphere entirely. At the same 
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time, selective law enforcement is also a manifestation of the political leaders’ refusal to bow 
to the constitutional order.  
9.4.1 Organizing Exceptionalism in the Dual State 
In Fraenkel’s (1941) model, the Prerogative State defines its own jurisdictional platform to be 
whatever it sees as important enough at the present time. The method to achieve this was a 
highly speculative juggling of legal principles (see fn. 85). In the formulation of a Nazi legal 
scholar of the Gestapo: 
The task of combating all movements dangerous to the state implies the power of 
using all necessary means, provided they are not in conflict with the law. Such 
conflicts with the law, however, are no longer possible since all restriction have 
been removed following the Decree of February 28, 1933. (Werner Best quoted in 
Fraenkel 1941, 25) 
The instrument to concretize the dual jurisdiction in Nazi Germany system was the legal 
concept Konflikt, a term which allowed the authorities to transfer any case they saw as 
significant enough to its own sphere of legally unbound jurisdiction (Fraenkel 1941, 29-30). 
The jurisdiction of the Prerogative State was by definition one of exceptions, because the 
cases it did not actively interfere with by default fell under the jurisdiction of the Normative 
State. In other words, the Dual State developed two modes of rule – one for cases in which the 
regime was not a major stakeholder, and one for the exceptions (figure 6)  
In Fraenkel’s Germany, as well as in many other regimes ranging from the ancien regime in 
France and military regimes in Latin America to the anti-terrorist regime under George W. 
Bush, exceptional cases are dealt with in parallel court systems (Pereira 2008). It is not least 
with regard to the organization of exceptionalism that selective law enforcement is a crucial 
element of Russian politics. Unlike in some other roughly comparable regimes (with regard to 
real civil freedoms), there are no political courts to deal with political issues in Russia. The 
boundaries between the two subsystems of the Dual State in Russia are therefore non-
transparent, at least to outside observers. Post-Soviet Russia “has been in a permanent state of 
exception,” Sakwa (2011, 42) notes, but the exceptions are “exercised not through 
constitutional provisions and some sort of defining a state of emergency, but through an 
informal and undeclared derogation from constitutional principles.” 
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This insight is of profound value. It implies that selective law enforcement is a solution to the 
same problems shared by many other authoritarian states, namely how to coordinate political 
control with rational-legal rule. In other words, selective law enforcement embodies the 
efforts to satisfy both the formal and the informal rules simultaneously. This perspective 
makes room for the dominating position of the political authorities to utilize the state for their 
own exceptional purposes, and it simultaneously also illustrates the relative strength of the 
legal order in Russia as pointed out by Sakwa. As he (2011, 3) observes, the most successful 
Russian politicians are those who are able to understand and manipulate both rule sets. 
The counterparts in Russia’s dual governance “are discreet subsystems, but the two are not 
insulated and hence Russian politics today is a dyadic order in which the two are in constant 
interaction, the essence of its hybridity” (Sakwa 2011, 41). The pervasive grey-zones in 
coercive practices with regard to legal/illegal and formal/informal dichotomies may thus in 
part originate in the lack of formalized exceptional channels to accommodate the interests of 
those in power. I therefore propose that selective law enforcement is an organization of 
exceptionalism in a state of institutional tension. 
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9.4.2 The Jurisdiction of Jurisdiction and the Exceptional Switch 
Similar to Fraenkel’s Germany, the exceptionalism in Russia is without clear boundaries. 
Even though the jurisdiction in Germany was delineated through the mechanism of Konflikt, 
the Prerogative State could move the boundary between the two states at will. In Germany, 
the Prerogative State was paradoxically de jure above law. In Russia, the interference with 
legal processes is informally constituted and thus not regulated by a formal mechanism of 
jurisdiction at all. Because of the organizational costs associated with it, the actual use of the 
exceptional channel is much more limited in practice than what it could be. This is true for 
both Fraenkel’s Germany and Putinist Russia (Fraenkel 1941, 57-58). In both cases as well, 
the interference in practice took the form of somewhat predictable patterns (Fraenkel 1941, 3). 
Following Sakwa (2011), I have suggested that exceptionalism in Russia takes place as an 
unofficial derogation from legal principles. The political leadership may nonetheless (or may 
precisely because of this) be said to have an unbounded jurisdiction, although not de jure 
unbounded. While the practice is not grounded in any legal rights, the political leadership 
takes the prerogative to interfere with constitutional guarantees. 
Because the informal political actors have no jurisdiction at all, their actions may take on 
forms of pro forma law enforcement and be pro forma resolved within the Normative State’s 
jurisdiction. At the same time, the unbound character of Russian exceptionalism is seen in the 
possibility of Russian authoritarian leaders to interfere in every sphere of life. Since this 
power is not channeled through a legal mechanism similar to Konflikt, it may be easier for the 
state-connected elites to appropriate areas that were relatively undisturbed in Fraenkel’s 
Germany, such as property rights (see Gans-Morse 2012; Ledeneva 2013, 191-194). The lack 
of clear borders between the two subsystems has led to a substantial spillover of state power 
for personal enrichment and may account for much of the grey-zone governance. As Sakwa 
(2011, 357) puts it: “The Putin system combined two opposed processes, which were not so 
easily distinguished because of their interrelated characteristics.”  
A consequence of the unbound (informally constituted) jurisdiction is that the political 
leadership may choose the rule sets according to which a case should be approached. In other 
words, the jurisdiction of jurisdiction allows them to switch between rational-legal and 
exceptional modes of governance at will. As we have seen, it may be enough to make a 
telephone call to “switch on” the exceptional system in Russia. The law enforcement 
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structures may even switch it on themselves as the exceptionalism becomes institutionalized. 
The key to the switch in either case belongs to the ruling elites, whose recruitment policy is 
primarily based on loyalty. 
9.5 Self-Restraint and Instrumentalism 
Another characteristic of the Dual State, largely omitted in the model’s adaptation to Russia, 
is that the lack of interference by the ruling elites in the Normative State’s affairs is self-
imposed. The regime needs not only a legal administration, but also a legal administration that 
is (at least partly) independent of itself.90 We cannot speak of a Normative State, Fraenkel 
contends, if it does not continue to operate according to its own legal rules when it is not 
hindered. To retain and support this mode of operation is what strengthening the Normative 
State is all about.  
Selective law enforcement may be taken as an indication that political actors to some degree 
are restrained by empowered legal rules. At the same time, we may suspect that the normative 
state is functioning properly in so many cases because it is allowed to function properly. 
When the political leadership shows a sufficient determination and willingness to interfere in 
individual legal cases, it can make the Normative State buckle fairly easily. That leaders have 
the possibility of influencing every decision does not mean that they will always do so: “If 
one picks at random a volume of the decisions of a German civil court and examines it 
systematically” the existence of the Prerogative State would not be evident, Frankel claims. 
The rational-legal logic is by definition resistant to interference. At the political level, this 
resistance is a matter of effective administration to rule a country with rational-legal tools. 
In Germany, the Prerogative State had de jure absolute power, but did not actually use it in 
the majority of cases (Fraenkel 1941, 57-58, 72). Issue areas like contract law, private 
property law, competition law, and labor law were in practice rarely (although not without 
exceptions) touched by the Prerogative State (Fraenkel 1941, 75-82). These issue areas were 
                                                 
90 The Gestapo leader Karl Rudolf Werner Best noted that “it is essential that many of the activities of the state 
should be carried out according to legal rules and that they should be calculable in advance” (quoted in Fraenkel 
1941, 62). In the words of Hermann Goering himself (giving a lecture in 1934 before a group of attorneys and 
judges): “An arbitrary deviation from the law would constitute a violation of the judge’s loyalty to the Leader” 
(quoted in Fraenkel 1941, 74). 
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kept isolated from political issues because of their importance for the economic development 
of the country. Indeed, the pockets of rational-legal governance were also institutionalized in 
the so-called economic estates (wirtschaftsstaende) that “deprived the state of its 
omnipotence” (Fraenkel 1941, 97). At the same time, both subsystems served as instruments 
to further the political project of the Third Reich (see e.g. Fraenkel, 1941, 57). This is a key 
point for Fraenkel: 
The limits of the Prerogative State are not imposed from the outside; they are 
imposed by the Prerogative State itself. These self-imposed restraints of the 
Prerogative State are of cardinal importance for the understanding of the Dual 
State. (Fraenkel 1941, 58) 
This is not to say, however, that the self-imposed restrictions are not contingent on external 
motivations. In practice, all political actors are constrained after all, by all the complexities of 
incentives and norms in the elite group, society at large, or the international environment. In 
Russia, these constraints are certainly far greater than in Fraenkel’s Germany. From an 
instrumentalist perspective, however, these are not external impositions but incentives and 
factors influencing the choices of the actors. The point is that political leaders may choose to 
empower courts not (only) due to their soft hearts but also in order to extract rents and 
increase the longevity of their regime’s survival. Research on a variety of regimes has shown 
that authoritarian leaders frequently empower courts in order to reap the benefits of a 
functioning legal system (see the collection of articles in Moustafa and Ginsburg 2008b). 
As it seems, there are too many benefits associated with a normative legal order for any 
modern state to simply ignore them. A well-functioning legal system may for instance make it 
easier for the political leadership to exercise social control and maintain regime cohesion by 
detecting self-interested and predatory state officials that go against its interests (Moustafa 
and Ginsburg 2008a, 7). Crucially, a well-functioning legal order may also protect the 
economy, which is the role the Normative State plays in Fraenkel’s model. Today this is a 
central aspect of judicial autonomy in a number of regimes (see Root and May 2008). A 
similar argument that stresses instrumental self-restraint is found in the research literature on 
so-called electoral authoritarianism. Several scholars (e.g. Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; 
Magaloni 2008; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009) have explored how authoritarian (and 
autocratic) leaders may favor partly free elections for reasons unrelated to “fake” democratic 
legitimacy. 
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That authoritarian courts are completely subordinated to the political regime is fundamentally 
a misconception. In modern states, semi-autonomous courts are paramount. This is the key 
aspect of the Normative State as a legal instrument – a device to extract the benefits of 
rational-legal governance. When we look carefully, we can see it thrives in the most 
unexpected places. Fraenkel’s study shows us that even a (near-) totalitarian state 80 years 
ago was not exempted from this rule. 
In this regard, two points deserve particular mentioning. First, many of the benefits of a 
rational-legal order are not associated with democratic legitimacy or Rule of Law in a broad 
sense.91 This does not mean that that the rational-legal basis for decision-making does not 
bring about legitimacy (it does). The source of legitimacy, however, is Weberian and not 
Dahlian – it is rooted in the rational-legal principles of equality and impersonalism, not in 
involving the population in decision making. In addition, the economic benefits of a rational-
legal order are substantial and the material wellbeing of the population is a crucial aspect of 
securing legitimacy for the type of regimes that Putin’s Russia falls under.  
Second, we should mention that the relative autonomy is real and must be (or at least appear 
to be) real in order to yield the favorable outcomes.  
Commitments to property rights are not credible unless courts have independence 
and real powers of judicial review. Administrative courts cannot effectively stamp 
out corruption unless they are independent from the political and bureaucratic 
machinery that they are charged with supervising and disciplining. (Moustafa and 
Ginsburg 2008a, 13)  
Importantly, this autonomy may seem (and is) real to individual actors. If each and every one 
could penetrate the rational-legal logic, the rational-legal order would simply cease to be. 
With regard to selective law enforcement, we have seen how self-restraint may be explained 
in terms of costs to use this exceptional channel. The relative empowerment of the normative 
state explains why a sounds legal basis is favored, but also why it is not necessary in all cases. 
 The liberal foundation for the Normative State in Russia in part may be seen as genuine but 
“suppressed” (Sakwa 2011): the remains of a “reversed democratization” (Solomon 2008b, 
263) or a product of the international order after the end of the Cold War. The semi-
                                                 
91 To state one of many examples, Gordon Smith argues “true rule of law” can only exist when both citizens and 
law enforcement authorities “internalize the values of the supremacy of law, due process, justice, impartiality, and 
equality before the law.” 
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autonomous legal order is allowed to retain its form, however, because the benefits that the 
system provides the regime exceed the threat the autonomy poses. I contend that the balance 
between the two subsystems of the Dual State is not a balance between a regime and the state 
as Sakwa (2011) suggests. Rather, it is a balance within the regime – a balance that constitutes 
it. For this reason, I suggest that the original model of the Dual State may be used in its 
original instrumentalist meaning when discussing contemporary Russia. Even if the 
Normative State has a far greater impact on political life in Russia than it had in Nazi 
Germany, it is also forced into an “unholy alliance” (Hendley 2010, 4) in Russia with political 
leaders exploiting it. The study of Knoops and Amsterdam (2007), for instance, serves as a 
good illustration of this point. 
9.5.1  The Normative State as Gatekeeper 
In Chapter 4, I suggested that politicians may depend on existing formal institutions in part to 
reflect and distort criticism by instrumentalizing the ambiguity of overlapping rules. In 
addition to this ability, however, we should not forget the most straightforward reason to 
employ the state for particularistic interests. The state is after all a massive power-wielding 
apparatus, internally organized, fuelled with state money, and readily available. In other 
words, the broader legal system and especially the law enforcement system is also an 
organization with violent capacities (see also Volkov 2002). While legal measures may seem 
soft, low intensity coercion is ultimately founded on violence or the threat of such. Although 
it is low intensity, it is still coercion. The state apparatus is obviously an immensely powerful 
tool for those who control it. It should thus be expected that the incumbent regime delimits 
access to the state power, and also that it exercises exactly state power in doing so. 
The organization of exceptions through the state is an important aspect of Putin’s system. As 
the control over legal actors has been centralized, selective law enforcement increasingly 
becomes a tool for the few. In section 8.5, I showed how Russia under Putinism has 
consolidated control over the means of repression within the regime. We saw that access to 
the ruling networks has increasingly been based on loyalty (in the broad sense) instead of 
professionalism (Ledeneva 2011a), and that the ruling elites have also taken other steps to 
align the interests of their various constituencies in the regions (Petrov 2011). Even if the 
interviewees see selective law enforcement as often initiated on regional initiatives the 
practice will tend to benefit the ruling elites as a group because of the common interest in the 
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status quo. To monitor and deal with regime insiders who overextend their mandates and step 
out of line, the regime has “its inner channels of checks and balances” (Ledeneva 2013, 249). 
Because of its relative (in)significance in political cases, the normative state may 
paradoxically work as a mechanism to delimit and simultaneously support exceptionalism. 
The reason for this apparent contradiction is the exclusive nature of exceptionalism itself. If 
the Normative State was too weak (and exceptionalism informally constituted), the country 
would basically be lawless as exceptionalism would be pervasive and in the final consequence 
become the norm. In today’s Russia, as well as in other countries, the Normative State is due 
to its relative empowerment being able to withstand many attempts to influence its modus 
operandi. 
 
 
 
At the same time, it is exactly this resistance to interference that makes the exceptional 
channel exclusive. The Normative State is to a degree able to resist localized or otherwise 
weak pressure upon it. Precisely because of its relative empowerment, it limits free riding in 
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the exceptional lane and ensures that nobody gains more access than his or her position within 
the regime’s informal structure would allow. As the severity of the repressive acts increases, 
so do the organizational and moral costs to push them through. The higher the cost of the 
project, the fewer will have the necessary prerogatives to see their initiatives through (and 
tackle the consequences). In this fashion, the perks of the exceptional system is paradoxically 
regulated by the relative empowerment of the Normative State (figure 7). The power to direct 
the state machinery against its own constitution is in this way centralized in a limited access 
order.  
9.6 Pragmatic Dualism – A Cautious Instrumental 
Approach 
The Russian constitutional order does not function according to the books. An important 
reason for this fact lies with the lack of willingness of the ruling elites to be subordinated to 
the constitution. The ruling elites are constantly exempting themselves from the validity of 
legal rules, and they circumvent and manipulate them for their own benefit. Nonetheless, it 
would be wrong to say that the informal and formal parts of the political system are simply in 
conflict. As noted elsewhere, the legislators and the primary manipulators belong to the same 
elite group, a group for which the state is their primary source of power. Instead of seeing the 
contradictory rule sets as necessarily problematic from a practical governance perspective, I 
see them as parts of a dualistic political system that works. The insistence on working 
according to both reflects the fact that benefits may be reaped even without completely 
satisfying either. In the words of Zimmer (2008, 305), the “selective and power oriented 
applications or circumventions of legal rules …establish parallel formal and informal logics 
of action according to which the actors operate.” 
I am of course not the first to point this out. Indeed, Sakwa (2008, 879) has also observed how 
“the contradictions themselves became a source of Putin’s power.”As he (ibid) asserted, the 
ambiguities gave Putin the ability “to act in several different political and discursive spheres 
at the same time”. Within the literature that employs neo-Weberian approaches to Putinist 
Russia, several scholars have reached similar conclusions. Sarah Whitmore (2010, 1000), for 
instance, argues that the tensions of neo-patrimonial Putinism “helped to reinforce and 
reproduce the existing regime.” Neil Robinson (2012, 304) also reflects on the neo-Weberian 
term and suggests that the contradictive system came into being “because the complex needs 
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of Russia as a state and a society that demanded a more complex administration that could be 
provided by personalist presidentialism.” Conversely, one may argue that the complexities of 
the severe crisis of the late 1990s created a need for the legitimacy associated with personal 
governance. Putin’s dual state building may be seen to address both these challenges 
simultaneously.  
In Robinson’s (2012, 300) words, the neo-patrimonial regime “pushes a part of the state away 
from personal relations toward more enduring hierarchies based on impersonalism” (ibid). 
Robinson’s formulation illustrates the “split” in Putinist rule, an element that may sometimes 
be forgotten when we focus on quasi-formality, quasi-legality, and grey-zones. While the line 
between the state and the regime is not always easy to discern, the separateness of the two is 
still evident. 
As noted in the section on institutional interactions (section 4.3), Russian authoritarianism is 
attached to the formal legal system like a parasite – borrowing both its muscle and its legal 
cover. In the process, the formal system gets weaker, unable to take care of all of its core 
duties (Taylor 2011) and suffers an appallingly low support in the population. And yet, the 
parasite remains totally dependent on its host and cannot survive long without it. If a parasite 
does not kill its host, that is not a sign of the parasite’s weakness. On the contrary, the parasite 
can in this way continue to extract benefits from its host over the longer term. Sakwa (2011, 
vii) points out that neither subsystem “in present conditions can gain uncontested dominance 
over the other.” Yet this balance should not be interpreted as a balance between equals. While 
formal rules may partly restrict the political leaders’ conduct, it is still the informal interests 
that call the shots.  
In conclusion, today’s Russia is not just hybrid, grey, and quasi-, it is also a dual state in terms 
of its parallel logics. This duality takes the form of separate, yet interacting, impersonal and 
exceptional channels to get things done. In a way, selective law enforcement solves some of 
the problems that stem from the lack of formalized exceptional channels under a regime that 
insists on prerogative powers. The exceptional channel is not void of legal elements, and the 
impersonal state is tainted with corrupt practices. Even if much selective law enforcement 
seems to be clustered around certain issues such as anti-extremism or election registration, the 
legal system hinges on the relative weakness of the normative system – its penetrability. The 
two modes of Putinist rule are thus not fully insulated from each other, yet the exceptionalism 
is distinct and observable. 
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This is not to say that either selective law enforcement or political dualism in general is a 
thoroughly brilliant regime design. The genesis of the current system tells a different story. 
Solomon (2008b, 276) for one, argues that the “court system was designed for a democratic 
political order in the making. That is, it is a judicial system meant to produce independent 
courts and impartial adjudication, and one invested it with responsibility for important 
decisions.” Today, he (2008b, 262) claims, the courts “represent a legacy of incomplete, 
failed, or revered democratization and [has] become an awkward institution in a competitive 
authoritarian environment.” While this is at least partly true with regard to the system’s 
origins, the Dual State still carries out instrumental functions for its current masters and is 
reproduced and only gradually amended for their benefit. Even if the ruling elites did not 
create the rules of the game by themselves, they are utilizing the enabling aspects of these 
rules to considerable effects. Within these frames, practices like selective law enforcement 
may be seen as the improvisation upon existing institutional constraints with the effect of 
gradually amending these to make the most out of the system. 
9.7 Conclusions on Legal and Political Dualism in Russia 
Instead of focusing on “real” democratic elements in the governance in Russia, in this chapter 
I have elaborated on the functional and instrumental benefits of the Dual State to its rulers. 
My basic argument has been that the political leadership is dependent upon the legal order for 
regulating everyday affairs, yet that informal interests insist on their prerogatives to define 
exceptions, without which it would risk losing its grip on the country. The regime is willing to 
empower courts in order to reap the benefits of a legal order, but only to the degree that extra-
constitutionalism may still be exerted when political expediency demands it. Within this 
system, selective law enforcement becomes a solution to the contradictions that appear in 
cases where the formal and informal rules disagree over constitutional freedoms 
Because the Normative State is relatively weak, the rules can be bent and circumvented when 
the political leaders are willing to pay the political cost, including reduced trust in the legal 
system and the citizens’ antagonism towards the ruling elite (see Sharafutdinova 2010). 
Selective law enforcement also makes clear what rule set that in the end of the day call the 
shots, and how easily constitutional guarantees can be sacrificed. Since the Normative State is 
also relatively strong, however, the system is one of limited access. To some degree, the entry 
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costs to interfere with the Normative State project may insulate the exceptional channel from 
pervasive free riding by actors not within the fold.  
In my conception, the interaction between the two subsystems of the Dual State is not a 
balance between the state and the regime (cf Sakwa 2011), but a balance that embodies the 
regime: “the Prerogative and Normative States constitutes an interdependent whole” 
(Fraenkel 1941, 71). The paradox of complementary contradictions is at the heart of Putinist 
rule, and selective law enforcement is an important part of this picture. 
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10 Conclusions 
My project to conceptualize selective law enforcement turned out to be like opening a can of 
worms. I believe the reason for this is at least threefold. First, the practice is inherently 
slippery and hard to grasp. When a colleague first commented on an early draft of a theory 
chapter to this dissertation, he compared it to nailing jelly to the wall and went on to contend 
that I basically did two things in my concept development. First, he maintained, my work on 
selective law enforcement was an effort to explain something very simple in complicated 
terms. At the same time, he added, he also saw it as an attempt to describe something 
incredibly complex in very simple terms. I have increasingly come to think of this remark as 
an excellent description of the research project. 
Second, researching selective law enforcement in Russian politics is tricky due to its political 
sensitivity and the authoritarian aspects of the regime. The high tensions generated by the 
issue may have lead interviewees to point their statements and have also made it problematic 
for me to collect information on both sides of the conflict. 
Third, any effort to build an academic concept more or less from scratch necessarily requires 
a broad approach to be successful. For me, this has involved a genuinely multidisciplinary 
approach and required examination of a host of different topics. Through this dissertation, I 
have not only presented and analyzed the interviewees’ perceptions of what goes on behind 
the scenes, but also discussed formal institutional arrangements, laws, resolutions, and court 
rulings; I have reviewed issues of legal culture and informal practices; I have extended the 
theories of institutional interactions, legal dualism and various other regime theories; and I 
have touched upon issues of jurisprudence and the power of weak rules. 
10.1 Summary of Main Findings 
In the introduction to this dissertation, I claimed that selective law enforcement is a practice 
that highlights and reflects the tensions between formal and informal institutions in Russian 
politics. Through a methodology of concept development, I have attempted to answer how its 
hybridity may be grasped, and I have presented a concept of selective law enforcement as a 
mechanism of repression aimed at enforcing informal rules of political conduct through 
selective legal acts – in short a mechanism to enforce informal rules. Chapter four especially 
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tried to get under the skin of this peculiar interaction of formal and informal elements. The 
result of these complex patterns of interaction is a fundamental non-transparency surrounding 
legality and coercion in Russia. 
To recapitulate the key findings of my study, I want to use my above definition of selective 
law enforcement as a point of departure. This definition is the epicenter of the analysis. It is 
also its conclusion, a condensed answer to my question of what selective law enforcement is 
and a hint towards how it works. Below, I will make three claims as to why this provides a 
good answer. First, the dissertation indicates that my concept of selective law enforcement 
provides a good fit with observed reality. Second, my answer is useful to explore more 
complex theories of how selective law enforcement works. Third, the concept provides a 
useful point of departure for further research. 
 To define selective law enforcement as a mechanism to enforce informal rules 
provides a good fit with the observed data. 
My initial approach to selective law enforcement presupposed a number of conceptual 
components that I identified for purposes of empirical observation (figure 1). By 
systematically exploring these subcomponents and adjusting the more abstract analytical level 
of the concept along the way, I achieved a degree of coherence in the concept – an internal 
consistency between the various conceptual levels and an external coherence with the 
observed data on the ground. Although this observed reality will appear different to different 
observers, an apparently good fit between the concept’s categories and actual observations on 
a number of issues is certainly a promising sign if we seek a robust concept. The involvement 
of the broader legal system and the state monopoly on legitimate violence to impose 
punishment gives us strong reason to interpret what is going on as rule enforcement. The 
behavior of the law enforcers, the interviewees’ perceptions of the practice, and the actual 
outcomes, however, all suggest that the rules enforced are informal. 
Especially with regard to the interviewees’ perceptions, the fit with a rule enforcement 
perspective is striking. The same is true with cases I only know from second-hand sources. 
The similarity in how the cases are framed indicates that we are really confronted with a 
genuinely distinguishable phenomenon. Many and probably most new stories of politicized 
justice from Russia that find their way to the media’s spotlight carry many of the same 
characteristics: A pro forma use of laws, claims to a conscious selection upon informal 
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criteria, the prevention of effective work and (more often) the deterring effect upon others, 
often suggested at through an overarching narrative of repressors and repressed. Notably these 
characteristics are also presupposed by my concept (see section 2.3).  
The concept is also coherent in a third meaning, namely in relation with authoritative existing 
approaches to Russian politics and legality. To some degree it is also able to serve to bridge 
different perspectives. The proposed approach to selective law enforcement also seems in 
agreement with authoritative literature on Russian legal culture, including its instrumentality, 
formality and disconnection between law and morals. Clearly the concept agrees with the 
premise that law is subordinated to men in Russia, but at the same time does not close the 
door on a parallel existence of a relatively empowered and increasingly modern legal system. 
Similarly, selective law enforcement as a mechanism to enforce informal rules also takes into 
account the strong elements of informal politics and clientelism in the governance of Russia 
without neglecting the strong tendencies of centralization and statism. We can see that the 
duality and tensions on the level of more abstract theories are reflected in the concept of 
selective law enforcement itself. 
For all these reasons, I find that the suggested concept of selective law enforcement has 
certain structuring qualities: it provides a by-and-large coherent framework for describing 
these aspects of social reality. 
 To define selective law enforcement as a mechanism to enforce informal rules is 
useful to explore more complex theories of how selective law enforcement works. 
While I have pointed out a significant degree of coherence both internally and with regard to 
existing theoretical frameworks, this is not to claim that the concept does not stir up certain 
theoretical difficulties. Most acutely visible in my dissertation is the lack of fit with 
mainstream theoretical perspectives on institutions, at least within comparative political 
science. 
Instead of circumventing the apparently conflictive relation with some existing categories, by 
for instance referring to loosely defined grey-zones in Russian politics, I have attempted to 
deal with the difficulties head on, with regard to both the quasi-formality and the quasi-
legality that one hardly can deny are present. In my conception, selective law enforcement is a 
complex entanglement of formal and informal components and of legal and extra-legal 
elements. It is not a quagmire, a fog, or a blur, however; with due care the entanglements can 
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be disentangled. Indeed, my effort to do so has brought about some insights on how selective 
law enforcement works to fulfill the function by which I have defined it (enforcing informal 
rules).  
My definition of selective law enforcement entails a separation between formal and informal 
rules, and along the same line it also entails a separation between the issue of political 
selection and an issue we can call the legal concern. Readers should note this, as it seems the 
two are very often confused in public discussions of possible selective law enforcement. The 
confusion arises, I suggest, because the two rule sets are overlapping – and intentionally so. 
To quickly recap the argument presented towards the end of chapter 4, selective law 
enforcement plays upon the overdeterminancy of a rule’s consequent that appears when two 
rules are enforced by the same means: When the enacted punishment in retrospect can be 
explained by reference to either formal or informal rules, what rules have actually been 
enforced becomes a question of controversy. The resulting situation of non-transparency is 
exploited by those who utilize selective law enforcement. The benefits to the manipulators are 
several, even if observers do not always believe in the assurances that political concerns have 
not been involved in the law enforcement process. Because of the ambiguity of the two rule 
sets, the informal selection is hard to prove legally and the issue of selectivity is not explicitly 
dealt with in Russian courts. The technical employment of, and insistence on, formal rules not 
only distort and complicate criticism, but also protect the initiators against legal backlash. In 
chapter 4, I suggest this way of playing upon two rule sets simultaneously as an 
instrumentalization of ambiguity. 
This explanation of how selective law enforcement works should be a more than viable 
challenger to more simplistic façade theories built upon implicit or explicit notions of 
deceptions. If we interpret selective law enforcement as an attempt to make repression look 
apolitical, this will impute an incredible clumsiness to the actions of Russian authorities and 
law enforcement officials, who are often generously providing hints of the ulterior motives. 
Façade interpretations have considerable problems in explaining the rather overt political 
motives that we can see in many of the cases and in explaining the double-speak in informal 
conversations. In other words, façade interpretations never really get much further than to 
explain one aspect of double-speak, namely the official denials of political interventions – in 
other words “speak” pure and simple. 
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My conceptualization of selective law enforcement tentatively unties the knot of the double-
speak. I have recapped how the instrumentalized ambiguity serves as a possibility for the 
political leaders to deny the political motives and the repressive character of the prosecution. 
At the same time, my conceptualization utilizes deterrence theory, a relatively uncontroversial 
aspect of rule enforcement. Deterrence theory predicates a promulgation of the rules enforced 
and thus explains the need to double-communicate the political content of the cases. 
Considering the communicative aspects of rule enforcement, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that the smoking gun may in fact have been purposefully being left on the scene. Again, this 
explanation provides a good fit with what we can see on the ground; how the cases are so 
easily recognizable as political, how the concerned targets’ perceive the motives behind the 
acts, and how they react to them. 
While my concept of selective law enforcement implies a conscious selection (or at least the 
perception of one), it leaves open the question to what degree selective law enforcement is an 
outcome of contemplated regime design. The research finds indications that selective law 
enforcement is not the result of a coordinated campaign to suppress all the challengers of the 
regime. At the same time, I have explored the functionality of indirectly managing the use of 
the mechanism by means of aligning incentives and centralizing access.  
Part of the reason as to why regime insiders can simply point to formal rules when they 
prosecute critics through selective law enforcement lies with the outlook of the utilized rules. 
As I have argued, many provisions used in selective law enforcement have been subjected to 
heavy criticism for how they open up a possibility to punish more or less anyone for some 
violation or another. In chapter 6, I discussed this important element of how the self-perceived 
targets of selective law enforcement interpret their cases under the heading of “catch-all 
theory”. In the same chapter, I also discussed the plausibility of interpreting laws as legislated 
intentionally weak (in a Fullerian sense) to exploit their potential of distortion without 
abandoning the formal platform of law enforcement.  
If taken to the extreme, this form of governance is not based on legal rules as empowered by 
legislators. Rather it is dependent on the regime’s indirect control over the implementation of 
these weak rules. By means of controlling legal actors and centralizing access to them, a 
political regime may fill the legal vacuum left by weak laws in a more or less coherent and 
predictable fashion. In this way, the ruling elites carve out an informal channel for political 
exceptions within the state machinery. It seems that some of the requirements of this form of 
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social control are in place in Putinist Russia, but the evidence is at the moment too thin for 
further speculation about the intentionality on regime level. As noted towards the end of 
chapter 6, there are also reasons to question whether the rules are indeed as catch-all as some 
of the interviewees claim. 
The final chapter on legal dualism adds another layer of complexity to the system we now see 
the contours of. Substantial efforts to modernize Russia and initiate legal reform have 
coexisted with the ruling elites’ insistence on prerogatives to define exceptions to 
constitutional constraints. In this fashion, the political regime operates according to two 
conflicting rule sets without completely satisfying either. On this level, selective law 
enforcement is a solution to the contradictions inherent in the formal and informal rule sets. In 
contrast to many other authoritarian regimes, post-Communist Russia never formalized a 
separate channel for politically salient cases (like special courts), but deals with them in part 
by selective law enforcement. Under Putin the access to this channel has been centralized, and 
the gradual strengthening of semi-autonomous courts have made legal abuse easier to direct 
and structure in a fashion compatible with the interests of the incumbents. 
My concept of selective law enforcement as a mechanism to enforce informal rules makes the 
informal interests stand in a parasitic relation to the formal system. The parasitic notion is 
fitting because it illustrates how the informal interests not only exploit the formal system but 
also are entirely dependent upon it for survival. The practice of selective law enforcement, 
moreover, to some degree undermines the system it preys upon. Interestingly, the metaphor of 
the parasite fits equally well on the level of abstract institutional interactions as it fits the 
analysis on the level of the regime. 
 Selective law enforcement as a mechanism to enforce informal rules is a useful 
instrument for further research. 
The concept of selective law enforcement that I advance also has the benefit of being easy to 
(in)validate and expand on, even if it deals with rather non-transparent matters. This is of no 
small importance, as concepts serve to link empirical data with broader theories. As noted in 
the introductory chapter, we have been lacking a concept that facilitates the accumulation of 
knowledge about selective law enforcement and a concept that communicates this complex 
practice to the research community and other relevant actors. 
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Selective law enforcement is also more intuitive to non-Russians than more esoteric terms 
derived from Russian colloquial language. It is too early to make any explicit claims as to 
which parts of my study may be transferable to other cases and which may not, which 
elements of selective law enforcement are the result of particular Russian developments and 
which may also be expected elsewhere. It is fair to assume, however, that at least parts of the 
insight would be valid for other regimes and to other times.  
I have suggested through theory and illustrated through practical research how the concept 
may be disassembled and investigated in empirical cases. The many contact points with 
reality on the operational level of the concept serve to anchor the more theoretical analysis to 
real experiences and observable facts. This is of particular importance with regard to topics 
such as selective law enforcement, arguably prone to anecdotal evidence and speculation. 
That being said, my concept is certainly not immune to the non-transparency associated with 
repression in partly closed regimes. In this research project, I have left behind considerable 
blank spots for others to fill, some of which are only with difficulty accessible. In particular 
some of the informal criteria discussed in chapter 7 may with benefit be explored with 
different research designs. The most obvious weakness of the concept in this regard is how it 
hinges on the ulterior motives; the intentional selection. Because intentions are hard to 
examine directly, a certain restructuring of the concept may be advisable for some purposes. 
Some aspects of selective law enforcement would, for instance, be easier to explore from an 
outcome perspective (cf Shields 2010), temporarily setting the issue of intensions aside. 
In a short article, Morse and her colleagues (1996) observe a considerable gap between the 
need for good concepts in social science and the lack of criteria to identify these concepts. In 
an effort to mend this problem, they point to four basic “indices” to evaluate whether a 
concept is “mature” or in need of further development. A developed concept should (1) be 
well-defined; (2) have specified characteristics; (3) its preconditions and outcomes should be 
“described and demonstrated”; and (4), the boundaries of a well-developed concept should be 
clearly delineated (Morse et al 1996, 388-389).  
I dare say that I have contributed to improve the concept of selective law enforcement with 
regard to all four indices of maturity. I did spot conceptual borderlands, however, when 
analyzing claims to selective anti-extremism in the period. In this legal issue area, it seems, 
the formal and informal rules became so similar that the concept of selective law enforcement 
was not necessarily preferable. The legal concept of extremism and the undefined notion of 
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criticism both turned out so broad and diffuse that their difference at times could be regarded 
one of legal interpretation.92 Also with regard to outcomes of, and not least preconditions for, 
selective law enforcement, further research would be well-advised. Finally, as Gerring notes, 
a concept’s usefulness can at the end of the day only be evaluated in competition with other 
concepts that aspire to explain the same aspects of reality. To date, there have been few if any 
comparable attempts to explore the phenomenon in a structured fashion. In a horse race 
without competitors even a blind old mare can win. 
10.2 Institutionalization, not Immobility 
Another red line through my work concerns patterns and institutionalization. Rules become 
rules when their generalizations get entrenched and influence human conduct by their very 
capacity of being rules. A mechanism that has been institutionalized has independent weight 
and has an element of regularity that shapes actors’ expectations that makes the mechanism 
run more smoothly. The institutionalization of selective law enforcement makes legal actors 
aware that they should take informal agendas into account and makes them more willing to 
bend when powerful actors interfere and voice their preferences directly. That powerful 
individuals even consider this tool as a means to solve their problems is also a product of its 
institutionalization. Because law enforcers, targets of the practice, and society as a whole 
share roughly the same expectations of politicized justice, the institutionalization of the 
practice also lubricates the promulgation of informal rules. I have argued that the practice in 
its institutionalized form resembles what Beissinger (2002) called a “regime of repression,” a 
smoothly functioning system where repression has gradually become routine and operates in a 
more or less “automatic” fashion.  
Some core aspects of this system are intimately connected with legal culture and have 
arguably been in place through several political regimes. Russians have a mutual 
understanding that ordinary and exceptional cases are dealt with according to different logics. 
Because Russian citizens understand that political cases are exceptional, the rational-legal 
functions of the system as a whole are not seriously hurt. In addition, because they understand 
that the exceptional cases are political, the informal rules are effectively enforced. Selective 
                                                 
92 Which would of course not change its possibly extra-constitutional character. 
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law enforcement stabilizes the regime, at least in the short term, by enforcing the status quo 
and reproducing existing power relations. 
What we need to remember, however, is that while institutions are associated with regularity, 
stability and predictability, they do not imply stagnation or stalemate. On the one hand, the 
very definition of selective law enforcement as a rule enforcement mechanism implies that the 
rules need to be enforced. In other words, if the willingness or capability to employ force 
diminishes, so will selective law enforcement as a coercive tool. On the other hand, the 
longevity of the practice is also threatened from the “opposite side”. Tendencies in recent 
years indicate that some rules that were enforced by means of selective law enforcement are 
now beginning to become formalized.  
When I started to take interest in selective law enforcement in about 2008, Russian NGOs 
financed from abroad complained being harassed by means of an extra-ordinary high level of 
scrutiny with regard to all sorts of formal requirements, by means of frequent inspections, and 
by speculative claims of more serious violations. The informal criteria that triggered the legal 
acts, many NGOs then claimed, were not least the Western sources of finance. In 2012, 
however, the situation was changing as a separate legal category was established for these 
organizations, which were now required to register under the label of “foreign agents” 
(inostrannye agenty, see Federal Law 121-FZ of 20 June 2012). Similarly, when I started my 
research on selective law enforcement, gay parades were also suppressed by quasi-legal 
means. Gay parade participants knew they should never cross the street on red lights, for 
instance, because the Russian police had been known to use this infringement as a pretext to 
crack down on such events. Only a few years later, the parades are simply forbidden by law 
(Federal Law 135-FZ of 30 June 2013). 
The combination of strong statism and bureaucratic formalism on the one hand, and 
clientelistic politics and low trust in formal institutions on the other, create fertile grounds for 
selective law enforcement. Because these conditions so resistant to change, there are no 
reason to believe that the problem will disappear overnight. At the same time, the practice is 
contingent on a much more complex set of factors that are yet to be clearly indentified as 
necessary and sufficient conditions.  
Another screw has been tightened in the Putinist machinery since the 2011 elections. While 
cases of selective law enforcement continue to resurface, some anti-liberal policies that would 
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seem politically impossible to formalize a decade ago have now found legal form. We may 
expect that selective law enforcement will continue to evolve, yet we need more research on 
its preconditions to predicate how. While legal abuse was rife in the 1990s, and while quasi-
legal rule was prominent also under the Soviet regime, selective law enforcement became a 
symbol of Putinism. A new standard was set with the prosecution of several oligarchs in 
Putin’s first term of presidency, and later selective law enforcement became a tool against less 
distinguished targets. It ran parallel to and partly overlapped with the fight between protestors 
and police on the streets that followed the growth of a protest movement after the so-called 
colored revolutions (Robertson, 2011, Horvath, 2013). By means of selective law 
enforcement, the authorities could touch spots that neither the contemporary legislation nor 
batons could reach. Not only street protesters, but also journalists, bloggers, editors, human 
rights organizations, ecologists, and other critics fell victim to the practice. 
In a stage of siege, imagined or real, the regime spent large amounts of resources on this form 
of censorship. Not only were alternative views and oppositional voices restrained, but also 
information on what crimes had been committed by individuals within the incumbent regime. 
On a broader scale, the impact of this repression is hard to measure; the number of opinions 
that were never publicly voiced is literally speaking uncountable. 
Assertions of non-involvement in legal affairs in Russia have become a ritual few believe in. 
In the words of the human rights veteran Sergei Kovalev (in Myagkov et al. 2009, 9): 
“Everybody knows everything. The very lie no longer aspires to deceive anyone, from being a 
means of fooling people it has for some reason turned into an everyday way of life, a 
customary and obligatory rule for living.” We recall from the first chapter (section 1.3.5) how 
scholars invoked such metaphors as fig leaves, theaters or Potemkin villages to describe 
Russian formal institutions. From the perspective of my research, the metaphor of the theatre 
may accurately describe selective law enforcement after all: both actors and audience 
understand that what is shown on stage is merely a play. The same may also be said of the 
Potemkin democracy. Contrary to popular myth, the Russian 18th century statesman never 
pretended that his decorations were anything but ornamentation (Panchenko, 1999). 
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List of Interviewees 
(Only interviewees explicitly referred to are listed) 
 
ANONYMIZED.  2010 (anon.) 
activist 
ANONYMIZED.   2010 (anon.)  
journalist 
ANONYMIZED.   2011 (anon.) 
political party United Russia and regional Central Election Committee 
ANONYMIZED.   2008 (anon.)   
NGO leader  
ANONYMIZED.   2011 (anon.) 
political advisor 
ANONYMIZED.  2013 (anon.)   
 NGO GOLOS   
ANONYMIZED.   2011 (anon.)   
activist     
AVERKEIV, Igor.   15.11.2011 (Perm)  
activist 
BELOBORODOV, Vyacheslav.   13.11.2011 (Perm) 
 political scientist        
BUNDINA, Lyudmila.  05.09.2011 (Vladimir) 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
CHERKASOV, Yurii.  05.09.2011 (Vladimir) 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
CHIKOV, Pavel.  22.06.2010 (Moscow) 
NGO AGORA  
DENISOVA, Anastasia.  17.12.2010 (Moscow)93 
NGO Eth(n)ics           
DMITRIEVSKII, Stanislav.  16.12.2010 (Nizhniy Novgorod) 
NGO Tolerance Foundation 
ESHANU, Lyudmila.    05.09.2011 (Vladimir) 
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newspaper Vladimirskaya Gazeta and NGO GOLOS 
GARIFULLIN, Damir.  09.06.2011 (Sterlitamak) 
Yabloko  
GASKAROV, Aleksei.   02.06.2011 (Moscow)  
activist 
GIRIN, Nikita.   01.06.2011 (Moscow) 
Novaya Gazeta  
GODUNIN, Sergei.  06.09.2011 (Vladimir) 
political party Just Russia 
GUSAK, Nikolai.  10.06.2011 (Tuimazy)  
independent activist 
KARASTELEV, Vadim.  03.06.2011 (Moscow)  
NGO Novorossiysk Human Rights Committee 
KHRUNOVA, Irina.   13.12.2010 (Kazan) 
NGO Kazan Center of Human Rights 
KOTOVA, Lyudmila.   18.11.2010 (Samara) 
Volgainform News Agency  
KURT-ADZHIEV, Sergei.   18.11.2010 (Samara) 
newspaper Novaya Gazeta Samara ed. 
KUZMINA, Lyudmila.   19.11.2010 (Samara) 
NGO GOLOS  
LYUBAREV, Arkadii.  02.06.2011 (Moscow) 
NGO GOLOS 
MILOSLAVSKAYA, Daria.   16.11.2010 (Moscow) 
NGO International Centre for Not-for-profit Law  
NOVRUZOVA, Emilia.   16.12.2010 (Nizhniy Novgorod) 
newspaper Novaya Gazeta Nizhniy Novgorod ed.    
PODVINTSEV, Oleg.   13.11.2011 (Perm) 
political scientist 
PRUSENKOVA, Nadezhda.   22.06.2011 (Moscow) 
newspaper Novaya Gazeta  
SIMAK, Sergei.  22.11.2010 (Samara) 
NGO Socio-Ecological Union  
SITDIKOVA, Lesyan.  13.12.2010 (Kazan) 
wife of journalist Irek Murtazin 
SLAUTINA, Galina.   13.11.2011 (Perm) 
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political party Yabloko  
STARKOV, Andrei.   15.11.2011 (Perm) 
independent politician  
URAL, Khazmin.   08.06.2011 (Ufa) 
lawyer of journalist Robert Zagreev  
VERKHOVSKY, Alexander.  12.11.2010 (Moscow) 
NGO SOVA  
VISHNEVSKII, Boris.  26.08.2011(St. Petersburg) 
political party Yabloko and Newspaper Novaya Gazeta 
Selective Law Enforcement in Russian Politics 
~ 216 ~ 
 
Legal Documents 
CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (adopted by national referendum 12 December, 1993). 
CRIMINAL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION NO. 63-FZ OF JUNE 13, 1996. With additions and 
amendments as of March 1, 2012. Available in English translation at: 
http://legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/7, [accessed 01.10.2013] 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL 
FREEDOMS, as amended by Protocols nos. 11 and 14. Council of Europe. 
FEDERAL LAW NO. 42-FZ OF 9 APRIL 2007 "O vnesenii izmenenii v stat'i 146 i 180 Ugolovnogo kodeksa 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii". 
FEDERAL LAW NO. 78-FZ OF 29 DECEMBER 1994 ”O bibliotechnom dele”. 
FEDERAL LAW NO. 67-FZ OF 12 JUNE 2002 "Ob osnovnykh garatiyakh izbiratel'nykh prav i prava na 
uchastie v referendume grazhdan rossiiskoi federatsii". 
FEDERAL LAW NO. 114-FZ OF 25 JULY 2002 "O protivodeistvii ekstremistskoi deyatel'nosti". 
FEDERAL LAW NO. 148-FZ OF 27 JULY 2006 "O vnesenii izmenenii v stat'i 1 i 15 Federal'nogo zakona 'O 
protivodeistvii rkstremistskoi deyatel'nosti". 
FEDERAL LAW NO. 211-FZ OF 24 JULY 2007 "O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel'nye zakonodatel'nye akty 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii v svyazi i sovershenstvovaniem gosudarstvennogo upravleniya v oblasti 
protivodeistviya ekstremizmu". 
FEDERAL LAW NO. 121-FZ OF 20 JUNE 2012 "O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel'nye zakonodatel'nye akty 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii v chasti regulirovaniya deyatel'nosti nekommercheskikh organizatsii, 
vypolnyayushchikh funktsii inostannogo agenta".  
FEDERAL LAW NO. 135-FZ OF 30 JUNE 2013 "O vnesenii izmenenii v stat'yu 5 Federal'nogo zakona 'o 
zashchite detei ot informatsii, prichinyayushchei vred ikh zdorov'yu i razvitiyu' i otdel'nye 
zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii v tselyakh zashchity detei ot informatsii, 
propagandiruyushchei otritsanie traditsionnykh semeinykh tsennostei". 
PERM KRAI LAW NO. 766-PK OF 21 APRIL 2011 2011 "O vyborakh deputatov zakonodatel'nogo sobraniya 
permskogo kraya". 
SUPREME COURT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 2010 Postanovlenie plenuma Verkhovnogo suda 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii No16 ot 15.06.2010. O Praktike primeneniya sudami Zakona Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
"O sredstvakh massovoi infromatsii". 
SUPREME COURT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 2011. Postanovlenie plenuma Verkhovnogo suda 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No11 ot 28.06.2011. O sudebnoi praktike po ugolovnym delam o prestupleniyakh 
ekstremistskoi napravlennosti. 
SVERDLOVSK DISTRICT COURT IN PERM, 2011. Delo No. 2 -2696/2011 goda. O priznanii nezakonnym 
resheniya territorial'noi izbiratelnoi kommissii, 14.02.2011. 
VLADIMIR OBLAST' LAW NO. 10-OZ OF 29 JANUARY 2003 2003. "Izbitatel'nyi kodeks Vladimirskoi 
oblasti". 
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